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PACIFIC STUDIES

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“THE NEW HEBRIDEAN IS EVERYWHERE”: THE OCEANIAN LABOR TRADE TO NEW CALEDONIA, 1865–1930

Dorothy Shineberg
Australian National University

Although the Oceanian labor trade has been fairly intensively studied since the Second World War, the New Caledonian sector of it has been neglected, apparently because of the dearth of systematic official records dealing with the subject. But by piecing together fragments from a variety of sources I have been able to trace its basic features. From 1865 to 1930, about fourteen thousand indentured laborers were imported into the French colony from other Pacific islands, overwhelmingly from the then New Hebrides (Vanuatu), but also from the Solomon Islands, with a few from the Gilberts (Kiribati). Although, as elsewhere, young men in the prime of life were the preferred recruits, about 10 percent of the laborers were women, and many young children were also indentured. Some recruits were kidnaped, some volunteered for a variety of reasons, and some left their home islands in response to local constraints. The recruits to New Caledonia worked in a greater variety of occupations than those who went to other places. Conditions of labor were harsh and state supervision was slack. The death rate among workers was very high. Indentured laborers were entitled, under certain conditions, to reside in the colony after eight years of continuous service, and many did. What happened to those who stayed and those who returned to their homeland remains to be studied.

FROM THE 1860s until the early twentieth century, many thousands of Oceanians were shipped from their homes to work as indentured laborers for Europeans, generally for an initial period of three to five years. Most of them were taken to the British colony of Queensland in Australia, but significant numbers also went to Fiji, Hawai'i, Tahiti, Western Samoa, and New Caledonia. This traffic, known as the Pacific Island or Oceanian labor trade, aroused immense controversy during its lifetime, a debate driven largely by a humanitarian concern that it was a disguised renewal of the slave trade.

Only since the Second World War has the movement received scholarly attention from historians,¹ and, with notable exceptions, it remains largely ignored by anthropologists.²

Research interest has naturally tended to center on the larger movements to Queensland and Fiji, although interesting small studies have appeared on Hawai'i and Samoa. Yet to account for the fact that—at last count³—240 works have appeared on the Queensland episode, while almost no study at all has been devoted to a similar movement to the French territories, requires more explanation than the greater size of the former. After having been engaged for more than ten years in a study of the Oceanian labor trade to New Caledonia, I am no longer mystified by the discrepancy. The subject is much more difficult to research. Accessible Immigration Department files and official registers that exist in Fiji and Queensland listing the name, estimated age, place of origin, and other details of the imported Oceanians have no counterpart in New Caledonia. Although such records must at some time have existed, they do not appear in the archives either in France or in the territory, except for occasional years or as estimates in official reports.⁴ It was necessary to reconstruct the basic data, adding the numbers of arrivals and departures from reports in the shipping columns of local newspapers over the whole period,⁵ searching references in court records and official correspondence, scanning the acts of the *état civil* (Register of Births, Marriages, and Deaths) for foreign Oceanians whose origin, estimated age, (less often) registration number, and (rarely) date of arrival and ship might be given.⁶ This arduous process had to be completed before I could establish the volume and time frame of the trade and begin the normal process of research and interpretation.⁷ Within the scope of this article, I outline some of my conclusions regarding the length and volume of the trade and remark on the age, gender, and origin of the workers with a brief reference to their employment and the conditions under which they were recruited and worked.

The Labor Trade

The systematic importation of Oceanian labor into New Caledonia began in 1865, roughly the same time as the movements to Queensland and Fiji, but it was to outlast both of these. Although the trade peaked between 1874 and 1894, a modest but steady intake continued throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, with dwindling numbers arriving up to the onset of the Great Depression of 1929–1931. There were officially two interruptions in the flow—a suspension of nearly two years between June 1882 and February 1884, and a longer ban of five years between March 1885 and March

1890—but in fact Oceanian labor continued to arrive during the second suspension regardless of the formal prohibition.⁸

No fewer than fourteen thousand Oceanians arrived to work in New Caledonia in the period between 1865 and 1925; twelve thousand of them came before the end of the nineteenth century.⁹ These workers were often known to the whites by the generic term of “New Hebrideans” (*néo-hébridais*) or simply “Hebrideans,” and indeed, more than 90 percent of them came from the then New Hebrides, Banks, and Torres Islands, which now form the state of Vanuatu, only a few days’ sail from New Caledonia. The total includes about a thousand, however, from the Solomon Islands and probably fewer than a hundred from the Gilbert Islands (Kiribati).¹⁰ To encompass all these people and to distinguish them from the indigenous Melanesians, one would have to use a lengthy rubric. I will continue to use the term “New Hebrideans” for this class of migrant worker for the sake of convenience, but it has to be understood to include those from the other islands mentioned above.

The number of so-called Hebrideans present at any one time is extremely difficult to calculate exactly, given their comings and goings and a high death rate among them. In the peak years there were probably close to three thousand at one time, and between the years 1874 and 1894 the figure hardly ever fell below two thousand present each year.¹¹ As an official report said in 1883, “The New Hebridean is everywhere and few houses are without them.”¹² The figure of the Hebridean was a familiar one in the landscape of nineteenth-century New Caledonia: no traveler’s tale was complete without a reference—usually jocular—to the “labor boys” who carried their boxes, rowed them ashore, disported themselves on the Place des Cocotiers on Sundays, or whom they observed working on the plantations and at the mines.¹³ So it is quite remarkable how this most visible character of the period has now been forgotten in the territory itself, perhaps overshadowed by a later large influx of Asian workers.¹⁴ And, with the notable exception of Pierre Gascher,¹⁵ who gave a useful outline of the employment of imported Oceanians until 1894, modern Pacific historians give them but a passing mention, if any at all.¹⁶

Nevertheless, these workers formed the backbone of the labor force in the development of the French colony in the nineteenth century. In 1901, they still outnumbered the combined total of Asian *engagés*, and by then numbers more of them would also have been working in New Caledonia without contracts, having completed the requisite eight years of engagement before being entitled to become “free residents.” They were, however, themselves outnumbered in the same year by indentured local Kanaks, most of them Loyalty Islanders,¹⁷ whom the government finally succeeded in

recruiting through the progressive imposition through the 1890s of a head tax, forcing them to earn cash. Their history also remains to be written.

Profile of the Recruits

The earliest imported Oceanians came from the southern islands of the New Hebrides that were already familiar to the sandalwood traders, and it was a former sandalwood trader, Andrew Henry, who brought the first convoys under government contract.¹⁸ But in the 1870s the labor trade had shifted to the northern islands of the group and to the Banks and Torres Islands; the bulk of the recruits thereafter came from these islands. There were several recruiting voyages to the Solomon Islands before 1890—one as early as 1870 that was certainly a kidnaping affair—and a couple to the Gilbert Islands. After 1890 the Solomon Islands was fairly regularly visited, even after it became a British colony in 1893, but the group was finally closed to external recruiting at the end of 1911.¹⁹ A more unlikely source of labor was developed between 1892 and 1912—a return to the southern New Hebridean island of Tanna, which had been more or less off the recruiters' list since the beginning of the 1880s. Yet as late as 1912 more than a hundred Tannese were recruited for work in New Caledonia,²⁰ something that requires explanation.

A young man in his prime, about eighteen to twenty-four years of age, was the worker considered most desirable by recruiters on behalf of employers. But because there were no restrictions on the ways in which New Hebrideans were employed, as there were, for example, in Queensland, women and children were also sought for what was considered appropriate work. Women were sought for domestic service and field work—often a combination of both—and also, it seems, worked in the mines, as indeed French women were still doing. In a colonial society with more than the usual preponderance of unattached males, female workers were without a doubt also sought as concubines. An indentured domestic in the household of a single man often became his bedmate, and female workers were used to attract and keep overseers or valued male *engagés*.²¹ Some women enlisted with a husband or partner in the first place and worked as a ménage. Women were difficult to recruit, mainly because the menfolk in their homeland were usually unwilling to let them go. Many of them, indeed, were runaways (a fascinating story in itself that, unfortunately, would take too much space to elaborate here). Although they were recruited more freely in some periods and from some islands than others, overall women formed probably no more than 10 percent of the total number of recruits.

An unusual feature of the trade was the high proportion of very young recruits. For the first fifteen years of the labor trade to New Caledonia, the minimum legal age for recruits was fixed at six years (their age always being an estimate).²² At the end of 1880, a commission of inquiry recommended that the minimum age be increased by two years.²³ Government agents' instructions appear to have been amended accordingly by 1884, when recruiting was resumed after the first suspension, but no new requirement appeared in the regulations until the decree of 1893,²⁴ in which a provision forbade the recruiting of children of less than 110 centimeters in height, later reckoned at about nine years of age; by 1904 the minimum age for an unaccompanied recruit was still only ten years, or a height of 114 centimeters.²⁵ To Rear Admiral Amédée Courbet, governor of New Caledonia (1880–1882), "one of the saddest aspects of this kind of operation" was the large number of child workers imported; he quoted as an example the first two convoys of 1882, of which nearly 40 percent were children under sixteen.²⁶ The proportion was probably even higher in the 1870s.²⁷

Why were so many children recruited when the ideal choice was someone in the prime of life? Part of the answer was an extraordinary provision in the labor regulations that allowed children to be indentured not for three to five years, like the other recruits, but until the attainment of their majority,²⁸ which meant that they might be kept for ten years or even longer. A loophole like that was bound to be exploited. Although children made quite useful workers, they became more valuable as they grew older and stronger, and could even be traded off for a profit. In addition, it was said, not only were children easier to entice or to kidnap,²⁹ but also their relatives were sometimes willing to exchange them for coveted trade goods.³⁰

Children were employed at the nickel mines, sorting nickel at the mine face, and in the fields, doing odd jobs such as chasing grasshoppers on the sugar plantations at Dumbea, but the most common employment for young children was as house servants, particularly nursemaids. Several settlers commented with surprise on how well they kept the house in order and especially on how well they cared for infants, "better than do most nursemaids in France," as one said.³¹

Recruitment Practices

The French labor trade, like the British trade, was never entirely free from kidnaping. The use of force and fraud in recruiting, however, was proportionally greater in the former, not because the French were less humane than the British—indeed many of their recruiters were in fact British—but because the French policing of recruiting was much inferior to the British.

There were no government agents on French recruiting ships until 1875—five years after British recruiters were compelled to carry them—and little supervision of these until the French navy began to patrol the New Hebrides under the Joint Naval Commission of 1887, whereas the British trade had been policed by the Royal Navy since 1872. Even after 1887 there was usually only one French naval vessel in these waters compared with several British ships,³² and the French commanders had powers inferior to their British counterparts, as they continually complained.³³ Widespread abuses eventually received official attention in 1880, when a commission of inquiry—sparked by complaints from the British consul—revealed that nearly all the labor voyages out of Noumea in that year had engaged in kidnaping.³⁴ The revelations became the overt reason for the first suspension of labor recruiting in the islands in 1882.³⁵ In spite of stricter control when recruiting resumed, there were complaints of kidnaping as late as 1911.³⁶

After the labor trade to New Caledonia became familiar to islanders, however, most recruits were obtained without the use of force on the part of the European crews, just as they were in the British sector of the trade. New Hebrideans were often waiting on the beach or even sometimes swam out to the ship in order to sign on. Why were they ready to leave their homeland for years of hard work in a foreign country? The question has been too often raised in relation to the motivation of individual recruits;³⁷ while this is appropriate in the case of runaways, who left without community consent, normally islanders young enough to be interesting to recruiters would not take a decision to leave the country on their own account. When recruits were waiting on the beach to sign on, the question would already have been much discussed by the senior men in the community; they would have decided among themselves how many young men or boys, if any, they could spare to offer to the next labor ship and precisely who they would be, just as in later days it was discussed and decided who would go away to earn the tax money that was levied on the community. The desires of the young men in question might be a factor in the decision, but so also might the obligations of one family to another: there were reciprocal obligations to fulfill that were a form of debt, and the “creditors” had a strong hold over those under obligation to them.

One has to ask why parents or local community leaders were prepared to offer recruits. As elsewhere, the chief reason was the prospect of wealth in the form of desired trade goods: there was the immediate payment on the beach to the kin supposed to have authority over the recruit and the goods brought back to the island by the workers, representing their earnings over their term of labor. So far as the beach payment was concerned, special temptation existed when it became a Snider rifle for an adult male recruit,

as it did in the New Caledonian trade, especially after 1884, when such a payment was forbidden to the British trade, giving the French colony a competitive edge. The desire for Snider rifles seems to be the reason for the renewed interest in recruiting for the labor trade in Tanna, in the 1890s, mentioned above: during this period, there was frequent warfare in Tanna, and firearms were at a premium.³⁸ Other highly valued goods might put pressure on a community to offer recruits, but sometimes the item sought was traditional; in the northern New Hebrides pigs were necessary for traditional rank-taking ceremonies, and in 1885 the recruiter of one ship, the *Marie*, was promised recruits if he would bring four boars from another island.³⁹ Sometimes communities were forced to offer recruits as a result of natural disasters. Many of the Pacific islands are frequently subject to them: floods, droughts, and above all cyclones can wipe out the year's food supply so that people are starving. In such a situation recruiters expected and got a windfall of "volunteers" recruiting simply in order to stay alive.⁴⁰

In the case of runaways who left without the consent of their community, the reasons—insofar as European observers could determine them—were individual and varied greatly: the lure of adventure, escape from a difficult situation at home, the hope of improving status, or simply because one's friends had decided to go—the sorts of reasons that sometimes motivate people to join the army.

Employment of Recruits

The employment of the New Hebrideans was much more varied than in Queensland and Fiji. In the earliest days of colonization (and even before) there had been New Hebrideans working in New Caledonia in the sandalwood and bêche-de-mer trades,⁴¹ and in the 1850s on a property in Mont Dore.⁴² But when Governor Charles Guillain (1861–1870) decided in 1865 to import them on a large scale, it was partly to answer the needs of the administration. Already in difficulties trying to raise sufficient labor for the most basic of public works, the administration had a desperate need for its own supply of cheap labor when shiploads of convicts began arriving in 1864: buildings had to be erected, the convicts had to be housed, fed, guarded, and rowed to the mainland from the island chosen as their quarters, Ile Nou. The administration did not have enough control over the indigenous Melanesian population to exact a continuous labor supply from this source and was not to have for many years to come. Only short-term *corvées* from nearby tribes were possible.⁴³

As well, Guillain was strongly in favor of the development of the country by private settlers, in the usual forlorn hope of colonizers that private devel-

opment would eventually meet the cost of public expenditure on administration. He was therefore bound to help such settlers procure a supply of cheap labor. He had actively encouraged the emigration of a group of planters from Réunion to develop the sugarcane industry in New Caledonia. The first cohort of Réunionnais had arrived in 1864; they had imported their own Indian laborers, but found them insufficient to work their large plantations. Under the aegis of Guillaín, coffee plantations, cattle runs, and other agricultural enterprises were also set up in these early, hopeful days, and all demanded cheap, servile labor in order to compete on world markets.

The earliest convoys of New Hebrideans therefore went mainly to the administration or to agricultural enterprises. For the government they worked as convict guards, boat's crew for the penal administration and the Port Authority, ship hands on the coastal shipping service, which was virtually the sole means of communicating with the interior, and at the government workshop.⁴⁴ Later they worked in the telegraph service. Private settlers employed them as field hands on sugar and coffee plantations and cattle runs, and as barge crew for river transport of their produce, while they also were used as crew on private trading or fishing vessels.

Although it was not part of Governor Guillaín's plan, they were also engaged from the very beginning as house servants, in Noumea and also in the bush. And in spite of the stated intention of using them to develop the agricultural potential of the interior, other kinds of urban employment absorbed a large number of these workers throughout the period: as laborers on the wharves, carrying loads to stores, in the stores themselves, and as laborers, waiters, and rouseabouts in hotels and bars—always a much larger industry than in the British colonies.⁴⁵

From 1873 there was a change in the pattern of the use of their labor as a result of the beginning of mining. As the British colonial secretary pointed out in April 1874, the mine owners "had already channelled such an inexpensive labor force on to their mines."⁴⁶ The development of mining also led to a large upsurge in the numbers recruited in the islands from 1873 on and increased competition for labor, causing a rise in the so-called passage money, the price of hiring a contracted laborer, over the decade 1874–1884. As a result, smaller employers were increasingly hard-pressed to maintain or renew their supply of labor, and some indeed considered that they had paid enough when they paid the inflated passage money, and simply did not and at times could not pay wages to the workers.⁴⁷

Workers destined for the mines were sent on by sea first to the "Fern Hill" gold mine, then to the copper mine in the Diahot region near Ouégoa in the northeast, then to the first nickel mines in Thio, Canala, Kouaoua, and Houailou in the southeast and south to Mont Dore, to Walpole Island

and the Chesterfield Islands to dig phosphate, and later to the mines of the northwest.⁴⁸ Gangs of laborers did the heavy work of clearing the site, excavating, and making the road or tram track for the transport of the mineral to the coast. Once the mine was in operation, New Hebridean laborers were at first used to dig the ore, but as death from “chest complaints” claimed an alarming number of them, the tendency throughout the 1880s was to employ them only at surface works. At the surface they sorted the ore and put it into sacks—work that was often done by quite young boys—and loaded the sacks onto wagons that others either pushed or pulled along a tramway to the wharf.⁴⁹

But Noumea was also in competition for labor in this period, for after 1872 it had to cope with a large influx of exiled Communards, the so-called *déportés*. The administration, on a reduced budget since the disasters of the Franco-Prussian war and the Paris Commune uprising, was under pressure to house and service this influx; shopkeepers and bartenders in Noumea experienced an expansion of business, only exceeded by the arrival of French troops brought in to quell the rebellion in 1878. All these developments caused a rise in the demand for cheap New Hebridean labor.

In spite of the impression given in contemporary literature that most of the New Hebrideans were employed in mining, this was never the case. The impression probably came about because they were more visible in mining, being employed in large gangs, and also because of the publicity surrounding the high death rate at mining sites. But at the high point of their employment in mining, at the end of 1882, only a little more than a quarter were working at the mines, as against about a third at “stations in the bush,” and more than 40 percent were employed in Noumea or in local and coastal shipping.⁵⁰

The pattern of employment was once again changed for a few years in 1885, when a severe depression in the mining industry closed most of the mines. Surviving mine workers who were not repatriated were probably diverted to other occupations, particularly to burgeoning coffee plantations and to domestic service.⁵¹ But in the mining revival of the late eighties, a period when the labor trade was officially banned, so-called free New Hebridean labor—totally unregulated and uncontracted—was going to the mines, to Le Nickel at Thio, to the Méré mine near Houailou, to new mines in the north near Pam, and to the phosphate diggings in the Chesterfield Islands.⁵² During other periods of depression in mining, from 1892 to 1895 and from 1903 to 1906, there was again a diversion of New Hebridean labor to other occupations, but in 1912 mining still employed more than 20 percent of indentured New Hebridean labor (although there were only some seven hundred New Hebrideans in the colony by that time, of whom 125

were “free residents,”⁵³ who would not have elected to work in mining, the most hated of occupations).

Whenever the New Caledonian community argued for help in introducing cheap Oceanian labor or petitioned the government against the suspension of the labor trade, it always argued that agriculture and mining would be ruined without this form of labor. It very rarely referred to other uses of New Hebridean labor, which, although considerable, would have been less persuasive in the context of economic development. I refer to labor in shops, stores, hotels and bars, and above all as domestic servants in private homes. Domestic service had always been the most constant if not the largest employer of imported Oceanians. Mines closed down, farms and businesses went bankrupt, but the demand for personal servants never wavered, in town or country. Over the whole period, cooks, nursemaids, and houseworkers were always wanted by public servants as well as private settlers. In the bush there was often no clear distinction drawn between field and domestic duties; it depended on the needs of the employer, and no doubt all hands were in the fields at harvest time. By the 1920s, however, nearly all New Hebrideans, whether indentured or “free residents,” worked in Noumea, either in domestic service in private homes, bars, and restaurants, or as dock and store laborers.⁵⁴

Labor Conditions

The New Hebridean indentured laborers worked long hours, from dawn to dusk, with breaks for meals, but so did European workers in the same period. In the matter of food, shelter, and clothing, minimum standards were laid down by regulation, but as on-site inspections were rare, the daily conditions of workers depended almost entirely on what their employers considered appropriate. One has to assume that in their own long-term interest most employers provided adequately for the needs of their workers, but there were quite large employers who consistently underfed their workers.⁵⁵ Although this news spread to the New Hebrides and was given as a reason for not recruiting for “Noumea,”⁵⁶ the lack of effective control in New Caledonia itself meant that such behavior continued. The same can be said in the matter of clothing: there are several references to the failure of certain employers to provide sufficient clothing to cope with a much cooler climate than New Hebrideans and Solomon Islanders were accustomed to, especially in the early mornings and evenings of the winter months and particularly in the mountains,⁵⁷ but I have yet to come across a prosecution for this fault.

As is usual under a system of indentured labor, there were penal sanc-

tions enforcing the labor contract. For absence from work, refusal to work, insubordination, and a number of other disciplinary infractions, workers could be sent to an *atelier de discipline*, on the recommendation of their employer, for from eight to sixty days.⁵⁸ This procedure had obvious disadvantages for employers, especially those in the bush, and some resorted to their own more direct methods of discipline—fines and corporal punishment. So far as physical abuse is concerned, Governor Courbet was probably right when he said that cases of real cruelty were unlikely to exist in the capital, where the employer was under the eye of the authorities, but that there had been several bad cases in the interior, where the master believed he was a law unto himself.⁵⁹ However, the governor might have added that it also seemed to be normal for overseers on plantations to carry a whip or a stick, and in one court case an employer accused of cruelty to New Hebridean workers argued, without being contradicted, that the commissioner for immigration himself kept a whip behind the door and used it on recalcitrant “*canaques*” they brought to him.⁶⁰ Cases of bad physical abuse did come before the courts, but where offenders were convicted they generally received only derisory fines and were not prohibited from continuing to employ servile labor.⁶¹ Courbet was also correct in his belief that most employers freely dispensed minor corporal punishments and that slaps, blows, kicks, and pushes were generally considered quite normal means of emphasizing a point to colored workers, as they were in most places where unfree labor was used:⁶² “*c’est déjà trop*,” wrote an official in the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies in the margin against Courbet’s remark, admonishing the governor for treating this as of little account.⁶³

Clearly, the conditions of workers varied enormously in the colony. Large firms, perhaps more conscious of their long-term interests, tended to adhere to the regulations. Many small employers also treated their workers well: some even became attached to their “boys.” However, the failure of the administration to control cases of ill-treatment impaired the reputation of New Caledonia as a recruiting destination.

One form of abuse that New Hebrideans were not prepared to forgive was the failure to pay wages.⁶⁴ In brief, there is abundant evidence that many employers considered that, once they had paid the passage money or, in the common parlance, “bought” the laborer, they had paid enough: he or she was theirs for three, four, or five years. In theory, wages were paid every three months before the *syndic*, who in the bush was usually the gendarme; but this provision was rarely observed. Some employers would give advances to workers when needed and pay only at the end of the term. Others evaded payment altogether. As well, the arbitrary infliction of fines for alleged infractions sometimes entirely swallowed up a worker’s wages. The Mobile

Inspection of 1907 found that nonpayment of contracted workers, Asian as well as New Hebridean, was widespread.⁶⁵

Migrant workers were prepared to put up with a good deal of hardship for the sake of the small payment that accumulated and was eventually turned into a box full of trade goods to take home at the end of their term. To come home empty-handed was a shameful thing and a source of hostility on the part of their community. The failure of the administration to enforce the regulations in this respect was seen by people such as French naval commanders and the Mobile Inspection from France as a serious obstacle to recruiting.⁶⁶

Life and Death in the Colony

Even if well treated, the recruit had a harsh and difficult life in the colony. He was not used to regular hours of hard work, he had to mix with workers from other islands, equally strange to him as New Caledonia itself, he did not know the language of his master or of the other workers and had to acquire *bislamar* or impoverished French. Above all, he was separated from his kin. It was little wonder that in his free time he often turned to alcohol to forget his miseries. The abuse of alcohol only brought him impoverishment and ill health. The liquor he consumed was almost invariably of very inferior quality, but its purchase consumed much of his meager earnings; above all, drunkenness led to fights, to arrest, and to prison or fines or both.⁶⁷

The abuse of alcohol increased the already serious health risks of this population, who died at a rate several times greater than that of the white population. Consumption and dysentery were chiefly blamed for the alarming mortality, but, as these workers lived in close proximity and often in insanitary conditions, they were also the first and greatest casualties of an epidemic illness. Unaccustomed heavy work and poor nutrition—for even where the diet met the regulations, its staple food was often quantities of white rice⁶⁸—no doubt lowered their resistance. Courbet estimated the death rate among them at 5 percent (or 50 per thousand) per annum for the years 1879–1882, which, as he observed, were years *free* of epidemics. He was shocked at this figure—“*un chiffre énorme*,” he said. But it was in fact far greater than he thought, for the figures he used were from the “trusteeship of unclaimed estates” (*curatelle aux successions et biens vacants*), which listed deceased indentured laborers (among others) who died intestate with possessions or money. The number of these was inferior to the number recorded in the *état civil*, which itself was a minimum figure, since far from all New Hebridean deaths were registered.⁶⁹ For 1881, for example, Cour-

bet estimated 120 deaths (30 per quarter), using the *curatelle* lists, but even the number of deaths recorded in the *état civil* for that year is 151, or about 62 per thousand.⁷⁰ This was a peak year in the mining industry, where the death rate was acknowledged to be excessive.⁷¹ But the figure of 50 per thousand that so shocked Governor Courbet was often surpassed in other years also, particularly after a year of heavy intake of recruits, for, just as Ralph Shlomowitz has found for Queensland and Fiji, the indentured laborers were at greatest risk in their first year of service.⁷² In the year of the measles epidemic, 1875, the figure was at least 124 per thousand. In the plague years of 1899, 1906, and 1912, it was again over 50, and it indeed appears to have been between 30 and 40 even in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when there would have been very few agglomerations of workers. In addition, the morbidity rate was very high, and there were many complaints of workers being repatriated on the point of death, including one from the British district agent in Tanna, who had compiled a record of local people who died soon after repatriation.⁷³

Although it is unlikely that the New Hebrideans made a large demographic impact on the population of New Caledonia, they left some descendants. Many of the women had progeny during their time in the colony:⁷⁴ some of these may have returned with them to their homeland, but many stayed. Of the children from the numerous liaisons with white men, some were recognized by their fathers and brought up in the white community, and there were even a couple of legal marriages; other children of such unions were brought up by their mothers in the colony. There were also children born not only to male and female New Hebridean workers, but also to male New Hebrideans and local Kanak women, and local Kanak men and New Hebridean women.⁷⁵ I would assume that most in the last two categories were assimilated into tribal life,⁷⁶ but I have come across one enterprising Solomon Islander who took his Kanak wife back with him to the Solomon Islands. When last heard of, he had established a coffee plantation there, using the skills he had acquired in New Caledonia, and the couple were living together in prosperity.⁷⁷

Unfortunately, I can say very little about what happened to those who survived their term and returned in triumph to their homeland with their box of goods. I suspect it would take another ten years to find out, using the techniques of oral history; it seems a promising research project for a ni-Vanuatu student. What is certain is that New Caledonia owes a lot of its early development to the contribution of the New Hebrideans and Solomon Islanders who came to work here during that period. They have done so since under much happier conditions.

NOTES

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for suggestions that improved this article.

1. The first scholarly work on the subject was O. W. Parnaby, *Britain and the Labor Trade in the Southwest Pacific* (Durham, N.C., 1964); ground-breaking work was done by Deryck Scarr in *Fragments of Empire* (Canberra, 1967), and Peter Corris, *Passage, Port and Plantation* (Melbourne, 1973). K. E. Saunders, *Workers in Bondage* (St. Lucia, Qld., 1982), and C. R. Moore, *Kanaka: A History of Melanesian Mackay* (Port Moresby, 1985) deal with the life of the indentured laborer in Queensland. Numerous studies of various aspects of the traffic have appeared in articles, theses, and book chapters. A useful overview is Clive Moore, Jacqueline Leckie, and Doug Munro, eds., *Labour in the South Pacific* (Townsville, Qld., 1990).

2. One of the exceptions, Michel Panoff, in 1979 made a (largely unsuccessful) plea to anthropologists to pay more attention to this subject, which had had deep repercussions on the society that was the subject of their study, in "Travailleurs, recruteurs et planteurs dans l'Archipel Bismarck de 1885 à 1914," *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 35, no. 64 (1979): 172.

3. By Clive Moore, in "Revising the Revisionists: The Historiography of Immigrant Melanesians in Australia," *Pacific Studies* 15, no. 2 (June 1992): 61.

4. I have systematically searched the Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer (hereafter ANSOM) in Paris and the Archives Territoriales in Noumea. The records of the Immigration Department in Noumea contain files dealing with Asian immigrant labor but not New Hebridean; possibly the latter were assimilated into the records of the Department of Native Affairs, most of whose records have not so far turned up in any public repository.

5. The shipping reports in the newspapers were the major source for an estimate of the volume of the trade. I searched the official paper *Le Moniteur de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (hereafter *Moniteur*) from its inception (1859) for shipping movements, cargo, and passengers; later both it and its successor *Le Journal Officiel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (hereafter *Journal Officiel*) left the detail to the private newspapers. Apart from short-lived papers like *La Nouvelle-Calédonie* (1878–1879) and *Petites Affiches de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (1874–1878), among nongovernment newspapers I used the *Néo-Calédonien* (1880–1889), *Le Progrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (1880–1884), which became *Le Progrès de Nouméa* (1884–1885), *L'Avenir de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (1886–1892), *Le Colon de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (1888–1890), *L'Indépendant de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (1884–1889), *La France Australe* (1889–1930), and *La Calédonie* (1892–1907). It was an immensely tedious and time-consuming process to scan more than sixty years of local newspapers for this purpose, but unexpected benefits accrued. Not only did I sometimes glean some rare details about the recruits, but I also discovered that where there did exist an official estimate for any one year it was usually wrong by a considerable margin. This indicates to me that more caution needs to be exercised in accepting at face value the official figures for other areas also. My thanks are due to Dr. Anne-Gabrielle Thompson, who helped me do this work in the first three years of this study, and to the Australian Research Council, whose financial assistance made this help possible.

6. These are the main sources only, an exhaustive list being too long to put in an article of this length. Where individual names were given, all details so garnered were put on computer under name and twenty-four selected attributes. I now have just under six thousand individual records. I am indebted to the Procureur de la République in Noumea for permission to use the *état civil* for statistical purposes.

7. The documentation of official inquiries and inspections remained patchy, but was rich when it occurred. Among other sources, independent newspapers in Noumea—continuous from 1880—and the Procès-Verbaux du Conseil-Général (proceedings of the local assembly, hereafter PVCG), Noumea, provided valuable comment, supplemented by external impressions from British officials, French and British missionaries, humanitarian reformers, and visitors.

8. This is clear in the newspaper reports at the time and from official reports afterwards. The public reasons given for the prohibitions of the trade related to a concern for abuses. In both cases, however, other motives appear in the official correspondence: in the first case, an attempt to employ instead local Melanesians considered dangerous (after the 1878 revolt) when “idle,” as well as freed convicts; and in the second, a concern to employ the freed convicts in a time of economic depression. Both were also related to the concern that the British government would seize on the incidence of abuses as an excuse to annex the New Hebrides. Minister of the Navy and Colonies (Jauréguiberry) to Governor Courbet, 5 May 1882, BB4 1577, Archives de la Marine (hereafter AM), Paris; Governor Le Boucher to Minister for Navy and Colonies, 14 Mar. 1885 (telegram), and the minister’s reply, 16 Mar. 1885 (telegram), New Caledonia, Affaires Politiques, carton 282, ANSOM; Pierre Gascher, *La belle au bois dormant* (Noumea, 1974), 228. See also, H.B.M. Consul E. L. Layard to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, 25 Oct. 1887, Inward Correspondence, Western Pacific High Commission (hereafter WPHC), London, 219/87 (microfilm, Australian National Library, Canberra).

9. This figure—arrived at by the method described above—is for arrivals, not discounting for those who recruited for a second time. However, since New Caledonia was the least popular destination, “second timers” to the French colony—unlike Queensland—were few. Since my figure for arrivals is a minimum (partly because many numbers of the newspapers were not extant and partly because, in the first fifteen years of the labor trade, recruiting vessels were allowed to call at the eastern ports of Canala and Thio, where many laborers were off-loaded, and these arrivals were rarely reported in the Noumea newspapers), the figure is probably close to the actual number of individuals recruited.

10. Estimated from information derived from shipping reports in the newspapers, percentage of “places of origin” on the death registries, and estimates from official reports. The Solomon Islanders are much harder to count, since they are usually included under the term “New Hebridean” in the references to them in estimates, and reports of ships that have been to both the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands often do not break down the total number of recruits by island of origin. There is also a dearth of detail about voyages that took place in the period of 1885–1890, during the official suspension in the trade, although it seems that at least two voyages to the Solomons were then made. The Gilbertese came from only two voyages to these islands.

11. The 1894 figure includes those engaged under irregular arrangements during the second period of official suspension.
12. "*Le Néo-Hébridais est partout et peu de maisons en sont privées.*" "Rétablissement de l'immigration Néo-Hébridaise et des archipels voisins," report of the commission set up by Governor Pallu de la Barrière, 4 Apr. 1883, Affaires Politiques, carton 282, ANSOM.
13. For example, "Julian Thomas" (alias "The Vagabond," alias Stanley James), *Cannibals and Convicts* (London, 1886); J. W. Anderson, *Notes of Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia* (London, 1880); Charles Lemire, *Voyage à pied en Nouvelle-Calédonie* (Paris, 1884); Marc Le Goupils, *Dans la brousse calédonienne: Souvenirs d'un ancien planteur, 1898–1904* (Paris, 1928); and many others.
14. Although small numbers of Asians arrived between 1864 and 1885, and larger contingents in the 1890s and 1900s, the very large importations of Vietnamese and Indonesians from the 1920s probably dwarfed the memories of earlier exotic labor.
15. Gascher, *La belle au bois dormant*.
16. Most of the information regarding the New Hebrideans in New Caledonia in Donna Winslow, "Workers in Colonial New Caledonia to 1945" (in *Labour in the South Pacific*, ed. Moore, Leckie, and Munro, 108–121) was added by one of the editors from an unpublished paper of mine representing work in progress, without specific acknowledgment of my authorship.
17. In 1902, according to official estimates, there were 1,711 indigenous Melanesians under indenture, of whom 1,153 were Loyalty Islanders. *Annuaire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* (Noumea, 1902), 296.
18. *Bulletin Officiel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie* 1865:171. The contract was negotiated 29 Apr. to 1 May 1865, but the first convoy of New Hebrideans under this arrangement did not arrive until 9 Aug.
19. The right of all foreign governments to recruit labor in the Solomons was withdrawn from 31 Dec. 1911. Great Britain, Foreign Office, London, General Correspondence, 371, 1911, 1175/22289.
20. Annual Report, 1912, New Caledonia, Affaires Politiques, carton 271, ANSOM, reports 122 New Hebrideans recruited in the year, "nearly all from Tanna"; see also report of the Rev. J. Campbell Nicholson, Lenakel, Tanna, July 1912, in *Quarterly Jottings from the New Hebrides, South Sea Islands* (hereafter *Quarterly Jottings*), John G. Paton mission fund, Essex, no. 79 (Jan. 1913).
21. There are numerous casual references to these practices. Some examples are (as concubine of employer) Marc Le Goupils, *Dans la brousse*, 128; ("bought" for an overseer) *Le Progrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie*, 15 Jan. 1882; ("sale" for the purpose of concubinage), *ibid.*, 5 Apr. 1884, 15 May 1884; *Le Progrès de Nouméa* (continuation of *Le Progrès de la N.-C.* after 30 July 1884), 6 Aug. 1884; "The Vagabond," "In the South Seas," *The Age* (Melbourne), 3 Sept. 1887. Births as a result of such liaisons are the ultimate evidence.

22. The first labor code dealing with these “immigrants” is that of 26 Mar. 1874. It was an *arrêté*, that is, a regulation of the local administration, as distinct from a *décret* of the metropolitan government. The text appeared in *Moniteur*, 1 Apr. 1874. It laid down no minimum age, although a clause (article 37) stating that children under ten need only receive half rations recognized that very young children were routinely recruited, but the minimum legal age of six is cited in several documents arguing for a change in this state of affairs. It also appeared in the instructions given to government agents in 1881: “You will take care that no children under the age of six are recruited” (“General Instructions given to Government Agents on board ships undertaking immigration from the New Hebrides,” 1881, New Caledonia, carton 63, ANSOM).

23. “Modifications à la réglementation sur l’immigration proposées dans le cours de ses interrogations,” *Mémoires et Documents, Océanie*, vol. 4, Archives des Affaires Étrangères (hereafter M&D, O, vol. 4, AAE), Paris.

24. Decree (of the metropolitan government) of 1893 on indentured immigrant labor, *Bulletin Officiel*, 11 July 1893.

25. *Journal Officiel*, 22 Oct. 1904.

26. “C’est là un des plus tristes côtés de ce genre d’opérations.” “Rapport sur l’immigration Néo-Hébridaise,” Governor Courbet to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 17 Feb. 1882 (hereafter Courbet, “Rapport sur l’immigration”), New Caledonia, carton 63, ANSOM.

27. In his letters to Victor Schoelcher early in 1880, Léon Marchand asserts that recruits coming in the previous few years were “almost exclusively” children. Léon Marchand to Schoelcher, 2 Feb. 1880, Schoelcher Papers, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. One must allow for exaggeration in letters to a crusading reformer, but the death statistics for the 1870s also show a markedly higher proportion of children than for the next decade, especially in the group aged six to twelve (more than twice the proportion in the 1880s). Many other factors enter into death statistics, so they cannot form more than a rough guide to the proportions recruited.

28. Article 16 of the labor code (26 Mar. 1874).

29. “Ils sont plus faciles à allécher par les promesses, par les cadeaux sans valeur.” Marchand to Schoelcher, 2 Feb. 1880.

30. “Mais, il faut bien le dire, dans la majeure partie des cas, ce sont les parents qui amènent leurs fils au recruteur. Le ‘boy’ est troqué contre les objets qui excitent la convoitise du père.” Courbet, “Rapport sur l’immigration.”

31. Marchand to Schoelcher, 2 Feb. 1880. See also “The Vagabond,” “In the South Seas,” *The Age*, 9 July 1887; V. Lee Walker to his mother, 3 Feb. 1885, Walker letters, Rhodes House, Oxford; Charles Godey, *Tablettes d’un ancien fonctionnaire* (Paris, 1886), 121–122.

32. Government Agent Rouzaud reported nine there in 1875, when the French had none at all. Report of Government Agent Rouzaud to the Director of the Interior, 5 Aug. 1875, New Caledonia, carton 282, ANSOM.
33. See, for example, Commandant Bigant of the *Sâone* to the Governor of New Caledonia, 12 Aug. 1890. "I cannot prevent the *Mary Anderson* from taking passengers or emigrants where she likes. . . . We have not, in France, like the English, either a Kidnaping Act or a Western Pacific Order in Council. . . . I have already had the honour of pointing out to you this lacuna in our laws." BB4 1996, AM.
34. "Commission of Inquiry charged with throwing the greatest possible light on the acts of which the French ships the *Aurora* and *Lulu* are accused," Sept. 1880, New Caledonia, carton 63, ANSOM. In the course of the inquiry, it became clear that the crudest methods of kidnaping—such as canoe smashing—were practiced not only on the two voyages of the *Aurora*, but also on both the voyages of the *Venus* of that year (the *Lulu* was exonerated, not having sailed in that year, but the complainants had only mistaken the name of the vessel—the deeds attributed to the *Lulu* had been perpetrated by the *Venus*). The captain and recruiter on the first voyage of the *Aurora* were tried and convicted of acts of violence only after the government agent turned state's witness; the *Venus* crew were not charged until 1882, when the jury in Noumea defied the judge's direction and acquitted them. Report of Lafarge, President of the Superior Court, 14 Sept. 1882, encl. in Courbet to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies, 19 Sept. 1882, BB4 1577, AM. In 1880, of the five voyages completed by the time of the inquiry (September), all were made by the *Aurora* and the *Venus*.
35. See above, n. 8.
36. J. Campbell Nicholson, *Quarterly Jottings*, no. 75 (Jan. 1912).
37. For example, Corris, *Passage*, 53–59.
38. The Rev. W. Gray to Sir Samuel W. Griffith, 10 Sept. 1892, encl. in Sir H. W. Norman to Marquess of Ripon, 6 Mar. 1893; Further Correspondence Relating to Polynesian Labour in the Colony of Queensland, Great Britain, *Commons Papers 1893–1894*, vol. 61, no. 39, 44; *La Calédonie*, 22 Sept. and 16 Nov. 1894, 12 Feb. 1895.
39. Report of the Government Agent of the *Marie*, voyage 21 Feb. to 18 Aug. 1885, New Caledonia, carton 64, ANSOM.
40. See, for example, the report of the *Lady St. Aubyn*, in *La Calédonie*, 15 June 1893.
41. James Paddon brought his New Hebridean workers with him when he settled on Ile Nou in 1855. Bêche-de-mer and sandalwood traders like captains Lewis and Henry employed New Hebrideans almost exclusively as sailors and boat's crew on their ships trading around the island, and as laborers on their stations. Dorothy Shineberg, *They Came for Sandalwood* (Melbourne, 1967), chap. 15, 190–199.
42. Bronwen Douglas, "Conflict and Alliance," *Journal of Pacific History* 15, nos. 1–2 (1980): 32.

43. Bronwen Douglas, "Culture Contact in New Caledonia" (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra), 173–174, 418–420.
44. Examples of distribution of the earliest New Hebridean recruits can be found in *Moniteur*, 20 Jan. 1867, and *Bulletin Officiel*, Noumea, 1867–1868, 256.
45. The sources for the occupations of the New Hebrideans consist of accumulated references in official reports, court records, and newspapers, and death notices indicating place of death and either occupation of the worker or the name of the employer whose business was known. Sometimes they are supplemented by the direct observation of visitors.
46. Reply to a questionnaire addressed to the Colonial Secretariat, 27 Apr. 1874, Great Britain, Admiralty, Royal Navy Australia Station, 32.
47. Dorothy Shineberg, "Noumea No Good, Noumea No Pay," *Journal of Pacific History* 26, no. 2 (1991): 189–205.
48. These movements of labor can be tracked through the coastal shipping reports and also through subsequent notices of death at the mine sites in the *état civil*.
49. There are many descriptions of New Hebridean "labor boys" working at the mines. See, for example, Anderson, *Notes of Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia*, 200, 206; Lemire, *Voyage à pied en Nouvelle-Calédonie*, 201; Thomas, *Cannibals and Convicts*, 100–101; E. Glasser, "Rapport à M. le Ministre des Colonies sur les richesses minérales de la Nouvelle-Calédonie," *Annales des Mines* (Paris), tenth series, 1903–1904, 518.
50. "Renseignements sur les immigrants néo-hébridais," 1 Jan. 1883, 111.1, Archives de l'Archevêché de Nouméa (hereafter AAN). This is an unattributed report that clearly derives from official figures, now lost, since some of the figures elsewhere in it coincide exactly with figures used by Governor Courbet and also in an inspection report.
51. The occupations of a complete convoy of New Hebrideans who arrived in August 1884 are given in the *Moniteur* for 20 Aug. 1884; three of them listed as nickel-sorters at the mines died before the end of their first term at coffee plantations in Canala, no doubt part of a contingent transferred from the mines when they closed down in 1885.
52. In the years 1888–1891, the deaths of 157 imported Oceanians at the mines were reported in the *état civil*. The Le Nickel company, the only employer to use the category in the death notices, referred to fifty-nine of its deceased workers as "free laborers," a habit it dropped after an 1890 regulation enjoined employers to regularize the position of their migrant workers. The shipping of New Hebrideans to the Chesterfields is noted in the coastal shipping reports appearing in the newspapers of 1887 to 1889 (see n. 5 for names of newspapers).
53. Annual Report, 1912, section 8, "Main d'oeuvre et immigration," New Caledonia, Affaires Politiques, carton 271, ANSOM.
54. Of the 148 New Hebridean deaths registered in the 1920s, 136 died in Noumea. Of the 105 of the latter whose occupations were given, 85 were laborers and 17 domestic ser-

vants. See also H.B.M. Consul T.D. Dunlop to Winston Churchill, encl. in Churchill to Gov. Gen. of Australia, 12 July 1921, CRS A981, New Caledonia, 1921–1942, vol. 1, Australian Archives, Canberra.

55. Governor Courbet, "Rapport sur l'immigration," 17 Feb. 1882; *Le Progrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie*, 5 Feb. 1882; PVCG, 22 Nov. 1904 (Councillor Blandeau).

56. See, for example, the report of Government Agent Rouzaud of his recent cruise in the New Hebrides, 5 Aug. 1875, New Caledonia, carton 282, ANSOM.

57. Governor Pallu de la Barrière to Minister for the Navy and Colonies, 8 Dec. 1882, New Caledonia, Affaires Politiques, carton 282, ANSOM; Letter from "A" to *France Maritime* (Paris), 9 Sept. 1882; PVCG, 22 Nov. 1904.

58. Article 16 of the *arrêté* of 26 Mar. 1874, BB4, 1604, AM.

59. Courbet, "Rapport sur l'immigration."

60. Report of the trial of M. de Gimel, *Le Progrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie*, 12 Feb. 1882.

61. See, for example, the report of the trial of de Gimel for cruelty to four female New Hebridean workers, in *Le Progrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie*, 8, 12, 15, 22, and 29 Jan. 1882 (he was fined ten francs). One employer, Julien Déméné, was before the courts three times in four years on charges of ill-treating his New Hebridean workers. In 1878, he was found guilty of aggravated assault and fined sixteen francs; in 1879, he was charged with having in 1875 (!) assaulted an employee, causing his death, and acquitted; in 1881, he was prosecuted for having caused the death of four New Hebridean workers "through imprudence, inattention, negligence or non-observance of the regulations" and of beating and "using force and other assaults" on these four men and several other New Hebridean employees: he was acquitted on the first charge and given one month's prison for the second. Records of the Tribunal Correctionnel, 13 June 1878; Records of the Cour Criminelle, 28 June 1879; Records of the Tribunal Correctionnel, 24 Mar. 1881 (Noumea Archives).

62. Thomas, *Cannibals and Convicts*, 150; for Queensland, see Saunders, *Workers in Bondage*, 76; for Queensland and Fiji, see Corris, *Passage*, 83; for Hawai'i, see Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii* (Honolulu, 1985), 74.

63. See Courbet, "Rapport sur l'immigration."

64. I have written about this at length in "Noumea No Good, Noumea No Pay."

65. *Ibid.*, 195–196.

66. For example, see the Report of Contre-Amiral Du Petit-Thouars, 1874, M&D, O, vol. 4, AAE, 102; letter of Commandant Gadaud to the Governor of New Caledonia, 22 Oct. 1894, BB4, 1996, AM; Report of Inspector Gayet, Mobile Inspection of 1929, New Caledonia, carton 746, ANSOM.

67. There are countless reports of these events in the newspapers, especially on Monday mornings, and in the proceedings of the Tribunal Correctionnel.

68. The “normal” official weekly ration was 5.6 kilos of rice. *Moniteur*, 16 June 1867. Numa-Auguste Joubert fed his New Hebrideans 800 grams of rice per day. *Moniteur*, 15 Jan. 1873. The journal of the government agent of the *Winifred*, at Ambrym, 11 Apr. 1879, reports complaints of “too much rice” in New Caledonia; rice is named as the staple of Ballande’s New Hebrideans in *La Calédonie*, 6 Jan. 1900.

69. To quote one example only, in 1912 the British district agent on Tanna drew up a list of the names of 352 Tannese who had gone to work in New Caledonia “in recent times” (estimated by him as three years ago or less but by me as more likely a much longer period before, probably from the late 1890s to 1912). Wilkes to British Resident Commissioner for the New Hebrides, 10 Oct. 1912, encl. in British Resident Commissioner to Western Pacific High Commissioner, 4 Nov. 1912, Inward Correspondence, WPHC, 2259/12. Of these 352, 202 were known to have died in the colony, but only 21 of these names were registered in the acts of the *état civil*, liberal allowance being made for a different French spelling.

70. Both Courbet’s and my calculations of death rate are based on the governor’s estimate of the existing “Hebridean” population for that year of 2,346.

71. The death rate in the two previous years (1880, 1881) was also much higher than the 50 per thousand figure of Courbet: respectively around 81–82 and 62 per thousand.

72. Ralph Shlomowitz, “Mortality and the Pacific Labour Trade,” *Journal of Pacific History* 22, nos. 1–2 (1987): 34–55. The same is true for New Caledonia: the curve for deaths (based on the *état civil*) follows closely behind that for arrivals, although peaking out of proportion when there is an epidemic. Samples of complete convoys also show the highest rate of mortality in the first year of service.

73. Wilkes to British Resident Commissioner, 10 Oct. 1912. Wilkes reported that, of 92 Tannese who had been repatriated “in recent years,” only 53 returned well and strong. Of the other 39, one died on the voyage home, 35 were returned dying or gravely ill and died within a year of repatriation, one returned a cripple, one a leper, and another a permanent invalid.

74. A total of 265 New Hebridean women gave birth to one or more children in the colony, according to the *état civil*, a minimum figure. Some births “never registered” became known only because the child later died or got married; there were surely many more.

75. Information about the liaisons producing children, the recognition or not of the latter, and so forth, are from the *état civil*. Under the terms of my use of these registries, particularly in the period of the last hundred years, details may not be given.

76. In 1913, Father Passant, stationed at Païta, came across a New Hebridean from Epi who had settled down with a woman from the tribe of N’dé, having no intention of returning home and living with “the natives of N’dé, who recognize him as one of theirs.” He

requested baptism, as the woman was a Christian convert, and he wished the priest to marry them. R. P. Louis Passant à Monseigneur [Chanrion], Paita, 28 Feb. 1913, AAN 71.2. During a recent visit to Noumea, I was told by a Melanesian priest that there are many descendants of New Hebrideans living "*en tribu*," but I have not had the chance to pursue this information.

77. The Rev. Père L. Passant to Monseigneur [Chanrion], 19 June 1913, AAN 71.2. Father Passant did not know the name of the particular island to which they had returned.

LINKING COLONIZATION AND DECOLONIZATION: THE CASE OF MICRONESIA

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Although a significant literature exists on the processes leading to colonization, little has been written on the factors relevant to decolonization. Focusing on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, I outline an argument that rests on a unilateral decision by the United States to establish an empire in the Pacific. I then entertain the hypothesis that decolonization represents a direct reversal of the factors leading to colonization, that is, another unilateral decision by the United States. I argue that such a model is empirically simplistic and incorrect. I offer evidence to suggest that local elites in the various island "states" as well as an international norm against colonization led the United States to begin to alter its relationship with the Trust Territory in the mid-1960s. This example of decolonization partially represents the effort of the United States to gain legitimacy for its presence in the Pacific and partially represents an effective constraint on its autonomy.

MUCH LIKE INDIVIDUALS in the "state of nature" as described by Hobbes, individual states face each other with no metapower to arbitrate disputes and enforce a degree of peace. Accordingly, history has witnessed sometimes brutal intrusions on the sovereignty of weaker states. In some cases these intrusions have meant complete annihilation of the weaker state's political, cultural, and economic structure and assimilation by the stronger state. Empire represents one familiar category used by political scientists and historians to describe such intrusions. An empire, according to Michael Doyle, is "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural depen-

dence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing an empire" (Doyle 1986:45).¹ For Doyle, three criteria must be met to demonstrate that an empire indeed does exist. First, we must demonstrate the existence of control. Second, we must be able to explain why one state expands its power and establishes this control. Finally, we must explain why the other state "submits or fails to resist effectively" (p. 46). Although each of these research agendas seems intuitively and analytically relevant, the second point has attracted the greatest amount of attention from scholars.

Linking Colonization to Decolonization

However, I believe that a fertile area for research still has not been tapped. Assuming that great powers established empires for specific reasons, with specific interests in mind, we should recognize in decolonization a reversal of those interests. Likewise, if the periphery once promised something in return for the costs of maintaining an empire, then decolonization should correspond to the periphery's inability to provide that good any longer. If, for example, a territory provided rent because of some natural resource, then exhaustion of that resource should render that territory unnecessary. Or, if acquisition of a particular territory provided a buffer against a threat by an enemy, then that acquisition might no longer be justified when that threat had dissipated. In this article I weigh the evidence for colonization in a specific region against the evidence for decolonization. I begin with a survey of competing explanations for colonization in order to determine the most appropriate framework for discussing the region I have chosen to investigate. Having established an explanation for empire construction, I weigh the evidence for decolonization in an effort to establish a link between colonization and decolonization.

Specifically, I discuss the change in U.S. policy during the 1960s toward the groups of Pacific islands collectively known as Micronesia. That is, during this period, it appeared that the United States began to dismantle its Micronesian empire. It should become clear from the initial historical discussion that Micronesia provided little promise for either the financial sector or the bureaucratic rent seekers in the United States. Clearly, strategic interest in Micronesia played a role in construction of this empire. As a particular strategic framework, then, I shall adopt Lake's explanation for empire. Based on his discussion, we would expect the United States to dismantle its empire in the Pacific when the United States could realize economies of scale in the production of security through some other means or alliance, when the costs of governing Micronesia outweighed the security benefits for the United States, and when the risk of oppor-

tunism by the local elites became strong enough to appropriate gains otherwise accruing to the United States. However, I also present evidence to suggest that moral and political pressure from the emerging elite in Micronesia and from the international community encouraged the shift in U.S. policy. That is, decolonization is not the result of a unilateral decision made by the metropole. And while not denying that a real disparity in power may exist between the parties involved, I hope to demonstrate the significance of real agency and power in the periphery during this process. Thus, I suggest that decolonization may not simply represent a reversal of the forces that lead to colonization, and I attempt to reconcile the competing views on decolonization.

The Formation of Empire

Modern Scholarship on Empire Building

Generally, the arguments put forth for explaining the origin of empire can be characterized as metrocentric, pericentric, or systemic.² Modern scholarship on imperialism begins with a metrocentric or dispositional view. The set of explanations falling under this rubric can be divided roughly among those emphasizing nongovernment actors, economic forces, and government actors. J. A. Hobson, for instance, argued that special economic interests within the metropole successfully manipulated Parliament as well as the general public for the purposes of expanding investment outlets abroad. Lenin, in contrast, understood imperialism as the monopoly and final stage of capitalism. Imperialism came not from the interests of specific financiers but from the invisible and seemingly uncontrollable forces of the capitalist system. Joseph Schumpeter returned to a focus on specific groups, but he countered the economic interest explanation with an emphasis on the militaristic basis of imperialism. In fact, capitalism and imperialism are antithetical to each other; imperialism represents the “objectless disposition of a state to unlimited forcible expansion” (that is, formal imperialism or territorial conquest) (Doyle 1986:23).

Alternatively, a pericentric approach suggests that the explanation for empire building lies within the colony itself. Gallagher and Robinson claim, “Imperialism may be defined as a sufficient political function of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character is largely decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and time” (quoted in Doyle 1986:25). In other words, elites in the periphery who stood to gain from inclusion in the orbit of the metropole encouraged and called for the devel-

opment of imperialism. Facing the metrocentric and systemic approaches head on, Gallagher and Robinson quip, "They [empires] were not the objects of serious national attention . . . It would be a gullible historiography which would see such gimcrack creations as necessary functions of the balance of power or as the highest stage of capitalism" (ibid.).

Finally, the systemic approach claims that imperialism represents the successful efforts by the metropole to secure additional resources from the periphery for the metropole's interest in an international balance of power. Waltz, for instance, suggests that while motives for specific empire building may vary, imperialism generally follows surpluses of people, goods, and capital. The constant factor in imperialism is the gross disparity in power between the metropole and the periphery. He concludes that "where gross imbalances in power exist, and where the means of transportation permit the export of goods and of the instruments of rule, the more capable people ordinarily exert a considerable influence over those less able to produce surpluses" (quoted in Doyle 1986:27). Likewise, Doyle characterizes the systemic position in the following terms: "Disparities in power provide both opportunities and motives for the establishment of empires" (1986:26).

Contemporary Scholarship on Empire Building

More recently, explanations of empire have returned to metrocentric principles, but they now focus on the behavior of the bureaucracy rather than on the financial sector or the military complex. One school, for instance, has described imperialism in terms of rent seeking. Bean, using the analogy of the firm, suggests that an optimal size exists for the state. A larger state can realize more gains from trade by providing a larger free-trade area. Furthermore, per-capita defense costs should fall, since doubling the area of territory less than doubles the distance of the border, that area most vulnerable to attack. He argues that "changes in military technology or in administrative technique can alter this range of optimum sizes of the state" (Bean 1973:205). Given these events, then, states will have the incentive to expand. Similarly, Freedman, though admitting that territory may be of value for reasons of "strategy, sentiment, politics, or economics," nevertheless fundamentally assumes that "the value to a nation of any territory is the increase in tax collections made possible by control of that territory, net of collection costs." Thus, "the size and shape of nations will be such as to maximize their joint potential net revenue and will approach from below the size which would maximize their potential gross revenue" (Freedman 1977:60).

A Grand Strategy Model of Empire Building

Finally, Lake offers a model for conceptualizing strategic importance as an explanation for empire (1992a, 1992b). Yet, he approaches this problem from a different angle. Rather than launching directly into an examination of empire building per se, he arrives at a discussion of imperialism only after first asking how states determine and execute a grand strategy. In this way, he concludes that nations choose to construct empires in response to specific circumstances, but that empire is not the only means for ensuring one nation's security.

He begins by arguing that states produce security for themselves, often by pooling resources with other states. At one extreme, the relationship will be one of cooperation, in which each state maintains its sovereignty. At the other extreme, one state establishes a hierarchic relationship over the other. The dominant state exercises complete control over the operations of the dominated state, and resources in the periphery are effectively controlled by the metropole. Lake identifies three variables to explain this relationship and the form it will take. Generally, one state will pool its resources when there are economies of scale to realize through this relationship. Then, a state will establish an empire when the costs of governance do not outweigh the benefits in security produced and when there is a low risk of opportunism from the periphery.

The first variable in Lake's model specifies when a relationship is likely. Drawing on microeconomic theory, Lake suggests two opportunities for a state to realize economies of scale in the production of security. In the first place, technological innovation may allow the military to replace personnel with sophisticated weaponry and project its force over a greater distance at a lower cost. Second, a division of labor between allies allows each partner to specialize in the military activity it can produce most efficiently. One ally, for instance, may produce the sophisticated weaponry while another provides the territory in which that weaponry is placed. Tying the two opportunities together, the ability to project force over greater distance may determine what territory or state would be the most valuable ally in the division of labor. Lake then accounts for the choice of empire in terms of the high risk of opportunism. He recognizes that an external strategy presents the possibility for opportunistic behavior by one or more of the partners. The probability that a partner will abandon, entrap, or exploit the state is generally a function of the relevant opportunity costs and the governance structure.

The opportunity costs to the state rise with the value of the colony. This value is measured in terms of the number of alternative territories from which the state can choose a partner. As that number decreases, the value of

the specified colony increases. The value of the particular colony also rises as the number of its reasonable alternatives for alliance increase. Furthermore, opportunity costs are determined by the extent to which assets are transaction-specific. In particular, the technical nature of the asset may determine that its next best use is as scrap. The inability of the state to transfer these assets to other relationships increases opportunity costs by creating substantial "quasi-rents" (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978:297). Finally, the number of buyers in a market bears on the probability of opportunism. When there are few buyers, or alternative allies, the state cannot readily command the market, and "quasi-rents" and the risk of opportunism will increase. Lower "quasi-rents" and a decreased risk of opportunism, however, are associated with easily transferable assets and markets with increasing numbers of buyers, or partners.

The nature of the governance structure between the metropole and the periphery may also create or discourage opportunities. A more hierarchical relationship, for example, will prevent a partner from abandoning, entrapping, or exploiting the state. Conversely, in a less structured relationship, where the state enforces few constraints on the independent activities of the partner, a state will find itself increasingly vulnerable to the partner's independent interest. In sum, the lower the opportunity costs to the state and the more hierarchical the nature of the relationship, the smaller the likelihood that a state will face opportunistic behavior from its partners. In this case more efficient use is made of the pooled resources.

Any relationship between states also includes varying degrees of costs. Lake suggests that in the case of a dominant state seeking control over another, an agreement is set by contract or coercion. In either case, states do not face only (financial) startup costs. They must also contend with the costs of monitoring and maintaining the relationship, in terms of time and direct outlays. These costs will rise as the opportunity costs to the subordinate partner decrease, that is, as the number of attractive alternatives increases.

But these costs will also vary according to the nature of the relationship between the two or more states. A more hierarchical relationship generates at least three additional costs. First, as the relationship tends toward imperialism, the future provides fewer opportunities to renegotiate contracts. Therefore, greater specificity (implying additional costs) is demanded in the formulation of the initial contract. Furthermore, an empire must take greater care to insure against opportunistic behavior by the subordinate. The imperial power generally operates with a greater degree of coercion (laid over the contract and the costs associated with it), and with this coercion comes greater costs. Finally, in a hierarchical relationship, the metro-

pole must alone bear the costs of enforcing the agreement over time, since it has the unique incentive to maintain the relationship.

In sum, Lake's grand strategy model explains when a nation will pool its resources in the production of security and predicts the nature of that relationship. A state will pool its resources with another when there are economies of scale to realize. Then a state will construct an empire out of this relationship when the risk of opportunism in the periphery is high and when the costs of governing the empire are low.

Although Lake's model provides important theoretical insight, such an orientation tends to ignore the very real disparity in power that may exist between two states. Lake's model suggests that states each take a bargaining position and maximize their preferences under circumstances of freedom and constraint. While not explicitly denying the possibility of a disparity in power, the use of terms such as the division of labor and exploitation or entrapment by the periphery tends to downplay the effect of superior bargaining positions and real gains for those positions in the process of decolonization. This essay seeks to demonstrate the gross disparity in power between the United States and Micronesia, while at the same time highlighting that the Micronesians were not completely helpless in this endeavor, that they retained a certain degree of political autonomy and agency.

Historical Background

Establishing the Trust Territory

From just east of the International Date Line to about five hundred miles short of the Philippines stretch the 2,141 islands of Micronesia. Although the islands have been grouped geographically, they represent a variety of cultures, languages, and kinship ties. Since the late fifteenth century—when the papacy granted the area to Spain—European, Japanese, and American interests have in turn influenced the culture and politics of these islands. Near the end of the nineteenth century, the Germans purchased the islands from the Spanish.³ Still, Spanish Capuchins continued to work in the area alongside an increasing number of German Protestant missionaries. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations, Japan assumed control of the area under the League's Class "C" Mandate. Micronesia's fortune changed once again with the steady success of the U.S. campaign in the Pacific toward the end of World War II. As early as 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek had

agreed at Cairo that the United States would acquire the former Japanese Mandated Islands. In 1945, this decision was confirmed by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta (Nufer 1978:26–27).

From 1945 until 1947, the U.S. Navy Department controlled Micronesia *de facto*, while the departments of State and War argued over the nature of the forthcoming *de jure* rule. The State Department, on the one hand, focused its argument on the international trend toward decolonization and the role of the United States in encouraging this. Although it had no intention of giving the islands independence, the State Department argued for a looser and more temporary relationship. The War Department, on the other hand, stressed the strategic value of the islands and the need for strict control.

The newly formed Trusteeship Program sponsored by the United Nations satisfied the goals of the Department of State. The War Department, however, wanted greater control over the islands than trusteeship allowed and thus wanted the islands exempt from this agreement. In a letter to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote,

Acquisition of . . . [Micronesia] by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead, it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world. (Nufer 1978:27)

Truman mediated the dispute between the two departments and eventually signed House Joint Resolution 233 on 18 July 1947. This resolution rendered effective the agreement signed at the United Nations on 2 April 1947 that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.⁴

In consideration of the importance of these islands to U.S. security, the United Nations designated the Pacific Islands as a “strategic trust” in a “brilliant attempt at compromise” (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1994). The designation distinguished this region from the other ten trusteeships established at the same time, most importantly by transferring oversight of the territory from the U.N. General Assembly to the Security Council, where the United States retained veto power. It also accorded the United States the right to fortify the islands. Finally, the strategic trust provided that only the adminis-

tering authority, that is, the United States, could permit any changes in or termination of the agreement. However, article 6 of the agreement also bound the United States

to foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and . . . promote the development of the inhabitants . . . toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end . . . give to the inhabitants . . . a progressively increasing share in the Administration services in the territory and . . . take other appropriate measures towards those ends. (Nufer 1978:29)

Thus, although the United States successfully steered the administration of the Trust Territory away from wider oversight, it built into the agreement the inevitability of decolonization.

The Changing Relationship

Beginning in the 1960s, the United States appeared to begin to honor its promises elaborated under the U.N. Charter regarding trust territories. Once again, article 6 of the agreement had stipulated that the United States would “foster the development of . . . political institutions” in order to encourage “self-government or independence for the peoples of Micronesia” (Nufer 1978:29). Along these lines, in 1961 the United States encouraged the development of the Council of Micronesia, a local representative body. Kennedy’s National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 145 (cited in Nevin 1977:111–112; McHenry 1975:15, 17; Lynch 1973:117–118), issued in April 1962, outlined the U.S. interest in realizing its obligations to Micronesia under the terms of the original agreement. However, the security interests of the United States were of primary concern; the promise of decolonization came at a price for the Micronesians. Thus the course the United States chose in 1962 began to veer from the terms of the obligation set forth in 1945.

Although the Council of Micronesia produced few identifiable gains for sovereignty, members of the indigenous populations began to organize and eventually founded the Congress of Micronesia in 1965. The United States did not resist these efforts toward autonomy. Finally, in 1969, the United States agreed to meet for a first round of negotiations concerning the future political status of Micronesia. In May 1970 the Political Status Delegation of

the Congress of Micronesia met with U.S. delegates on Saipan. As a result of this meeting, the United States offered commonwealth status to Micronesia, similar to the status granted to Puerto Rico. Specifically, the United States offered financial assistance and free entry of Micronesian goods into the United States. The United States, however, would retain rights over eminent domain; the Micronesian constitution and its laws could not be inconsistent with either the U.S. code or the U.S. constitution; and Micronesia could not unilaterally change the agreement. Again, the United States did not intend to grant the islands complete independence. Indeed, the United States had an interest in furthering the Congress of Micronesia, because it provided a means of “institutionally tying” the two states. It would allow the United States to continue to influence and control events in Micronesia under a cloak of legitimacy. My point here, then, is simply to posit that there was a change, at least in the formal structure, and that that change needs explanation.

The new U.S. policy toward Micronesia resembles a “quasi-empire” as defined by David Lake (1992b). This is a relationship in which the metropole determines the form of government, selects local government leaders, and controls some allocation of resources at the same time that it allows some degree of sovereignty in the periphery. By the end of the 1960s, the United States had begun to encourage democratic forms of government at lower levels of administration. But the United States, through the administration of the Trust Territory, remained active in routine affairs in Micronesia. It still assigned Micronesian bureaucrats to positions within the administration, despite the growing influence of the Congress of Micronesia as well as individual movements for autonomy. Further, the United States continued to encourage Micronesian dependence on U.S. dollars. The United States maintained broad control over Micronesia, but in a manner that allowed the latter increasing sovereignty.⁵

Factors Contributing to a Change in Policy

Alternative Explanations

The purpose of this article is to identify, if possible, a link between colonization and decolonization. Before discussing the reasons for decolonization, I need to dismiss some of the explanations for empire building. In the first place, against Hobson's theory (1902), Micronesia promised no opportunities for U.S. financiers. There was no economy left in the still-burning embers of Japanese colonialism. The islands possessed few exploitable resources. Phosphate deposits on the island of Anguar, in the Western Caro-

lines, would be exhausted by 1955. Even so, it was a British company that extracted this natural fertilizer. Also, no effort was made to redevelop the agricultural tracts left by the Japanese in Babelthaub (Palau) or Saipan. Likewise, as the preceding discussion indicates, Micronesia could play no role in any stage of capitalism. In response to Lenin (1917), the pool of labor available in the islands was never tapped for manufacturing. This evidence also suggests, challenging Freedman's theory (1977), that the United States could expect little from Micronesia in terms of rents or tax revenue. And the small and economically distressed Micronesian population could add nothing to a larger U.S. free-trade area, against Bean's theoretical contention (1973). Furthermore, local elites in Micronesia might have gained something by soliciting the patronage of a colonial power like the United States; Gallagher and Robinson may provide some insight (1953). However, in my view there would have been no reason for the United States to offer its patronage without receiving gains in security in return. The case of Micronesia certainly illustrates a gross disparity in power between it and the United States. But Waltz's theory (1979) provides only a description of empire as such and does not provide much insight into why the United States colonized these islands. Indeed, there were many other militarily weak territories that were not colonized by the United States at this time. Finally, although I argue that colonization in Micronesia can be traced to the military and security interests of the United States, I do not suggest, challenging Schumpeter (1955), that it represents any "objectless disposition" by the United States (Doyle 1986:23). Instead, colonization in Micronesia meets specific and thoughtful criteria for U.S. grand strategy in the postwar era.

Strategic Factors

Economies of Scale in Defense. Perhaps a more useful starting point for linking the construction and disassembling of an empire is with a discussion of U.S. security interests.⁶ As the remark from Henry Stimson quoted above indicates, the United States valued the strategic position of the islands. Specifically, the United States determined that it must control the Pacific in order to check the advance of communism. Although the United States could project missiles over greater distances than the enemy, a forward defense strategy dictated that the United States deflect attack on its own territory and bring the battle to the enemy. In the light of this strategy, the United States forced upon the islands a division of labor whereby it provided military technology and Micronesia provided its most valuable asset, strategic location.⁷

The islands of Micronesia allowed the implementation of a forward

defense strategy that secured the entire western Pacific Rim, from the Philippines northward to Korea. Micronesia did for U.S. policy in Asia what Greenland and the Azores did for U.S. policy in the European Theater. However, aside from Guam, which is juridically outside the trusteeship, and Kwajalein, which was developed for military purposes from late in World War II, the United States did not actually develop military installations in Micronesia. In these terms, fortified Guam was the key Micronesian link in the defense chain. The other, nonfortified islands served as a security buffer for Guam.⁸

Clearly, the U.S. Navy was interested in the Pacific before the threat of communism and the doctrine of containment. Indeed, Guam and the Philippines were taken at the end of the nineteenth century, and the proximity to Japan was significant before Stalin or Truman came to power. That is, the United States might have taken the islands earlier, before the communist threat, if Japan had not stood in its way. The foregoing analysis attempts to explain the importance of Micronesia within the circumstances under which it was in fact taken by the United States, that is, as part of a cold-war policy.

Two developments during the 1960s resulted in a dramatic change in the economies of scale with regard to the role of Micronesia in U.S. defense strategies. Because of détente, the United States did not face as great a possibility of engaging the Soviet Union in these areas. More important, improved nuclear technology allowed the United States to produce and manage its security interests from a greater distance.⁹ The United States could still protect a front from the Philippines up to Korea. Long-range nuclear capability, specifically the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), managed from already established military installations, could replace a physical presence in the islands.¹⁰ Thus, during the 1960s, the United States moved away from the forward defense strategy that had given Micronesia such strategic importance.¹¹ Although Micronesia may not have been important in terms of available technology, it continued to be of importance strategically. The drawn-out status negotiation process demonstrates that the United States did not completely give up its interest. Kwajalein, for instance, would continue to be important as a missile testing area.

Costs of Governance. Contributing to the U.S. interest in the initial formation of the Trust Territory administration was the relatively low cost of governance. Despite its hierarchical structure, the governing of Micronesia came at a bargain. Immediately following World War II, the United States was spending about \$1 million per year in Micronesia (U.S. Department of

the Navy 1948–1951),¹² in sharp contrast to the \$1 million per day for the administration of Germany and Japan (Schaller 1985:82).¹³ Not only was the forward defense considered sound strategy, it was also relatively inexpensive to realize.

However, during the first two decades of the administration of the Trust Territory, the West witnessed dramatic improvements in health care and communication technology as well as an increase in the number of consumer goods available at relatively low costs. The increased expectations for goods and services generated by these advances could not be ignored in Micronesia. The United States had not only committed itself to monitoring the relationship with Micronesia formally through the maintenance of the administration itself; it had also committed to treating Micronesian illnesses, educating Micronesian children, and providing incomes to Micronesian families so they could purchase imports from Japan and the United States. Accordingly, the theory suggests that the United States should begin to extricate itself from financial obligations by gradually reducing its program of political domination.¹⁴

Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 tally the appropriations from the United States to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Between 1948 and 1950, there were actual decreases in the amounts appropriated. However, in 1951 they jumped 142 percent, followed by another jump of 111 percent. The year 1951 marks the transition of the administration of Micronesia to the Department of the Interior. Accordingly, this sharp increase in appropriations may reflect a difference in reportable costs, not an increased commitment to the maintenance of or encouragement of self-determination in Micronesia. Certain costs met by the navy in the preceding three years may not have been reportable to the United Nations. Nufer suggests that the U.S. Navy may have been spending as much as \$25 to \$30 million annually for the administration of Micronesia (Nufer 1978:51). By 1967 sources of funding for government operational support and capital improvement programs in the Trust Territory were as follows, in order of magnitude (U.S. Department of State 1967):

- 1/ annual grant provided from funding appropriated to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior
- 2/ federal (U.S.) categorical grants provided on a matching or outright grant basis
- 3/ tax revenues levied by the district governments of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
- 4/ reimbursements earned by the government of the Trust Territory for utilities provided
- 5/ international organizations

TABLE 1. Appropriations from the United States to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1948 to 1976 (000s of 1982 U.S. dollars)^a

Year	U.S. Appropriations	Trust Territory Costs	Balance (Local revenue and funds carried forward)	Percent- age of Total Met by United States	Percentage Increase in U.S. Appropriations
1948	7,739	6,120	-1,619	126.42	
1949	7,214	7,149	-65	100.89	-6.78
1950	4,916	7,676	2,760	64.00	-31.85
1951	11,918	7,921	-3,997	150.44	142.43
1952	25,158	28,228	3,070	89.11	111.09
1953	29,755	37,531	7,776	79.27	18.27
1954	28,669	30,954	2,285	92.61	-3.65
1955	24,038	29,716	5,678	80.89	-16.15
1956	25,337	35,136	9,799	72.11	5.40
1957	24,703	32,117	7,414	76.91	-2.50
1958	23,572	30,800	7,228	76.53	-4.58
1959	25,926	33,207	7,281	78.07	9.99
1960	27,377	33,028	5,561	82.89	5.60
1961	24,145	29,251	5,106	82.54	11.81
1962	23,969	30,243	6,274	79.25	0.73
1963	55,762	62,245	6,483	89.58	132.64
1964	54,347	66,054	11,707	82.27	-2.54
1965	61,403	82,480	21,077	74.44	12.98
1966	58,201	79,714	21,513	73.01	-5.21
1967	61,519	83,099	21,580	74.03	5.70
1968	91,238	106,755	15,517	85.46	48.30
1969	85,470	108,547	23,077	78.74	-6.32
1970	126,278	133,417	7,139	94.64	47.75
1971	146,009	125,343	-20,666	116.48	15.63
1972	136,940	135,815	-1,125	100.82	-6.21
1973	127,388	133,358	5,970	95.52	-7.50
1974	113,404	143,534	30,130	79.00	-10.98
1975	120,883	113,942	-6,941	106.09	6.60
1976	129,702	236,079	106,377	54.94	7.30

Sources: U.S. Department of the Navy 1948–1951; U.S. Department of State 1952–1977.

^a According to the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 (PL 99-239), the United States commits to annual payments to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, for the purposes of their development, a total of \$2.3 billion over fifteen years. PL 99-658 provides for legislation pertaining to a compact with the Republic of Palau. It commits the United States to \$450 million over a fifteen-year period beginning in FY 1994 (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1994:569).




FIGURE 1. Division of Trust Territory costs between U.S. appropriations and local revenue. (Sources: See Table 1.)




FIGURE 2. Total U.S. appropriations compared to total Trust Territory costs. (Sources: See Table 1.)

In 1963, appropriations jumped from \$23 million to \$55 million (in 1982 dollars), an increase of 132 percent. In April 1962, President Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 145, in which he wrote, "The present Administration has recognized . . . that fundamental changes have been taking place in the outlook of the peoples of the remaining dependent areas and in the attitude of the rest of the world toward these areas, bringing with it a recognition of the need for a greatly accelerated program of political, economic, and social development" (quoted in Lynch 1973:118). Furthermore, he argued that the Trust Territory must be given the real option to move into "a new and everlasting relationship with the United States within [its] political framework." Toward this end he proposed the formation of a task force that would operate with the principles of American security clearly in the fore. In May of the same year, Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 243, which commissioned Harvard business professor Anthony M. Solomon to tour Micronesia and report on its economic and social development. To be sure, Solomon made recommendations for increased outlays based on the appalling state in which the Micronesians had been kept. Still, interest in development was integrally tied to a continuing security interest. The report did not question the assumption that the United States should incorporate Micronesia into some sort of permanent relationship acceptable to the international community. It recommended that the United States hold a plebiscite in 1968, at which time the Micronesians would have the opportunity to choose between independence and a permanent relationship. It was expected that a significant increase in outlays up to 1968 would heighten a "sense of progress" and would persuade the Micronesians to choose a permanent relationship (Peoples 1985:16–17).

In the spirit with which the Solomon report was commissioned and keeping an eye on security, Kennedy set about to improve conditions with increased outlays.¹⁵ Deviating from earlier rhetoric, Kennedy appealed to a sense of moral obligation. Accordingly, he accelerated the mechanism that led to the dramatic increase in outlays in 1963. In terms of economies of scale in the production of security, he thereby created a more glaring discrepancy between the amount spent and the security realized.

Indeed, the commitments made by the Kennedy administration in the interest of an "everlasting relationship" eventually proved too costly. After Kennedy's death in 1963, the Johnson administration continued the increased outlays, but a greater proportion went to administrative costs and never reached the people directly in the form of education and health care (Meller 1966). It would be many years before the United States substantially cut its appropriations to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; for a few years after the 1963 jump, the outlays stabilized at the higher level. Yet, this

leveling itself reflects the beginning of a shift in U.S. policy. The price of administrative and social services was rising. Technology in health care, for example, was improving, but it was also marginally more expensive. Fulfillment of the promises of 1963 would have demanded increasing appropriations at a time when the value of Micronesia to U.S. defense strategy was decreasing.

Significantly, however, the appropriations took another leap (48.30 percent) in 1968 and (47.75 percent) in 1970 (see Table 1). In 1968 the Congress of Micronesia's Commission on Future Status submitted an interim report in which it defined four political alternatives for Micronesia. In July 1969, the commission submitted its second report, which called for self-government, but in free association with the United States. Finally, in October 1969, the United States and Micronesia met for the first round of future-status negotiations. The coincidence of the increase in appropriations and the activities by the Congress of Micronesia and its Future Status Commission suggests that, although maintenance of a colonial administration may have temporarily proved too costly, the United States was still deeply concerned about the implications of independence in Micronesia. And it demonstrates that the United States was willing to continue to up its ante to ensure a resolution of the negotiations that was favorable to its interests.

Dependency and the Low Risk of Opportunism. To continue the discussion of Lake's model, the risk of opportunism may be a function of the number of alternative alliances available to the periphery. By implication, this risk is a function of the ability of a local elite to organize resistance to one state and propose an alliance with another. In the early years of the Trust Territory, the Micronesians seemed too scattered and disorganized to challenge the United States successfully and court the patronage of another power. Yet there were other reasons why the United States feared that Micronesia would appropriate the gains in security intended for the United States. Specifically because it could identify no one institution with whom to ally, the United States feared that the islands might easily drift apart politically. The anarchic nature of the islands would prevent the United States from effectively controlling the area and would quickly swallow up the gains the United States sought. By treating them as one unit, the United States reversed the principle of divide and conquer and forced Micronesia into a single bargaining unit with whom it would be more convenient to negotiate. Thus, it was imperative that the United States treat this diverse group of islands as one unit. Coincidentally, the United Nations also expressed a clear interest in maintaining the integrity of Micronesia as a whole. Later attempts by the United States to deal with the Marianas sepa-

rately, in a reversal of that tactic, would be met with stiff resistance by the United Nations. And individual Micronesian islands themselves, namely, the Marianas, the Marshalls, and Palau, would eventually take advantage of this tactic.

In the mid-1960s, the development of a local ruling elite may have precluded the dissolution of cooperation among the islands against which the United States had once guarded. However, once an elite began to emerge, the United States might have cause to fear an active appropriation of their security gains by the Micronesians. The risk of opportunism may have been the highest at this time, and the principles of grand strategy would have dictated that the United States not shift its influence away from formal control. While not entirely eliminating this challenge, the United States managed to mitigate its effect. The United States had created a relationship of dependency through its financial outlays such that the Micronesians could not afford to extricate themselves completely from the influence of the United States. In other words, even though there was now theoretically a set of actors capable of exploiting the United States, these actors were constrained by another set of variables, those of financial dependence.¹⁶

Table 2 and Figure 3 display estimated figures for Micronesian imports and exports from 1949 to 1976. Until phosphate mining on Anguar ceased in 1955, Micronesia often ran a trade surplus. After 1955, however, the trade deficit grew at an alarming rate. The opportunity costs of the political relationship with the United States had risen for Micronesia. Increasing numbers of Micronesians no longer learned the art of fishing, which had sustained older generations. Their time was spent in school or in territorial administration. They had shifted from a subsistence economy based on barter to a money economy based on imports from Japan, Australia, and the United States. Furthermore, they had not developed a viable commercial fishing industry that might have helped to sustain them. In short, they could not afford to move forward without the continued support of the United States, nor could they afford to go back to a traditional way of life.¹⁷ Indeed, I would suggest that this economic reality was not simply an unintended consequence of U.S. policies. The principles explicitly stated in the Solomon report were taken up by the Nixon administration, even if the United States had failed in executing a plebiscite in 1968. In the next section I will argue for the role of the Micronesians in furthering the cause for their own self-government. But it must be kept in mind that their efforts were constrained by their own willingness to accept and to come to expect payments from the United States.¹⁸

Despite this dependence on the United States, it might be suspected that Micronesia could have broken ties and forged an alliance with some other

patron. The effects of *détente* in the 1960s notwithstanding, Micronesia might have opted for a relationship with the Soviet Union. Micronesians probably recognized, however, that the Soviet Union could not offer anything above that offered by the United States.¹⁹ And since Micronesians were not hostile toward the United States, there was no incentive to shift alliances. Furthermore, the United Nations, despite its complaints against the U.S. administration of the Trust Territory, was still clearly in favor of the United States' managing the path to self-government in Micronesia. Finally, the Soviet Union would have realistically judged the impossibility of replacing the United States as a hegemon in the Pacific, in the same sense that the United States did not realistically hope to replace the Soviet Union in the Eastern Bloc. A line had been drawn, and the two superpowers knew on which side each stood. McHenry goes so far as to suggest that both China and the Soviet Union wanted the United States in Micronesia as a deterrent to the other communist power (1975:79).²⁰

For another reason, however, the United States should not have feared opportunistic behavior from the new elite in Micronesia. The discussion of the development of nuclear capability above suggests that Micronesia would have few security gains to appropriate from the United States. The United States was realizing its economies of scale elsewhere. Thus, even if Micronesia was not financially dependent on the United States, there was no room to exploit the United States, because there was now nothing of value invested by the United States in Micronesia.²¹ Thus, the state of dependency successfully, though not necessarily intentionally, set in motion over many years reinforced the decisions made by the United States in the light of technological and political change. National security was still of paramount importance, but dependency provided extra insurance against abandonment or exploitation by Micronesia.²² It was a convenient way to substitute a more costly formal relationship with a less costly informal relationship while meeting the same objective, security.²³

To sum up the security argument, the United States identified Micronesia as a resource for the production of security because the strategic location of Micronesia provided an opportunity for the United States to realize economies of scale in the production of security. The United States chose empire over cooperation with Micronesia for two reasons. First, the costs of maintenance did not surpass the benefits derived from that empire. Second, because of the disorganized nature of the Micronesian islands, the risk of opportunism to the United States was high. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the United States could realize economies of scale through deployment of the ICBM. The costs of maintaining the empire were no longer justified in the light of new economies of scale. And the risk of opportunism

TABLE 2. Estimated Total Value of Imports and Exports for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1949 to 1976 (000s of 1982 U.S. dollars)

Year	Imports	Exports
1949	5,835	11,280 ^a
1950	6,974	8,507
1951	10,780	10,730
1952	8,768	8,300
1953	10,200	5,807
1954	10,460	15,480
1955	11,960	20,680
1956	14,500	7,911
1957	18,160	7,201
1958	18,000	6,859
1959	16,300	5,045
1960	15,050	7,596
1961	17,950	8,387
1962	15,740	8,081
1963	18,700	8,035
1964	20,600	9,580
1965	24,880	11,060
1966	29,920	10,090
1967	31,470	7,441
1968	41,000	9,141
1969	39,720	8,139
1970	54,910	10,960
1971	63,820	7,319
1972	60,120	6,020
1973	55,260	4,003
1974	56,030	15,400
1975	66,220	11,830
1976	62,430	7,832

Sources: U.S. Department of the Navy 1948–1951; U.S. Department of State 1952–1977.

^a Primary exports are phosphates (until 1955), copra, trochus, handicrafts and shells, vegetables, fish and crab, and charcoal.

was either very low because of Micronesian dependence on U.S. dollars or irrelevant because there was nothing for the Micronesians to appropriate from the United States.

Although a grand strategic analysis of U.S. behavior in Micronesia may claim to demonstrate that decolonization entails a reversal of the process of colonization, the foregoing discussion should begin to point to the complex-




FIGURE 3. **Comparison of Trust Territory imports and exports.** (Sources: See Table 2.)

ity of the issue. Thus, I would like to consider some other evidence to highlight the inadequacy of this analysis and to demonstrate that the process of decolonization is not so simple. Whereas constructing an empire has often been the result of specific interests, emanating from the metropole, whether financial or militaristic, dismantling an empire often involves the influence of actors from the periphery and the international community.

External Constraints on the Metropole

A Threat from the Local Elite. Despite the dependency on the United States, local Micronesian elites did begin to pose a political challenge to U.S. dominance. As I indicated above, the United States did not eliminate all movements toward autonomy. In 1961, in fact, it encouraged the development of the Council of Micronesia, although the movement never gained much momentum. However, by 1965 the indigenous population had established the Congress of Micronesia. Four years later, the Congress of Micronesia and representatives of the United States formally met for the first round of negotiations concerning the future political status of Micronesia. Eighteen years had passed since Truman transferred the administration of the Trust Territory to the Department of the Interior. Now it looked as though the United States was finally moving toward realization of its original commitment, though still apparently constrained by strategic interests.

Ironically, the development of the Congress of Micronesia was indirectly

facilitated by the programs committed to by the United States, even before the Americans intended or expected to change their posture in the Pacific. Although older Micronesians may have communicated among different island groups in Japanese, the younger, increasingly political, Micronesians benefited from the outlays for education, in particular the teaching of the English language. Indeed, Heine goes so far as to suggest that the "English language is the only vehicle of political unity in Micronesia" (1970: 202).²⁴ Furthermore, an increasing number of Micronesians attended the universities of Guam and Hawai'i. Students from throughout the territory met, interacted, and exchanged ideas. Consistent with the increasing number of Western-educated Micronesians, the Trust Territory administration hired more Micronesians to fill positions at both the federal and district levels. In particular, the dramatic increases in appropriations in 1963 allowed the administration to follow this hiring pattern (Nufer 1978:76).

Although the U.S. government and senior representatives in the Trust Territory continued to determine policy, Micronesians increasingly oversaw the implementation of these programs (Goodman and Moos 1981:76). Micronesians began to develop the political acumen that would enable them to effectively organize and displace the territorial government. Even as early as 1961, the *United Nations Review* reported, "The people of the territory . . . felt much closer to their government now that their own compatriots took part, and Micronesians realized that administration was their responsibility and that to discharge it they must educate themselves" (Aug. 1961, p. 16). The needs of the local bureaucracy began to create the space in which the Micronesians developed the skills and identity necessary for independence.

With this education also came a heightened awareness among the islanders of a unifying Micronesian culture. Whereas they may have formerly emphasized their individual identities as a Palauan or a Trukese, for example, increased education and participation in the territorial administration brought an appreciation of shared conditions and treatment by an outside power. Robert Trumball reported, "Peace Corpsmen who came to the Trust Territory from stations in the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia were astonished to find the Micronesians almost totally lacking in the fervent [island] nationalism seen in other peoples brought under colonization" (*New York Times*, 30 Oct. 1967, p. 1, col. 7). This finding indicates the degree to which the Micronesians began to assume an identity imposed on them from outside, that is, as a group rather than as individual entities. And this identity was apparently integral to their growing political activism. In a position paper preparatory to a round of status negotiations, one author reports, "It can be stated that [the] Congress of Micronesia has a

united front; a false sense of unity only because it has a common foe—the presence of the American Administering Authority” (Nufer 1978:71).

As the United States increasingly inculcated Western ways of thinking upon the Micronesians, the latter came to adopt a view of themselves understood by the Westerners. If they were to speak English and work in a Western form of government, they could only successfully articulate themselves in the terms provided for them. For over fifteen years, the colonial power had treated them essentially as one group, denying fundamental differences in culture, language, and kinship. But this emphasis also provided the foundation for a movement toward self-government and a local ruling elite. As Doyle suggests, “imperial development, just as it created collaboration, also created the basis for resistance and revolt: it spread technical and organization skills, it widened political horizons as it built larger national political units, and it recruited new strata into political participation” (1986:363).

Heine takes issue with the contention that Micronesia in general and its Congress in particular expressed a strong sense of unity (1970). He points to significant linguistic cleavages and particular island identities as well as a clear dissension on issues within the Congress of Micronesia. Indeed, the Northern Marianas increasingly vocalized its claim for separate status talks with the United States, and eventually Palau and the Marshall Islands would stake the same claim. Beyond the linguistic and cultural issues, the Northern Marianas probably recognized the potential for a better bargaining position with the United States if it was not constrained by its linkage with the rest of Micronesia; that is, the Northern Marianas comprised the most strategic of the Trust Territory islands, and it did not fancy the idea of seeing its tax revenue dissipated among the other, more populous areas of Micronesia. The United States was willing to treat the islands separately, reversing its earlier policy, even against the wishes of the United Nations.²⁵

My point is that, despite these cleavages, Micronesians began to demand a place at the negotiating table. Even if Nufer is correct that Micronesia shows a united front “only because it has a common foe,” it shows a front nonetheless. And it was a front with which the United States had to reckon. Even if eventually successful in capitalizing on the cultural or political cleavages, the United States still contended with calls for self-government and eventual independence from Micronesia—whether from one unified body or the four separate bodies that eventually formed.

International Pressure. One of the first challenges to the United States from the international community came with the passage of the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” on 14 December 1961. Among its provisions, the document provided that

“[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence” (*United Nations Review*, Jan. 1961, p. 7). Yet, these were just the sorts of arguments produced by the United States in defending its position in the Pacific. Ironically, the Soviet Union had been particularly vocal in the debate leading to the document’s passage. The Soviets vigorously attacked the United States for its hypocrisy, as indeed the United States seemed particularly interested in Europe’s divestment of its colonies.²⁶ Valerian Zorin, the Soviet delegate, lambasted the United States as the most powerful colonial power, one that operated with “a more dangerous and sinister aspect” (*United Nations Review*, Jan. 1961, p. 9). Although the United States may not have felt directly threatened by the Soviet Union, this criticism did bring the situation in Micronesia to the attention of the world community.²⁷

I have mentioned that with National Security Action Memorandum 145, issued in April 1962, Kennedy first articulated the need to accelerate development in the “remaining dependent areas,” and on the heels of this memorandum came the Solomon report. The action came just five months after the passage of the U.N. document on decolonization. The timing is significant and suggests that external moral pressures may have begun to influence the policy of the United States and the form that its colony in the Pacific would take.

The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, as well as the Decolonization Committee, with no authority over the Security Council, also became increasingly critical of the U.S. presence in Micronesia. Although oversight for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands fell within the Security Council, where the United States retained veto power, the Trusteeship Council sent a series of visiting missions in 1951, 1953, 1956, and 1957 to observe and report on conditions in Micronesia. Presumably under U.S. pressure, they generally reported favorably on conditions. These missions appear to have been mostly a formality, generating little reaction. In the 1960s, though still of a generally optimistic tone, the reports became more critical; and recommendations for setting specific dates to terminate the trusteeship agreement came more frequently.²⁸ Following a 1961 visit, for example, the Trusteeship Council commended the United States for progress but urged “realistic target dates for the rapid and planned advance of the territory” (*United Nations Review*, Aug. 1962, p. 27). Dr. Carlos Salamanca, the Bolivian delegate to the Trusteeship Council, quipped that “the United States is administering its Pacific Trust islands with a minimum of economic resources in a shoestring empire” (*New York Times*, 5 June 1962, p. 11, col. 1). Indeed, the most vocal opposition to the continued role of the United States in Micronesia came from members of the United Nations who had recently been

liberated themselves and who hoped to see this liberation applied to all countries.

The Soviet criticism continued beyond the debate on the declaration on colonialism. In 1965, the Soviet delegation to the Trusteeship Council charged the United States with negligence with respect to the objectives of article 6 of the U.N. Charter (*New York Times*, 10 June 1965, p. 6, col. 3). The following year, the Soviet delegation called on the United States to set a deadline for the termination of its administration of the Trust Territory, claiming that "the United States was treating the islands as a colonial military base and doing little for the people" (*New York Times*, 1 July 1966, p. 14, col. 8).²⁹

It is interesting to note that the *United Nations Review* for the decade under consideration never reported any action on the part of the Security Council pertaining to Micronesia. All of the activity reported took place within the Trusteeship Council and its visiting missions. Strikingly, there are no reports in the *Review* of the United States defending its position against the accusations of the Trusteeship Council or the Soviet Union. Whether this absence reflects a bias in reporting against the United States is difficult to ascertain. But if the silence from the United States is accurate, it may reflect a recognition by the United States that no argument it could offer for its management of Micronesia would satisfy its critics.

Another source of criticism in the 1960s came, ironically, from a program initiated by the United States itself, namely, the Peace Corps. In 1966, the United States began sending young women and men to the islands as elementary school teachers. Some of these volunteers actively encouraged the Micronesians to seek autonomy. A particular group of volunteers, dubbed the "media specialists" by Robert Trumbull (*New York Times*, 11 May 1969, p. 2, col. 3), established newspapers in most districts, criticizing the administration in weekly mimeographed publications. These activities did not go unnoticed stateside, as "American officials . . . blamed young activists in the Peace Corps [particularly some attorneys] for a . . . surge in Micronesian sentiment for independence." The U.S. government cut the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Micronesia from a high of 665 in 1968 to 411 in 1969 (*ibid.*). That the government bothered to respond in this manner suggests that the United States considered this criticism to be a potential threat.

The number of references from the *New York Times* in the preceding paragraphs indicates yet another source of pressure on the United States.³⁰ The *New York Times Index* for each of the years of the 1950s contains few references to Micronesia. Those that do exist are concerned primarily with administrative issues such as the transfer of authority to the Department of

the Interior. However, the number of articles and their length increased significantly in the 1960s. Many Americans no doubt were previously unaware of the islands' existence, much less of the nature of the agreement between the United States and Micronesia. Robert Trumbull, residing in Saipan, wrote a series of articles for the *New York Times*, often candid and critical of the U.S. administration. He reported the comment of Lazarus E. Salii (Palau), chairman of the Joint Committee on Future Status and the first president of the Republic of Palau: "Public Opinion has been so opposed to the American administration of the Trust Territory that the United States cannot take the Micronesians for granted" (*New York Times*, 7 May 1969, p. 15, col. 1).

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, the United States began to alter its relationship with Micronesia beginning in the 1960s. Following Lake's model, changes in technology and a world balance of power created the opportunity for the United States to realize economies of scale in the production of security elsewhere. Along with this opportunity, the costs of governing Micronesia began to outweigh the benefits of security for the United States. Furthermore, dependency on the United States provided insurance against abandonment, entrapment, or exploitation by Micronesians. At the same time, however, a viable local elite began to emerge in Micronesia and to challenge U.S. domination. Finally, pressure from the international community mounted against the United States and encouraged it to retreat from total political control of the islands.

A comparison of the variables that contributed to the change in U.S. policy toward Micronesia with those variables that led to the formation of the empire requires a comparative analysis of the relative importance of each variable. The question to be addressed is whether the motives that led to decolonization represent a reversal of those that contributed to colonization. As discussed in this article, strategic concerns appeared to be the principal motivation for acquiring Micronesia. A change in the forward defense strategy during the 1960s, because of a changing balance of power and technological innovation, suggests that the strategic importance of Micronesia, as originally conceived, had changed. Since this strategy appears to be the only motivation for establishing the empire, we might conclude that removal of this factor was the key event leading to decolonization. Nevertheless, when we consider the retrenchment from Okinawa and the Philippines, and if we consider that communism continued to gain ground in Southeast Asia, perhaps the United States could not, in its eyes, afford to lose control of

Micronesia. Indeed, the military value of the islands is not limited strictly to the possibility of missile deployment. Logistics are equally important (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1994). Furthermore, a purely strategic evaluation presents a one-sided analysis that ignores the very real power of the local Micronesians as well as the international community. Indeed, their position of agency in this matter should not be underestimated. In this case, then, the importance of alternative explanations for decolonization become all the more important.

Admittedly, the importance, if not the fact, of local and international pressure may be undermined by the considerable control the United States continues, even to today, to enjoy in Micronesia. Indeed, the record of U.S. management of Micronesia suggests that if a moral obligation did play a role in decolonization, it was only after a period of extended (moral) neglect. Clearly, adherence to the U.N. agreement does not fully explain U.S. policy in Micronesia. Throughout the 1950s, for instance, U.S. appropriations never rose to the annual \$7.5-million cap allowed by Congress. For years, the United States did not interfere in the daily lives of the majority of Micronesians and allowed many of them to subsist in squalid conditions. Further isolating the islands from international contact, the United States forbade civilian travel to the islands, ostensibly for security reasons.

Perhaps of greatest significance, the United States transferred the Trust Territory administration from the navy to the Department of the Interior in 1951. In keeping with the spirit of the U.N. resolution, transferring the administration to the State Department would have been much more appropriate. However, despite the U.N. resolution, some members of the U.S. Congress wanted to annex Micronesia formally and permanently. They believed that if Micronesia could play a role in containment, it might be less expensive and involve fewer problems in the long run if Micronesia was legally a part of the United States. Many in Congress really did not believe that what the United States was doing in Micronesia looked anything like what the French and British had been involved with in Africa or Asia. Indeed, at the time, few complained about U.S. control of Guam or Hawai'i.

Certain evidence needs to be highlighted, however, to suggest that, although security interest is an important variable, external moral pressure cannot be ignored. For instance, it is significant that the United States, despite creating a special designation for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, still bound itself to the principles of independent development of Micronesia in article 6 of the U.N. Charter, even if it then took fifteen years to realize these commitments. The United States also bound itself to some monitoring of development in Micronesia. Furthermore, by couching his policy toward Micronesia in moral terms, Kennedy suggested

that the United States should be prepared to relinquish this colony, even if that would contradict U.S. security interests. If the application of Lake's model presented in this article provides an accurate account of Micronesian development, then relinquishing the colony did not contradict the security interests. But this article has demonstrated that Lake's model, though not without merit, cannot provide a complete description of the case of Micronesia.

If Micronesia no longer provides a means for producing security for the United States, then why didn't the United States completely abandon Micronesia with the development of détente and the ICBM? Although the appropriations for Micronesia stopped escalating after an increase of 132 percent in 1963, why did the United States maintain appropriations, especially at a higher level? Why did the United States continue to monitor the Congress of Micronesia? And why did the United States continue to meet for status negotiations? The answers to these questions lie with moral and political pressure from Micronesia and the international community. I suggest that this pressure not only played a role in decolonization, but that it also mitigated the effects of that decolonization on Micronesia. The coincidence of international pressure and a continued interest in Micronesia subsequently provided the incentive for the United States to incorporate Micronesia into some sort of permanent relationship with the United States. By executing this relationship with the consent of the Micronesians themselves, then the international pressure would surely wane. This, then, explained the interest of the United States in the status negotiations (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1984).

In a broader sense, the case of Micronesia illustrates that even great powers in the international "state of nature" become bound to commitments and may change their policies toward their dependencies for reasons other than the great powers' own interests. It suggests that superpowers may not be completely autonomous agents, but have become involved in a complex web of international norms and standards for the treatment of nonthreatening states. Furthermore, this case argues that power does not always come from the barrel of a gun. The change in policy toward Micronesia did not require rebellion in the periphery; much less did it require external support for rebellion.³¹

Decolonization in Micronesia illustrates that independence may come from an appeal to the rights of groups to govern themselves and from the peaceful transference of those structures of governance. But more important, this all suggests that the process of decolonization is a much more complex process than colonization and that a one-to-one linking of colonization with decolonization is a dubious project.

NOTES

I would like to thank David Lake for encouraging me to pursue my interest in Micronesia and for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. I would also like to thank Arthur A. Stein, Francis X. Hezel, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful substantive comments.

1. I will use the terms *empire* and *colony* somewhat interchangeably throughout.
2. The organization of the following three paragraphs was guided by Doyle (1986: 22–30).
3. In 1886, after Pope Leo XIII resolved the dispute between Germany and Spain over the title to the islands, Spain had two governors in the islands. This situation ended with the sale to the Germans in 1899 (see Hezel 1983).
4. For a description of metropolitan internationalists versus nationalists, see Snyder 1991: chap. 7.
5. There are certainly competing labels for this sort of arrangement. For consistency's sake, I will preserve Lake's term.
6. That these represent a general law of empire building might be challenged by the reasons Spain and Germany had for colonizing the same islands. Hezel suggests that the Caroline Islands were a "token of national prestige . . . a national adornment and little more to both these European countries" (pers. com., 1994).
7. For a discussion of the Pentagon's "East Asian Base Structure," see Snyder 1991: 268–270.
8. The U.S. Navy does have SeaBee camps scattered throughout the islands, and the CIA is reported to have trained Chinese guerrillas on Saipan.
9. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, appropriations seem to indicate a renewed interest in Micronesia. In the wake of the Vietnam War, with the threat of expulsion from the Philippines and the return of Okinawa to Japan, the military began to turn its eyes to Micronesia. B-52 bombing missions to Vietnam flew over thirty hours round-trip from Guam because the Philippines would not allow bombers from Subic or Clark to fly on these missions. But at least from the early to mid-1960s the military interest seemed to wane.
10. The United States did not withdraw its forces from the Philippines, Guam, and so forth. But it had committed itself more heavily in those places in terms of military hardware and personnel. The costs of withdrawing those assets would have been much greater than withdrawing a small bureaucracy from Saipan. In other words, not only could the United States realize economies of scale elsewhere, but the cost of making that shift was minimal in the case of Micronesia. For a discussion of the U.S. Republican Party (led by Senator Robert Taft) preference for atomic power over troop deployment, see Snyder 1991:266–268.

11. Nevertheless, U.S. strategy may still have been conducted in the terms of World War II. That is, despite the introduction of the ICBMs, the United States still saw the importance of planning for conventional wars. Indeed, by the 1960s, the United States was involved in one in Vietnam. This involvement, coupled with the reality of retrenchment from Okinawa and the Philippines in the late 1960s, explains the continued strategic importance of the islands and the security interest in Micronesia when negotiations between it and the United States did begin in 1969 (F. Hezel, pers. com., 1994). These facts will lend support to the need for an alternative explanation for decolonization to be broached later in the article.

12. Hezel thinks the figure is closer to \$2 million per year (pers. com., 1994).

13. The figures for Micronesia may not include substantial sums spent by the navy (perhaps as high as \$25–\$30 million annually) in the early years of the administration that were not reported (Nufer 1978:51).

14. See Snyder's discussion of imperial overextension (1991:8–9).

15. As Hezel notes, Kennedy never had a chance to study the Solomon report carefully. He died six weeks after the report reached his desk (pers. com., 1994).

16. See Doyle 1986:43–44 for a distinction between dependency and imperialistic control.

17. My intention here is not to develop thoroughly or test a model of dependency. I only want to pay due attention to some relevant information. For the classic discussion of Dependency Theory, see Hirschman 1945.

18. In the 1970s the United States began to speak of money, at least in the cases of Palau, the Marshalls, and the Marianas, in terms of rents for specific pieces of land, rather than as direct appropriations. In either case, the incentive to allow continued U.S. control is evident.

19. For a similar argument on the inability of the Soviet Union to offer anything to Third World nations, see Walt 1987:280–281. Firth suggests that "the Islanders' best hope seem[ed] to lie in mild flirtations with non-Western powers, which ha[d] the effect of encouraging a rush of Western assistance" (1989:93).

20. However, a 1979 Interior Department "Interagency Policy Review" noted the increase of Soviet military activity and its contributions to tensions in Asia (quoted in Lutz 1984:103).

21. In an ironic development, the nuclear issue would later constrain the bargaining position of the United States vis-à-vis the Republic of Palau. In the 1980s the United States encouraged ratification of the Compact of Free Association by asserting that the United States would recognize Palau as a sovereign nation and continue to provide grants, though in exchange for certain rights. On numerous occasions, the compact was rejected by the voters because the United States refused to guarantee that it would not navigate nuclear submarines through Palauan waters.

22. Of course, the United States never actually went elsewhere. But surely the threat of abandonment was far more credible from the United States than from Micronesia.
23. If Micronesia was no longer necessary for the security of the United States, then this argument is moot. Still, the United States did keep an eye on emerging nations at this time, hoping that none would opt for communism over democracy.
24. He also states that "the only language that can unite the people of the Trust Territory is spoken by a very small proportion of the population" (Heine 1970:202–203). I discuss Heine's taking issue with the contention of unity below.
25. It should be noted that those groups that eventually did go their separate ways, that is, the Northern Marianas, Palau, and the Marshall Islands, each had something of more strategic value to offer the United States compared to those states that formed the Federated States of Micronesia.
26. During the debates leading up to the Trusteeship Agreement in 1946–1947, the Soviet Union had expressed concern over the U.S. position, but it backed down and eventually voted in favor of the agreement. Goodman and Moos suggest that the Soviet Union may have acquiesced in the light of its interest in securing Eritrea after the departure of the Italians (1981:69).
27. In the final vote for the "Declaration on Independence," the Soviet Union's proposed amendments were rejected. The final draft was accepted unanimously (eighty-nine votes), with nine abstentions: Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
28. The Trusteeship Council also sent visiting missions in 1961, 1964, and 1967.
29. The *New York Times* reported twelve days later, "An amendment put forward by the Soviet Union that would have set a deadline for a vote by the islanders on self-determination was defeated" (13 July 1966, p. 19, col. 6).
30. I do not purport to offer here an extensive discussion of the role of the media in influencing foreign policy or the influence, by implication, of the public over foreign policy. The tools and data I have here only allow me to indicate a strong correlation and to hypothesize a causative relation, the test of which must be conducted elsewhere (see Kegley and Wittkopf 1991; Risse-Kappen 1991).
31. I thank Arthur Stein for articulating this last point.

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TERMINATING TRUSTEESHIP FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS: INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PACIFIC

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Big-power disagreements delayed United Nations Security Council approval of trusteeship termination for the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) through the 1980s, but when Russian (then Soviet) policies changed with the end of the cold war, the United States was able to engineer a favorable council vote in 1990. U.N. membership followed for both countries in 1991, effectively resolving any latent questions of their political status on the world stage. The end of the cold war also diminished the U.S. strategic military interests that had driven American policies and justified financial largess toward the islands. Under U.S. tutelage, the economies of both the Federated States and the Marshalls had become heavily dependent on U.S. assistance. The outlook remains bleak in light of the general failure of development programs, a situation that will be exacerbated by decreases in U.S. aid. Sustaining even the current relatively low standard of living will depend more on the evolution of a fundamentally different relationship between the United States and the two countries than on continued efforts along traditional development lines.

Introduction: The Trusteeship Is Dead, Long Live . . .

[In Pohnpei] as in the Marshalls, arguments about what the place is now shade into disputes about what it will become—an inde-

pendent nation with close, friendly ties to the United States or a pathetic American client state, dependent and adrift.¹

SO OBSERVED American writer P. F. Kluge on returning to Micronesia in 1989. Twenty-five years earlier, then with the Peace Corps, he had helped the islanders draft the "Declaration of Intent" to state their aspirations as negotiations with the United States got under way to decide their future. Today, in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM or Federated States) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI or the Marshalls) doubts continue with the approach of 2001, the year that marks the end of the initial term of the bilateral arrangements with the United States.

Where are these two island states politically and economically? Politically, they have arrived on the world stage—the end of the cold war permitted resolution of legal and political status questions. The first two sections of this article examine the process that led first to formal trusteeship termination in the U.N. Security Council,² and then to U.N. membership. The third section briefly analyzes the concomitant change in the strategic military picture and its implications for the islands.

Economically, progress toward self-sufficiency has faltered badly, with heavy dependency arguably inculcated by U.S. material assistance. The following section looks at this dismaying picture and the prospects. In the final section, we draw conclusions about the islands' current status and suggest directions for the future.

Trusteeship Termination—Hostage to Big-Power Politics

By late 1986, self-determination for the FSM and the Marshalls had been accomplished in all essential respects, but big-power politics had intervened in the arenas where the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council hold sway.³

A basic Compact of Free Association with separate subsidiary agreements for each entity had been negotiated to final signature. Plebiscites had been held in both territories in 1983, duly observed and validated by visiting missions of the U.N. Trusteeship Council. The U.S. Congress had passed all necessary enabling legislation. The stage was set for ending what had become the United Nations' last remaining trusteeship.⁴

The Legal Issue

The essence of the legal question as of late 1986 was whether the Micronesians had exercised their right to self-determination so that the trusteeship

could be terminated accordingly. Article 83 of the U.N. Charter assigns to the Security Council responsibility for determining the answer: "1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council."⁵

Until 1990, however, the Soviet Union gave an emphatic *nyet* to trusteeship termination. After the plebiscites, the British and French were satisfied that self-determination requirements had been met, but they still wanted Security Council action. Their concerns were legal and political: insistence on "proper" legal application of the U.N. Charter and fear of precedent potentially affecting their own territories.

This halfway position taken by the British and French allowed the United States to bring matters to a head in the Trusteeship Council under its rules of majority voting without a veto. On 28 May 1986 the council, by a vote of three (United States, United Kingdom, France) to one (the Soviet Union),⁶ passed Resolution 2183 (53), which was unambiguous on the specific questions of self-determination and trusteeship termination. The council, it read, *inter alia*, "1. Notes that the people [of the FSM and the Marshalls] . . . have freely exercised their right to self-determination. . . . 3. Considers that the Government of the United States, as the Administering Authority, has satisfactorily discharged its obligations under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and that it is appropriate for that Agreement to be terminated."⁷

U.S. Unilateral Action

Facing a certain Soviet veto in the Security Council, the United States acted unilaterally to implement the Compacts of Free Association, arguing that a Security Council vote was not required by the U.N. Charter, notwithstanding the language of article 83. On 3 November 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan issued a proclamation declaring the trusteeship agreement no longer in effect as of 21 October 1986, with respect to the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and as of 3 November 1986, with respect to the Federated States of Micronesia, with the Compacts of Free Association in "full force and effect" on the same dates.⁸

The U.S. president's action was dictated by the perceived need to implement the process of self-determination that had proceeded so laboriously over the previous fifteen years. The dominant U.S. view in both the administration and Congress was that the compacts represented a fair deal for both sides and that the majority of islanders clearly wanted to move ahead on that basis.

The U.S. unilateral move did not find broad acceptance. Despite their

votes in the Trusteeship Council, the British and French, along with a number of other nations, withheld diplomatic recognition of the island states pending Security Council action. The FSM and the Marshalls were left in a kind of international limbo.

A desultory campaign by the United States, the Federated States, and the Marshalls ensued to pressure other countries to recognize the two states. The effort met with relatively little success, although the key South Pacific nations of Fiji and Papua New Guinea shifted in late 1988 to support their fellow island states with establishment of full diplomatic relations.⁹

Resolution of the Impasse

The stalemate continued into 1990. By that year, the collapse of the Soviet Union was well under way and “new think” had become the order of the day in most aspects of Soviet foreign policy. In the changed circumstances, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York recognized that the former ideological and strategic security concerns of the Soviet Union no longer applied. Washington agreed, and approaches were made by the U.S. State Department to the Soviet Union to sound out its willingness to forgo a Security Council veto.

In the course of the 1986 Trusteeship Council vote, the Soviet representative had repeated long-standing Soviet objections that the islands were too dependent to be able to express free choice; the United States had “illegally” fragmented the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and the main goal of the United States was to turn the territories into a “military-strategic springboard” in the western Pacific.¹⁰ By 1990, much of this argumentation was ringing hollow against the background of Baltic nation appeals to the United Nations for release from Moscow’s grip. Nevertheless, the Soviet hard line persisted in initial exchanges with the United States.

However, given the Russian military pull-back to a defensive posture and the virtual end of nuclear confrontation, in any serious analysis of its interests by then, Moscow surely had to recognize that competition in the mid-Pacific for strategic advantage was no longer in its interest. Improved relations with the West and potential Western financial assistance now loomed much larger than military rivalry or gains from continuing the propagandistic, anticolonial lines of the past.

Thus, when U.S. diplomats raised the issue at high levels on the margin of talks on other subjects in late 1990, it was speedily resolved. The Soviet Union acquiesced to Security Council action; in return, the United States granted the Soviet Union a fig leaf—restatement of declared policy that the American government had no intention to establish new military bases in the areas concerned.

With the Soviet veto threat out of the way, the only other potentially serious sticking point to Security Council action was the circulation of a letter from the governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), who objected to trusteeship termination for the CNMI and urged continued U.N. "protection" against unilateral U.S. actions.¹¹ Since anticolonialism had remained a kind of last bastion of United States-bashing in the United Nations, the governor's letter caused a certain discomfort with Security Council members such as Cuba, Ethiopia, and China.

Key Pacific island nations, however, openly welcomed trusteeship termination and largely ignored the CNMI appeal. The permanent representatives from Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea sent official letters to the Security Council conveying South Pacific Forum support for an affirmative council vote. Moreover, the history of the CNMI's own vociferous choice in 1975, when it was the first to split off from the rest of the Trust Territory, was a matter of clear record. In the end, the CNMI objections fell by the wayside.

Matters proceeded to a conclusion on 22 December 1990. Of fifteen council members, all but the Cubans voted yes. The Cuban representative's explanation of his vote was couched in ideological terms, citing procedural problems, the letter of the governor of CNMI, and a U.S. television program critical of U.S. policy in the Marshalls.¹² Ironically, in the name of anti-colonialism Cuba alone voted in favor of continuing a colonial relationship!

The Security Council vote resolved the legal question of the charter requirement for trusteeship termination. The result did not, however, automatically assure progress to the next step—U.N. membership for the islands—or answer all doubts about their sovereignty and independence.

U.N. Membership: The Final Hurdle to International Recognition

Eligibility for membership in the United Nations hinged on the ability of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, like any aspirants, to meet the requirements of article 4 of the U.N. Charter: "1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."¹³

Behind the scenes, some (mostly Western) diplomats and legal advisers questioned whether FSM and RMI delegations to the United Nations could vote freely or pursue their own national interests faithfully, given constraints built into the Compacts of Free Association. Of specific concern were compact provisions requiring the FSM and RMI governments to "consult, in the conduct of their foreign affairs, with the United States." The most restrictive

formulation is in section 313(a) of the basic compact text, which states, "The Governments of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia shall refrain from actions which *the Government of the United States determines*, after appropriate consultations with those Governments, to be incompatible with its authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia" (emphasis added).¹⁴

Beyond this problem specific to the basic compact lurked the broader issue of microstates and their membership in the United Nations. How small is too small? At what point are a state's own resources so insignificant as to make that state virtually weightless in the U.N. context, with reference not only to voting but also to contributing to U.N. activities and coffers?

For the United States, at least, the lawyers' concerns were more than offset by a strong realpolitik view in Washington that, as long as "rogue" countries such as Cuba, Libya, Iraq, and Iran enjoyed full membership, the United States should aggressively support the Federated States and the Marshalls for their voting power, if nothing else. Moreover, the argument against microstate memberships was largely swept aside by the admission in 1990 of well-heeled, European, Liechtenstein, despite its small size (population under thirty thousand) and its assignment of some sovereign responsibilities to Switzerland.

In any case, the Federated States and the Marshalls enjoyed broad support from fellow Pacific islanders as well as from the numerous former colonies in the United Nations. Most developed countries feared opposition on their part would raise the specter of colonialism. Thus, an overwhelmingly favorable vote on membership was assured.

On 17 September 1991, the General Assembly voted to accept both countries. With U.N. membership, legal questions about the sovereignty and independence of the two countries were essentially overcome. Politics resolved the issue for practical purposes.¹⁵

Declining Strategic Value

The military strategic value of the islands was undeniably the dominant consideration in U.S. policy for nearly forty years from the inception of the trusteeship in 1947.¹⁶ For America, the experience of fighting to drive the Japanese off the islands in World War II bred a "never again" attitude, especially in the U.S. Congress.

In this context, the U.S. military's operational concerns were to assure, should war come, both complete freedom of action and denial of the area to potential adversaries. These factors underlay the compact provisions that grant the United States rights to use American nuclear forces, to have access

to land and naval bases in the islands, and to control the presence of any other military force. The U.S. Pentagon viewed these terms as essential to guarantee the defense of the islands (as well, obviously, as of the United States) in contingencies up to and including nuclear war. The United States was not willing to establish two separate defense regimes, one for the islands and one for the United States itself. Overall, American officials believed the military aspects to be fair and balanced, given risks to U.S. forces for defense of the islands in worst-case scenarios contemplated through the 1970s.

However, some commentators deemed the compacts to be instruments of U.S. imperialism. As late as 1991, for example, one article called the U.S. approach “something akin to imperial control” and asserted that “not only is autonomy severely affected by economic dependency, but national sovereignty is denied by the absence of international recognition and *by American military control*” (emphasis added).¹⁷

Whatever the design of the military aspects of bilateral agreements, by the late 1980s the strategic value of the islands had greatly declined and the American military had begun retrenching. For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will almost certainly further contract, relying on existing basing arrangements in Guam, CNMI (Tinian), and the Kwajalein missile range facility in the Marshalls. Although there are many possible scenarios (e.g., with a nuclear China or a resurgent Russia), as a practical matter the U.S. military has neither the inclination nor the funding to expand or exercise any sort of control beyond continued operations at the above-mentioned existing facilities.

This decline in U.S. military strategic interest may have profound and economically adverse consequences for the islands. An immediate specific problem would arise for the Marshalls if Kwajalein closed or contracted, since the Marshalls draw substantial income from its presence and would have no prospects for many years of making up the difference. More important, the strategic value of all the old Trust Territory islands has been the major justification for the large sums of money provided by the U.S. Congress for economic and social program assistance.¹⁸

Although the fact of change in the strategic picture is well recognized both in Washington and in the islands, more study and open discussion is needed for a better understanding of the consequences for the islands’ future relationship with the United States.

Coming to Grips with Economic Dependence

“Self-sufficiency” was the original goal of economic development policy for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The United States invited high

expectations when it signed the 1947 Trusteeship Agreement committing America "to promote the economic advancement *and self-sufficiency* of the inhabitants" (emphasis added).¹⁹ By inserting the words "and self-sufficiency," U.S. drafters of the agreement went beyond the U.N. Charter, which in article 76 charged trustees only to promote the "economic advancement" of the inhabitants.

Although little was done for years after World War II, once development efforts got under way, planning consistently identified tourism, fishing, agriculture (primarily copra), and handicrafts as promising economic activities for the Federated States and the Marshalls (as well as other Pacific islands). All have been pursued with varying degrees of success. More recently, there have also been efforts to exploit economic niches with particular activities such as philately, the selling of passports (in the Marshalls), and textile production to take advantage of access to the U.S. market. Some have dreamed of the kind of offshore banking or financial operations that give Bermuda and the Caymans substantial incomes, but so far little has developed along these lines.

Doubts had been expressed periodically about the prospects for self-sufficiency. As early as 1972, Virginia McClam put the pessimistic view succinctly: "In my opinion, however, both the United Nations and the [private U.S. firm] Nathan Associates nurtured false hopes in the minds of the Micronesians. . . . Though economic development is a worthy aim, Micronesian self-sufficiency is, in my view, an illusion and a dream."²⁰

Dependence Writ Large

Development programs in any case continued on traditional lines with little real progress—today, the extent of dependence is evident and dismaying. For fiscal year 1992, the contribution (cost) of U.S. government programs was estimated at roughly \$100 million for the Marshalls and \$130 million for the Federated States. This compares to their 1989 estimated GDP of \$63 million and \$150 million, respectively.²¹

One 1987 survey, pointedly titled "The Economics of Dependency in the Marshall Islands," found that 92 percent of food is imported, the economy is "almost totally dependent on external subsidies," health services are inequitable, the standard of education is low, and "only 35 percent of the available workforce is employed and [of these] over half are in the public sector."²² Another researcher observed in 1992 that "some Pacific islands, notably the FSM and RMI, have become dependent on imported food to the extent that there are negative implications for their trading balances and future economic development."²³ As concerns problems in education, another com-

mentator noted with evident understatement that “most important to an appropriate literary curriculum in Micronesia is the recognition that achieved literacy is not widespread either in the home language or in English in most parts of the region.”²⁴

To better understand these kinds of problems, which are by no means unique to the FSM and the Marshalls, a number of analysts have newly examined the dynamics of island microstate development. I. G. Bertram and R. F. Watters propounded the emergence of “MIRAB” economies, MIRAB being an acronym for *m*igration, *r*emittances, *a*id financing, and *b*ureaucracy. The “MIRAB process,” they found, *inter alia*, “involved closer integration of the islands’ economies with that of the mainland . . . turned the islands from resource-based into rent-based economies . . . skewed the occupational structure toward bureaucracy and non-agricultural activities” and evolved “multinational kin networks” of mobile islanders moving to the mainland to earn money, portions of which were remitted home.²⁵

While not all would agree that the MIRAB paradigm applies comprehensively to the Federated States and the Marshalls, the economic fault lines are comparable. Migration does appear to be of growing importance. In the FSM, particularly, emigration to Guam and CNMI became a major factor with the implementation of the compact in 1986 and has steadily increased. Studies document that FSM citizen arrivals in Guam rose from fewer than one hundred in 1985 to about nine hundred in 1989. It was predicted that by the year 2000, there will be twenty thousand people from the FSM on Guam and by about 2015, as many as forty thousand. Although most of the Micronesians work in low-skill jobs and many are homeless or below poverty level, their collective 1992 earnings in Guam approximated \$25 to \$30 million. There has also been substantial emigration from the FSM to the Northern Marianas.²⁶

From the Marshalls, however, emigration to date appears relatively low, although three or four expatriate communities have become well established in the United States.²⁷ Compared to the Federated States, the Marshalls have traditionally sent fewer students abroad and enjoyed higher income at home owing to the major U.S. military facility on Kwajalein. Moreover, remittances from the Marshallese in the United States are probably negative, that is, more money comes from the Marshalls to the United States, at least currently.

Self-Sufficiency to Self-Reliance to Sustainable Development to . . .

Despite the grim picture of deepening dependency, the FSM, RMI, and U.S. governments have persisted with traditional development policies and

euphemistic policy phrases such as “enhancing” or “promoting” self-sufficiency.²⁸

The FSM National Development Plan projects three five-year phases from 1985 through 1999, with the third phase titled “Achievement of Economic Self-Reliance.”²⁹ The plan proposes to achieve this objective essentially by following the past development model of attracting foreign investment, sustaining substantial foreign assistance, and promoting fishing and tourism—the approach initiated in the late 1960s and 1970s, which more recently has been only marginally bolstered by additional goals of promoting subsistence agriculture and entrepreneurship. The lasting siren song of self-sufficiency was reflected in a 1993 report, noting that in the plan, “and seconded by President Olter in conversations, the road to economic self-sufficiency must pass through marine resources.”³⁰

The second five-year plan of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, approved by the cabinet in June 1992, emphasizes similar programs, calls for a “self-sustaining” growth process, elimination of “lopsided” dependence on foreign assistance, and development of new sources of foreign aid. In October 1992, the RMI finance minister returned from International Monetary Fund/World Bank meetings in Washington and spoke of RMI economic restructuring to move from aid dependence to self-reliance.³¹

For its part, the U.S. government undertook a major interagency review of the situation in 1993 and concluded there was need for economic restructuring to promote “sustainable development.” A four-part action plan was devised, emphasizing establishment of FSM and RMI policy guidelines addressing these goals, annual bilateral consultations with the United States, a multilateral consultative group convened by the Asian Development Bank, and stronger expert advice. Meetings in Manila with the Asian Development Bank and talks with RMI and FSM representatives put this approach in train in early 1994.³²

The Emperor's Clothes?

Can development succeed under the best of circumstances? It must be recognized that compact aid and the development efforts of the local governments have brought considerable benefit to the citizens. Per capita incomes and social service levels in the FSM and the Marshalls are well above the average for similar small Pacific island countries (except the French territories, where there are comparable and equally dependent economies).

Although the traditional model of island economic development (foreign investment, tourism, fishing, and agriculture) cannot be ignored totally by any means, its application to the Federated States and the Marshalls is ques-

tionable at best. In Guam and CNMI, where such an approach was followed under conditions of much closer association with the United States, per-capita income had grown by 1990 to \$11,500 (Guam) and \$7,598 (CNMI).³³ But, the people of the FSM and RMI cannot replicate the history of Guam or CNMI; nor do they seem inclined to compete seriously with them for foreign investment and its accompanying problems.

There is no existing plan or reasonable economic projection that suggests significant growth for the Federated States or the Marshalls in the foreseeable future. Some improvement may be possible, but the evident concern as of 1994 is whether the islands can maintain current levels of economic activity in the face of anticipated declines in U.S. assistance. The proverbial economic "bottom line" seems to be marginal expansion at best. A 1992 report found that for the period 1983 to 1988, "per capita real GNP appears to have fallen because of the very high rate of population growth."³⁴ To borrow a phrase from one analyst, successful development remains a "mirage" that continues to mesmerize governments involved.³⁵ It is time to recognize openly that following the development lines of the past three decades will not break the cycle of dependence.

Conclusion: Toward a New Trust with America

As of late 1994, the state of affairs in the two island states seems clear: (1) they are sovereign and politically independent, albeit with lingering fears that this independence may mean little unless economic dependence can be decreased; but (2) there is no good plan to assure economic development in the face of declining U.S. assistance, assuming the people of the Federated States and the Marshall Islands do not wish to accept major reductions in their standard of living. What is to be done? As a first step, old assumptions must be reevaluated with an eye to the future. Three underlying patterns emerge from the last decade:

- 1/ The strategic underpinnings of the relationship with the United States have changed dramatically.
- 2/ The islanders' national political identity and place on the world stage have become realities.
- 3/ The traditional development approach has essentially failed.

Strategic Ties

Strategic value has declined, but not to zero. American strategists must still consider the possibility that some power could in years to come develop hostile intent and threaten U.S. interests in the region. In any case, important

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) still traverse FSM and RMI waters. And, as U.S. President Bill Clinton emphasized in a seminal security-policy speech before the South Korean National Assembly on 10 July 1993, the United States will maintain a military forward presence extending well beyond the islands.

The Compacts of Free Association have been overtaken by events, and the islanders need to know where they stand. The United States must rearticulate how the islands fit into American defense strategy for the future.

Islander Identity

The world continues to change, and to (badly) paraphrase John Donne, no island is an island. The Federated States and the Marshall Islands are being changed for better or for worse by such phenomena as cable television, nascent newspapers, foreign ambassadors, ambitious entrepreneurs, population pressures, and escalating emigration. The islands moved under U.S. administration from relative isolation to a long period of Americanization and aggressive paternalistic development, which not only "created a legacy of dependency,"³⁶ but also partially propelled the islanders into twentieth-century Westernized ways of living.

At the same time, the peoples of the Marshalls and the Federated States are part of a larger Pacific community, which is seeking to express a post-colonial "Pacific Way" of life. There is increasing interaction with other peoples and governments, especially of the Pacific Rim.

Special and difficult burdens rest with island leadership. There is a crucial need for islanders to forge consensus on what kind of societies they want to have. They will have to answer from their own perspective questions of how small is still beautiful, how many foreign laborers/entrepreneurs are too many, or how much they want their islands to look like Guam or Saipan.

The many Americans who want to help need to tap more into an islander vision and rely less on their own. The recent history of the two island groups has been driven by outsiders, principally Americans. The islanders generally had to accept the American vision and play by the American rules. Now, Washington's insistence is fast waning and new constructs for the future must be put in place.

Radically New Development Strategy

Continuation of current development policies will not provide a standard of living acceptable to the vast majority of islanders without unending infusions

of foreign aid. On the present course little, if any, real increase in per-capita GNP is likely. To achieve substantial growth, there almost surely has to be a qualitative change, indeed a revolution, of current development strategy. America must remain at the center (because, when all is said and done, there is no real alternative), and the focus has to be much more on ways that resource transfers from the United States to the islands can be both augmented and shifted from the public to the private sector.

To the authors, this suggests stepping back and starting over with a new vision based on partnership well into the next millennium. Such partnership has to flow in the first instance from what the islanders themselves want, and hence the importance of clearer articulation of their goals. There is much in the relationship between America and the islands to build on, over and above the asset of militarily strategic location. Many thousands of Americans know the islanders and have great sympathy for them—potential support that can be better mobilized if concrete objectives are put forth. Many islanders have established themselves in the United States; they too should be encouraged to tell the islands' story and to seek a broader-based understanding in America.

If the islanders seek substantial increases in income without further sacrifice of environment or life-style, a redefinition of the relationship might, for example, allow much greater exploitation of access to the U.S. labor market as granted by the compacts. Economically, this is a potentially enormous national asset. With focused government policies on both ends, could not FSM and RMI workers be channeled to productive jobs, remittances maximized, and stable flows of people encouraged, whether in one or both directions? An example of the kind of idea that might be explored is establishment in the islands of "remittance banks," which could give higher interest rates as inducements for the return of capital and the generation of funds for development projects rather than consumption.³⁷ The point is not to charge off with this or that new program, but rather to begin to articulate a vision of the future and conceive a qualitatively new United States-island relationship that fits and supports the vision. Otherwise, the future is likely at best to be no better than the present, at worst to be an irresistible downward spiral.

Many in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands already have a sense of new times and the urgent need to adjust to them. Their problem is to translate perceptions into concrete actions. Former FSM President John Haglelgam undoubtedly mirrored the thoughts of many islanders on this point when he wrote in early 1993: "While we want to preserve the best and most genuine elements of our culture, customs and traditions, we do not want the world to pass us by. We do

not want to fail to be participants in our new fast-moving, interdependent world. If we fail to participate and even to compete, we may find that the rich potentials of our people and our islands lie dormant, and that the complexity of the twenty-first century world will impoverish us.”³⁸

NOTES

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1. P. F. Kluge, *The Edge of Paradise: America in Micronesia* (New York: Random House, 1991), 68.

2. The authors were both directly involved as members of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

3. China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States constitute the so-called Perm Five, designated in the U.N. Charter as permanent members of both the U.N. Security Council, where they have veto power, and the Trusteeship Council, where the veto power does not apply.

4. For an excellent overview, see Robert C. Kiste, “Termination of the U.S. Trusteeship in Micronesia,” *Journal of Pacific History* 21 (July 1986): 127–138. In Palau, a parallel compact had also been approved by negotiators, but a constitutional requirement for ratification by 75 percent of voters was not met in the 1983 plebiscite. Palauan issues subsequently followed their own track separate from the Marshalls and the Federated States.

5. United Nations, Office of Public Information, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, DPI/511–40303 (New York, 1987); hereafter U.N. Charter.

6. The only other member of the council at the time, China, had chosen not to participate in council deliberations. By 1991, when the final stages of the trusteeship story were being played out, China had reasserted an active role in council activities.

7. U.S. Department of State, *Annual Report FY 1986—Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands* (Washington, D.C., 1987), 325–326. Such U.N. documents are also available in various U.N. publications; this particular State Department report has a handy compendium of the several related U.N. and U.S. government documents.

8. *Ibid.*, 273–275.

9. For a thorough review of diplomatic recognition actions, see Michael Zdanovich, "From Dependency to Sovereignty," *East-West Center Current Affairs Notes* 25 (1991).
10. Excerpted from the *U.N. Chronicle* in Daphne Doran Lincoff, ed., *Annual Review of UN Affairs 1986* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1988), 225–231.
11. Many observers felt the governor was using the U.N. stage to air standing grievances principally as a way to pressure the U.S. government for more forthcoming responses in bilateral talks.
12. U.N. document S/PV.2972 (New York, 1990).
13. U.N. Charter.
14. President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, *Compilation of Agreements between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands* (Washington, D.C., 1987). A parallel volume was published for the Federated States of Micronesia.
15. Lawyers and diplomats continue to debate the legal aspects of sovereignty and independence in the RMI and FSM cases. U.S. State Department officer Edward Michal has suggested use of the term "protected states" to describe the two countries as ones that are fully independent but have made arrangements with a larger power to provide for their security. See Edward J. Michal, "Protected States: The Political Status of FSM and RMI," *Contemporary Pacific* 5, no. 2 (1993): 303–332.
16. Donald McHenry, in his seminal book, focused squarely on the U.S. dilemma: "how to reconcile traditional American views in favor of self-government and self-determination with the belief that American control of Micronesia was required" (*Micronesia, Trust Betrayed* [New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975], 2).
17. Roy H. Smith and Michael C. Pugh, "Micronesian Trust Territories—Imperialism Continues?" *Pacific Review* 4, no. 1 (1991): 36–44.
18. One reflection of the changing times was the serious suggestion made at policy levels in Washington in 1993 that to save U.S. budget dollars Palauans, whose political status was still pending resolution at the time, be encouraged to opt for compact abrogation. Palau was judged to have little remaining strategic value despite persistent—and simply wrong—rumors that the U.S. military was about to move its Philippine arsenals there. (This recounting is based on personal recollection of one of the authors.)
19. Department of State, *Annual Report FY 1986*, 267–270.
20. Virginia McClam, "The Micronesian Islands: Economic Self-sufficiency versus Political Self-determination," in *Micronesian Realities: Political and Economic*, ed. Frances McReynolds Smith, 188–189 (Santa Cruz: University of California at Santa Cruz, 1972).
21. U.S. government program cost estimates from U.S. government sources, 1993; GDP estimates from *CIA World Factbook* (Washington, D.C., 1992 edition). All dollar figures are in U.S. dollars.

22. Pamela Thomas, "The Economics of Dependency in the Marshall Islands," *Pacific Economic Bulletin* 2, no. 2 (1987): 25–30.
23. Penelope Schoeffel, "Food, Health, and Development in the Pacific Islands: Implications for Micronesia," *ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1992): 289–321.
24. Mary L. Spencer, "Literacy in Micronesia," *ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1992): 223–245.
25. G. Bertram and R. F. Watters, "The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates," *Pacific Viewpoint* 26, no. 3 (1985): 497–519. See also Bertram and Watters, "The MIRAB Process: Earlier Analyses in Context," *Pacific Viewpoint* 27, no. 1 (1986): 47–59; and Geoffrey Bertram, "'Sustainable Development' in Pacific Micro-economies," *World Development* 14, no. 7 (1986): 809–822.
26. This discussion is based in large part on Donald H. Rubenstein and Michael J. Levin, "Micronesian Migration to Guam: Social and Economic Characteristics," *Asia and Pacific Migration Journal* 1, no. 2 (1992): 350–385; supplemented by Francis X. Hezel and Thomas B. McGrath, "The Great Flight Northward: FSM Migration to Guam," *Pacific Studies* 13, no. 1 (1989): 47–64.
27. Jim Hess, "Migration, Networks, Resources, and Households: The Formation of a Marshallese Community in Orange County" (unpublished monograph, 1992).
28. One of the better (or worse) examples is *The Challenge of Enhancing Micronesian Self-sufficiency* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, ID-83-1, 25 January 1983); the cover page includes the observation that "enhancing their institutional capabilities and their self-sufficiency will require substantial technical assistance."
29. Federated States of Micronesia, Office of Planning and Statistics, *First National Development Plan 1985–1989* (Kolonia, Pohnpei, 1984).
30. Gene Ashby, "100th Issue Special Report—Federated States of Micronesia," *Pacific Magazine*, July/August 1993: 44.
31. Cited in unpublished U.S. Embassy reports.
32. U.S. government sources in conversations with the authors, February 1994.
33. United States Department of Interior, *A Report on the State of the Islands* (Washington, D.C., 1992).
34. Bank of Hawaii, *Pacific Islands Economic Trends*, report to the Pacific Business Opportunities Conference, Honolulu, January 1992.
35. John Connell, "Island Microstates: The Mirage of Development," *The Contemporary Pacific* 3, no. 2 (1991): 251–287. The author asserts that for many island microstates "development is a wholly relative concept," largely irrelevant to current economic planning. Although not specifically addressing the FSM or RMI, much of his argument is on target there as well.

36. Kiste, "Termination of the U.S. Trusteeship," 129.
37. In his study of five smaller Pacific island microeconomies linked to Australia and New Zealand, Bertram proposed radical reorientation of development policies and called attention in particular to the importance of rents and migrant remittances. See Bertram, "'Sustainable Development.'"
38. John Haglelgam, *Continental Airlines Pacifica Magazine*, Summer 1993.

THE THEME OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE LITERATURE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 1969–1979

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The author gives an overview of the English-language literature—fiction, poetry, drama, autobiographies, and essays—written by indigenous Papua New Guineans between 1969 and 1979, a time of intense nationalistic fervor. She then provides a brief historical survey of the country's major changes, including Western colonization and political independence in 1975, before moving into a detailed thematic discussion of the treatment of social change in texts by the country's "first wave" writers during this decade.

SOCIAL CHANGE is a central concern in the literature of the Pacific islands. This article offers a reappraisal of the first ten years of English literature written by indigenous Papua New Guineans.

The period under discussion has already received substantial critical attention. Elton Brash (1973:168–169), Bernard Minol (1987a), Carroll Elizabeth Simons (1979), Subramani (1985:x), and Chris Tiffin (1978b: 1–6) have traced the dramatic emergence of the first "wave" of creative writing in the pre-independence years. Kirsty Powell has examined the work of Papua New Guinea's first playwrights (1978), and William McGaw has discussed aspects of pre-independence poetry (1987). Nigel Krauth has written essays about specific writers (1975; 1979b) and, in broader terms, about the role of writers in Papua New Guinea (1978c; 1978d). Both Krauth (1978c) and Joseph Sukwianomb (1982) have analyzed the decline in literary output after independence and have suggested reasons for this trend.

The present article revisits the 1970s and builds on these scholars' contri-

butions by adopting a thematic perspective. In focusing on social change as a literary theme, I pinpoint a phenomenon that has characterized Papua New Guinea's recent history. There are good reasons to look again at the 1970s, for they were the country's most productive and energetic writing period to date. A major impetus was the political climate at the time, with the push for independence fueling young writers' energies. Much of their work was overtly political, aiming to strengthen their readers' sense of identity and national pride. In contrast, the writing of the 1980s was more measured, placing greater weight on sober self-assessment, consolidation, and growth.

Research Overview

I began researching Papua New Guinean literature in 1991 for my M.A. thesis, titled "Changing World: The Theme of Social Change in Papua New Guinean Writing in English, 1969–1989" (Gorle 1993). The period under investigation begins with Vincent Eri's novel *The Crocodile* ([1970] 1981) and represents the country's first twenty years of indigenous literary output in English.

The central argument of my thesis is that Papua New Guinea's first writers sought to do more than simply reflect change as a tangible reality in their society. Their role extended beyond the mimetic into the dynamic sphere as they worked to shape social change by challenging existing attitudes and raising people's consciousness of their unique cultural heritage.

I chose to focus on social change as a literary theme because Papua New Guinea is often cited as an example of unusually rapid change:¹ a phenomenon that the tourist industry, to name just one group, has identified to its advantage. Behind the "stone age to space age" clichés, however, lies the sober reality of the tensions that these changes have brought: tensions between traditional and imported cultures, between urban and rural lifestyles,² and between the small, well-educated elite and the mass of ordinary people (many of whom are not part of the cash society and neither speak nor read English).³ I first visited Papua New Guinea in 1980 and stayed for two years. On my return in 1990 to take up a lecturing post, I quickly learned that a great deal had changed: increased urbanization, greater concern about unemployment and urban drift, the sudden explosion of technology, the presence of a national television network. The rate and the effects of change are vital concerns in the country and in the minds of many of its thinkers.

Because change is a sociopolitical phenomenon, my research ventured beyond those materials that have traditionally been considered literary.

Thus, while concentrating on fiction, poetry, and drama, I also looked at autobiographies, essays, and selected letters to *The Times of Papua New Guinea* from the 1980s. In addition, I interviewed several writers in the Port Moresby area, seeking their views on writing, the changes in their society, and the limitations (or otherwise) of the English language as a medium of expression.

Four Centuries of Change

Once described as the “Last Unknown,”⁴ Papua New Guinea has changed dramatically in the last four hundred years. The long-inhabited but little-explored island⁵ that Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch captains sailed past in the seventeenth century became the fragile scene of brutal clashes between Japanese and Australian soldiers during the Pacific War (1941–1945),⁶ and progressed from there to its present role as a major nation in the Pacific region.

New Guinea was first annexed by colonial powers in 1883 (Mackay 1976:21), and as James Sinclair shows, the consequences were painful and prolonged:

The partition of New Guinea that was completed in the last quarter of the [nineteenth] century was artificial and irrational, imposed upon the land and the people by the imperialism of Holland, Great Britain and Germany. Lines were ruled across the map, cutting through the formidable terrain and across communities in a fashion cavalier, even by the insensitive standards of that era, and in the process, creating political problems that now bedevil the independent nation of Papua New Guinea. (1985:1)

As James Griffin, Hank Nelson, and Stewart Firth point out, the Asians knew of New Guinea very early, but it was the Europeans who “would eventually transform it” (1979:2). This transformation (which was neither solicited nor smooth)⁷ has been a major theme in the work of the country’s first writers.

It has been a complex transition and one that has been accompanied by considerable anomalies. For example, the growth of cash crops for overseas export (notably coconuts, coffee, cocoa, rubber, tea, and pyrethrum) has brought significant changes to this society with its long tradition of small-scale subsistence farming. Notwithstanding the apparent economic advantages, some difficult questions arise. In the view of Utula Samana, premier of Papua New Guinea’s Morobe Province in the mid-1980s, such “develop-

ment” jeopardizes traditional patterns of land tenure and weakens family and community ties.⁸ As Samana demonstrates, these questions also attend the country’s large-scale logging and mining operations—operations that are undeniably lucrative for the government in the short term but potentially devastating to the environment and the life-style of entire communities (1988b; 1988c:50–55).

Papua New Guinea achieved its political independence in 1975, after approximately ninety years of colonial administration. The British had claimed Papua as a protectorate in 1884 and established a base at Port Moresby. In the same year, the Germans had claimed “the northern half of what is now Papua New Guinea” (Andrews 1978:38), with headquarters first at Finschhafen, then at Madang, and finally at Rabaul. The British protectorate of Papua became an Australian territory in 1906, and German New Guinea (duly renamed Australian New Guinea) came under Australian administration after the First World War. The two separate territories were brought under a single administration after the Second World War and called the Territory of Papua New Guinea. Almost thirty years later, the country achieved its political independence.

Australia’s legacy to Papua New Guinea is evident in the Westminster parliamentary system that the country inherited—a system with perhaps questionable relevance to a nation comprising hundreds of distinct language groups and a great diversity of cultures. Commenting on the imposition of this form of government, Sir John Gunther says:

I never had any reservations about it; it was the right thing to do. . . . I think that . . . where you’re moving rapidly towards independence, experimentation might be dangerous. So you implant what you know rather than try and find something different. . . . [W]e never proposed that anything we did should be everlasting.⁹ (Quoted in Australian Government 1991:26; originally quoted in Nelson n.d.:218)

The choice of the parliamentary system was to prove problematic all too quickly. Fifteen years after independence, Papua New Guinea’s prime minister, Rabbie Namaliu, admitted to finding

a growing cynicism among ordinary Papua New Guineans about politics, especially the contortions of Parliament, which seem to have ever diminishing relevance to questions of principle, policies or matters of public importance. It’s a power game here in Waigani [the location of Parliament House in Port Moresby]. People are out

to extract things for their own self interest and the nation's interest becomes secondary. (*The Canberra Times*, 14 Nov. 1990, quoted in Australian Government 1991:33)

Papua New Guinea is a country of great diversity, both cultural and linguistic. A major contributing factor to this complexity is the ruggedness of the land, which prevented (and still to some extent hinders) contact between different areas. The government's language policy has privileged English, Hiri Motu, and Tok Pisin (also known as "Pidgin English" or simply "Pidgin") as the three official languages of Parliament, and English has for many years been the language of education and administration. Vernacular languages currently have a higher status with the Education Department's plan to begin primary schooling in selected vernaculars and introduce English later—a proposal aiming to strengthen children's links with their cultural roots.

The Literature of the First Decade: National Identity and Political Energy

It is vital for any study of Papua New Guinea's written literature to begin by recognizing the nation's rich oral tradition. Although the transition from oral to written literature is not unique to Papua New Guinea, it is an important and complex transition, and raises some far-reaching questions that have yet to be fully answered. There is considerable concern, both inside and outside the country, about the vulnerability of the nation's oral tradition and the entire system of values, beliefs, and practices that are inextricably woven into that tradition. The presence of a written literature in English is no guarantee that the multilingual oral literature will survive. Nor is there any degree of confidence that written texts can begin to reach the same audience or have the same impact.

In 1969 two significant works appeared: Vincent Eri's *The Crocodile*, the first novel to be written by a Papuan;¹⁰ and the pilot issue of *Kovave*, a biannual journal of creative and critical writing. Prior to this time, hardly any literature had been published by indigenous Papua New Guineans. A notable exception was Albert Maori Kiki's autobiography, *Kiki: Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime*, which was published both in Germany and in England in 1968. As Judith H. McDowell makes clear (1973:301), the book was not the work of Maori Kiki alone, but was a cooperative effort with Ulli Beier, who transcribed and edited the story from a tape recording.

Another, much earlier, exception was Alan Natachee's poetry, some of which had been published in the journal *Oceania* in 1951. Carroll Simons

points out that Natachee's unusual childhood may partly account for his equally unusual literary output, written almost two decades ahead of any other English poetry by black Papua New Guineans (Simons 1979:1).

Sociopolitical Background

The dramatic emergence of a Papua New Guinean literature in English at the end of the 1960s can be traced to a succession of social, educational, and political initiatives in the country during the decade. My discussion here is necessarily selective and briefly touches on only the most significant points.

On a practical level, the nation's education system was expanded during the mid-1960s. The secondary school system, first established in 1957, was now extended.¹¹ In addition, several higher education institutions were formed, including the University of Papua New Guinea in 1964. It was initially at these new tertiary institutions that the "first generation" of writers emerged. Ulli Beier, who arrived in the country in 1967, worked closely with Prithvindra Chakravarti to establish creative writing classes at the university. Greg Katahanas coordinated classes along similar lines at Goroka Teachers College. Within a few years, largely through Beier's initiative, publishing outlets had been created in the form of *Kovave* and the new "Pacific Writers" series that was published by Jacaranda Press.¹²

On a philosophical level, there was growing pressure from several sources to bring the national school curriculum into a closer connection with traditional cultures. Thus the Literature Bureau was set up in 1969, with the aim of producing stories, biographies, and other literary material for use in schools. This measure was seen as a counter to the alienating effects of much classroom learning, which introduced young children to a world so different from their village roots that they inevitably grew away from home as they grew up. A uniquely Papua New Guinean body of writing was regarded as crucial in bridging this cultural and linguistic gap.

These changes in educational policy provide just one indication of the country's political climate during the pre-independence years. Looking back on that period, Joseph Sukwianomb observes:

Literary nationalism in Papua New Guinea in the sixties was born and spread like fire. The speed and the degree of its growth were determined by the build-up of tension, anxiety and restless voices of the local population against the violent and oppressive cultural colonialism and imperialism. . . . Perhaps we might like to call it the period of awakening of national culture, and in particular written literature. (1982:10)

The momentum lasted well into the 1970s. A Creative Arts Centre was built near the university in 1972, using funds provided by the governments of Papua New Guinea and Australia. High hopes were expressed for the path-breaking potential of this new facility. The playwright Arthur Jawodimbari described the new complex as “playing an important role as a catalyst” in the current period of social and cultural change (1977:190). Two years later, again partly through Beier’s efforts, the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies was formed with the objective of “promoting research into all aspects of life in Papua New Guinea and publishing work by indigenous writers” (Wendt 1980:xvii).

These developments within the country gained additional momentum from each other, and this momentum was further increased by related concerns in other parts of the world. Ecology was emerging internationally as a new field of scientific inquiry. Linked to this field was a worldwide recognition of both “the value and vulnerability of indigenous cultures” (Simons 1979:7). Ronald J. May expressed a widely shared view when he wrote in 1971: “It rests with Papua and New Guinea writers to record something of their traditional cultures before they disintegrate, and to help to formulate a sense of national identity” (1971:63).

Characteristics of the Early Writing

Nigel Krauth and Elton Brash have pointed out that the first “wave” of Papua New Guinean literature was predominantly the work of young men in their early twenties: undergraduate students who were talented storytellers but had relatively little background in creative writing (1972:1). Many of the texts grew out of creative writing classes at the University of Papua New Guinea and at Goroka Teachers College. The amount of editorial guidance that the student writers received in the process has not been fully established, although Kirsty Powell touches on this in her thesis (1978).

As Krauth makes clear elsewhere, there was a strong link between writing and politics during this period: not only was much of the writing intentionally political, but many of the early writers went on from their university studies to become influential public figures in the newly independent nation (1978c:45). Discussing the literary output of this period, Ulli Beier has pointed to the prominence of conflict (whether cultural or political) as a theme in the first “wave” of writing: “As in Africa and other ‘developing’ countries the first motivation of the writer is self-discovery and this necessitates a close analysis and re-interpretation of the recent (colonial) past and a growing awareness of topical issues” (1971b:ix). Given the country’s political

climate at the time, it is not surprising to find a strong nationalistic—often overtly anticolonial—emphasis in these early texts.

The spirit of nationalism is evident not only in the writers' characterization and choice of subject matter, but also in their distinctive use of language. Powell notes that the language of the early plays "mirrors the complexity of the Papua New Guinean culture with its blending of diverse elements," thus illustrating "the cultural evolution that can be traced in the sequence, place, colony, nation" (1978:vii).

Major Concerns in the Writing

The writing of this first decade had several major and interrelated concerns. First, there was the need to provide an accurate and uniquely Papua New Guinean record of events, serving to balance the sometimes misleading accounts of the country and its history that had been written by foreigners. The desire to "set the record straight" was strong, expressing itself in poetry, short fiction, and autobiographical pieces.

Second, there was the desire to foster nationalistic energy by recording and celebrating Papua New Guinea's past traditions and building a stronger sense of national pride from this cultural heritage. Both Bill Ashcroft and William McGaw have identified the romantic attachment of many Papua New Guinean writers to the village (Ashcroft 1989:61; McGaw 1987:83). This attachment is evident in Arthur Jawodimbari's short autobiographical piece "Conch Shell Never Blows," which expresses fond nostalgia for the "roaring and colourful days" of his early childhood (1971:22). Similar emotions feature in John Kasaipwalova's poem "Hanuabada" (1972) and Dus Mapun's poems "Change" (1973b), "The Biblical Land" (1973a), and "Oh Meri Wantok" (1980).

Third, there was the desire to incorporate legends and other traditional material in the new English literature, as Turuk Wabei did in *Kulubob*, a play based on a deity myth from Karkar Island (1970). Other such texts include *The Sun*, a Binandere legend adapted for the stage by Arthur Jawodimbari (1970); and *Warbat*, a collection of Tolai love chants and magic poems translated by Apisai Enos (1971). In addition, the play *Alive* by M. Lovori (1971) is based on a traditional legend, using material collected by John Waiko. The name Lovori is generally regarded as a pseudonym for a group of writers in one of Beier's creative writing classes (Powell 1978).

The need for self-appraisal was a fourth major concern in the first decade of writing. This concern is evident in the detailed, unsentimental accounts of traditional community life that were written by Michael Somare (1975), Leo Hannet (1973, 1974), and Paulias Matane (1971, 1972, 1974, 1978). It

also emerges in Bernard Narokobi's essays and those of his critics (published as *The Melanesian Way*), examining a variety of cultural, philosophical, and religious questions ([1980] 1983). In a different genre, Nora Vagi Brash's dramatic satire *Which Way, Big Man?* invites self-appraisal by provoking the audience to consider possible directions for Papua New Guinean society and in so doing to contemplate the dangers of neocolonialism (1977).

Interwoven with these four concerns was the desire to examine and prompt social change.

The Theme of Social Change

The first Papua New Guinean writers sought to do more than describe change: their role was not only mimetic but dynamic as well, and their intentions were sociopolitical as well as aesthetic. They were committed to actively challenging people's attitudes toward themselves, their roots, and their aspirations, and to shaping the forces of change in their society.

Bill Ashcroft has noted that "the romance of the village is pervasive in PNG" (1989:61). A profound sense of loss has been the response to foreign influences that have taken hold in the country and prompted cycles of change. Angry protest against these foreign influences was voiced in the early plays and in much of the early poetry. Joseph Sukwianomb notes the dedication of some of the first writers, who took what he terms an "uncompromising stand": a stance that included the push for complete localization of employment (1982:8).¹³ Some emphatically anticolonial writing emerged during the 1970s, perhaps most notably from the pen of John Kasaipwalova, whose passionately angry poem "Reluctant Flame" employs as the central image a volcano (1971), a device employed also in Lynda Kasaipwalova's shorter but no less effective poem "Volcano" (1971).

I propose now to examine in some detail four aspects of social change as they emerge in the writing of the 1970s: first, the impact of Christianity on traditional life; second, the broader results of colonialism; third, the alienating effect of modern trends in Papua New Guinea society; and finally the syncretic concept, explored by a few writers, suggesting that change can be viewed as a creative force and may introduce some beneficial elements.

Spiritual Clash: Christianity vis-à-vis Traditional Life. Papua New Guinea's first writers identify Christianity as one of the most far-reaching causes of change to village life and its traditional mores. In most cases, this process of change is seen as painful, costly, and ultimately divisive. In a country that places high value on spiritual perspectives, the introduction of imported religious systems must be recognized as profoundly significant.

Leo Hannet's short autobiographical piece "Disillusionment with the Priesthood" traces his difficult journey through spiritual conviction to gradual disenchantment with the Catholic church. In measured, economical prose, Hannet reveals the growing conflict he observed between the needs of village people (including his own family), the church's official teachings, and the priests' behavior and expectations: "When the Church was not living up to her own vows, must we still believe in Christianity? Or was the crucifixion merely a cruci-fiction? . . . Above all, I felt that the Church was not open and not frank and that they had rejected the dialogue and wanted to continue with their eternal monologue" (1973:49). Hannet concludes by saying that although his religious beliefs have not been destroyed, they have been altered. The certainty and simplicity of faith that he had before have not survived.

Kama Kerpi's drama *Voices from the Ridge* (1974) explores the clash between village culture and the imported Western culture (specifically the Catholic church in this case), showing that a degree of change is inevitable in the wake of such contact. One of the strengths of this play is the contrast that it builds up between the two cultures, highlighted, for example, in Boma's mixed feelings about the Reverend Father's gifts of a cross and a Bible after the Father has fallen ill and returned overseas. While the plot suggests that change is unavoidable, it treats the forces of change with ambivalence and a recognition that the cost in human terms can be very high.

A conversation between Boma and the village elders expresses the discomfort associated with change and the divided loyalties that can result:

Elder 3: You have heard voices from the ridges. Your shadow and your heart bend to the ways of the past. But your footsteps refuse to stay. Maybe man is made to walk forward and not turn back. . . .

Elder 4: . . . You have been made to walk on and not to turn back.

Boma: Yes, you have said it. Man is made to go on and on.
(Kerpi 1974:37)

Boma's words suggest agreement, yet the haunting image of his "shadow" and his "heart" inclining toward "the ways of the past" while his "footsteps refuse to stay" is disturbing and implies a personality torn apart.

A further example of the playwright's ambivalence about change is the treatment of Boma's son's death, a tragic event whose significance is not clearly explained in the play. The spirits announce the boy's death as a punishment, but neither the offender nor the offense is plainly identified. Is the

death to be understood as Boma's punishment for moving away from traditional ways? Is the entire village being censured for accepting Boma as Kola's husband? Perhaps the death is an indication of the cost, the complexity, and the final inscrutability of change: a reality that must be acknowledged and experienced but cannot be fully understood.

Sociospiritual change is a major theme in Paulias Matane's more overtly didactic novel *Aimbe—the Magician* (1978). Here two types of change are explored, both challenging the traditional order of things but perceived quite differently by Aimbe's village community. The first challenge comes from the Christian pastor, whose energetic attempt to convert the villagers to a new belief system meets with mixed responses. Although skeptical at first, the people are gradually won over—but neither totally nor permanently. Disenchantment with Christianity slowly sets in and builds up to a climactic outburst in which a large group of villagers angrily accuse the pastor of confusing them, undermining their traditional ways, and damaging their previously cohesive community.

The second challenge to village traditions comes from within the community itself, when Aimbe refuses to marry the young woman his parents have selected for him and proposes instead to use his own considerable powers of magic to woo the girl he prefers. His father, Tua, is dismayed: "You would bring great shame to me" (Matane 1978:93). Relatively quickly, however, Aimbe persuades Tua to change his mind, and the courtship and wedding take place with the family's blessing—and without any permanent damage to community relationships.

It may be that Aimbe's challenge to traditional marriage customs is accepted by Tua and the other villagers because he uses magic to bring it about, and magic is a well-established, widely respected dimension of community life. Thus Aimbe poses no threat to the basic order of the village. In contrast, the pastor's views clash with traditional beliefs, art, and attitudes (specifically attitudes toward women and "earthly spirits"). One of the village men, Duar, pinpoints the pastor's most serious offense: "You confuse us by telling us not to believe in other spirits." Aimbe's father, Tua, supports this view: "I find it difficult not to believe in worldly spirits. They are real. They help us when we need their help" (Matane 1978:76).

Aimbe seems strong and intact at the end of the novel. This is not true of Hoiri, the central character in Vincent Eri's novel *The Crocodile* ([1970] 1981), set in the Papuan village of Moveave in the 1940s. The story's structure is built around Hoiri's five journeys away from (and back to) the village. The fact that he always comes home after his travels is significant on several counts, not least because it emphasizes the tragic dilemma in which he finds himself at the end of the story. For Hoiri, as for many other characters in

Papua New Guinean writing, the experience of returning home brings a sense of alienation and loneliness, a discovery that this familiar place is no longer where he belongs.

Culture Clash: The Broader Colonial Impact. Like Matane, Eri explores the effect of Christianity on village culture, but he examines it as one aspect of the broader impact of colonialism. Bernard Minol points out that *The Crocodile* explores several common themes in Papua New Guinean literature: migration to town, the expectation that a Western education will be a cure-all for social problems, and the subsequent experience of disillusionment when this fails to occur (1987a:114). The novel's historical setting means that the Moveave people's experience of colonization includes being dragged into the colonizers' war, and this physical combat serves to illumine the other levels of conflict that the characters in the novel face.

Nigel Krauth has drawn some useful contrasts between Maori Kiki's autobiography and Eri's novel. He points out that although the two writers share similar aims and concerns, "Kiki's book reveals the strength and flexibility of Papua New Guinean identity; Eri's book reveals its vulnerability" (Krauth 1978c:50). The end of Eri's novel demonstrates the devastating effect of colonial rule: Hoiri is confused and lost, hopelessly torn between two diametrically opposed worldviews, neither of which can offer the security and understanding he craves.

According to Frances Devlin Glass, this confusion comes from "code switching" and is part of the bicultural experience:

Hoiri . . . naturally encodes the world around him, including the encroaching white culture, in terms of his primary culture. . . . Although he is intellectually and emotionally critical of white culture, Hoiri's admiration for it paradoxically ensures his own defeat at its hands. Finally he is reduced to the status of being destitute of a viable culture: he can never compete with whites on equal terms; nor can he any longer derive emotional security from his own culture. Culturally and emotionally he occupies a wasteland. (1983:131)

Glass notes the "fundamental ambiguities" associated with Mitoro and the crocodile (1983:137, 138, 140), and suggests tentatively that the crocodile may be linked with the destructive nature of Australian colonialism. My own reading of the novel suggests that the crocodile's magic powers are not fully clarified by Eri, nor is the extent to which Hoiri himself identifies with the crocodile—nor indeed how far the villagers link him with it. Clearly, however, magic is an important part of village life and traditional beliefs.

In John McLaren's assessment, the novel examines "the process of dealing with unsettlement, the task of establishing a new view of the world" (1971). The difficulty of establishing this new view is suggested by the depths of confusion that engulf Hoiri and the other villagers. In their case, Western contact has not only removed their familiar system of sorcery (which had its own internal logic), but has failed to provide a viable alternative to take its place. Bernard Gadd rightly observes that the novel reveals the "radical emasculation of a people" (1983:229). As Minol makes clear, Hoiri has failed in both cultural systems (1987a:114). He is unable to avenge Mitoro's death as his traditional culture requires, and he cannot sign his name.

A careful examination of the novel's shifts in narrative stance suggests a degree of detachment and ambivalence on Eri's part, in contrast with Hoiri's more straightforward emotions. One example of this difference is Hoiri's hope that his son will be able to attend the colonial school and learn to understand this mysterious foreign culture. Hoiri's own schooling has clearly contributed to his cultural disorientation, so it is a little ironic to observe him prescribing similar treatment for his son, in the hope that the end results may be different. It appears that Eri is gently amused at Hoiri's naïveté in the face of culture conflict.

In contrast with the evenhandedness and wry humor of Eri's novel, many early Papua New Guinean texts draw sharper anticolonial lines. For example, Kumalau Tawali's poem "The Bush Kanaka Speaks" depicts the colonial administrator as a totally flat character, no more than a rigid and angry cardboard cutout, while the villagers possess human qualities such as wisdom, adaptability, and a sense of humor (1970). Tawali has commented on this contrast: "I wanted to express what the ordinary man in the village thinks. . . . [T]he New Guinea villager has an existing body of knowledge which it doesn't matter how long a Kiap stays in an area, he doesn't know" (quoted in Maynard 1970:13). There is a similar demarcation in much of the early drama, including *The Unexpected Hawk* by John Waiko (1971) and *The Ungrateful Daughter* by Leo Hannet (1971b).

The superficial nature of much Western influence is graphically described in Jack Lahui's poem "The Dark Side of a Niuginian's Teeth," which questions the real nature of "civilization" (1987). Lahui's use of imagery is startling and innovative:

Education came like a Tek toothbrush
 Refined by the cream of Christianity
 Cleansed by the bloodbath of Christ's resurrection.

Inherent in each of these images is the idea of external or superficial change. This is the poem's central theme, drawing contrasts between the

two cultures in which the poet operates with equal skill. At base is his original world, his "home" where he sings "in slurred legato / The traditional melodies." Temporarily superimposed onto this world is the imported culture in which he was educated and in which he learned to sing "with trills / The foreign-worded songs." The poet's linking of different tenses to the different styles of music is significant here: he uses the past tense for the imported style and the present tense for the traditional music that he learned first of all and that he now sings again.

The central theme is reinforced by the poem's circular structure. The opening lines identify the poet's perspective from the "inside," behind the surface: "Black teeth, ripe watermelon seeds, / I see in the grin of my people. . . ." When he looks at his fellow Niuginians, he is aware of the "dark side" of their teeth. Recognizing external appearances for what they are, he sees beyond them to the real substance underneath. The closing lines of the poem bring us back to its starting point, but this time we see the outwardly white teeth that the Niuginian shows to society. With his final haunting question about how far down "civilization" really penetrates, the poet brings us full circle, working from the inside out and leaving us to consider how thin is the outward veneer of any individual person.

The confusion of modern, independent Papua New Guinean society has been explored in two poems that Loujaya Kouza wrote in 1978 at the age of fifteen. "Kaugere" depicts an ugly side of urbanized society: a squatter settlement in Port Moresby that may seem like "the City of Pleasure" with its bright night lights but in reality is the "Mother of Rascals" and the "Ghetto of the Poor" (1978b). Kaugere offers neither hope, comfort, nor economic stability to its jobless population of school dropouts. Kouza's poem "World of Today" is more provocative, questioning the future of a society where the "backbone which holds the status / Of many is collapsing" (1978c). Here the poet contemplates a world that has been weakened by many pressures, a world whose traditions are being undermined by modern inventions. Unable (or unwilling) to respond to its people's cries for help, the world of today embodies present chaos and future uncertainty.

The impact of colonialism has received slightly different treatment in Nora Vagi Brash's dramatic satire *Which Way, Big Man?* (1977). This play poses some searching questions about neocolonialism and future direction. The playwright exposes the irony of social and political success if the end result is estrangement between public servants and the very people whom they have been appointed to represent.

The drama's central characters are a modern urban couple, Gou Haia ("Go Higher") and his wife, Sinob ("Snob"). The action revolves around Gou's appointment as the new director of national identity, and the party

that Sinob organizes in his honor. Almost every aspect of Sinob's behavior indicates her disdain for village people and her preference for Western customs and attitudes. She ostentatiously nibbles at salad and T-bone steak, rejecting the traditional meal her cook has prepared. She describes a prominent official's wife as "hardly more than a village woman" and is very rude to her own husband's visiting relatives. Gou's new role as the country's director of national identity is celebrated not with a traditional Papua New Guinea sing-sing, but with a lavish Western-style cocktail party. Sinob's hopes for the evening fall apart when her father-in-law arrives unexpectedly from the village. Horrified to hear Gou inviting him to stay for the party, she instructs him to keep the old man out of sight. She is afraid that her important guests may be offended by his appearance, especially his teeth, which are "as black as the bottom of a village cooking pot."

Regis Stella has argued that Nora Brash's plays are flawed because "she forgets that first and foremost she is a woman and therefore her first moral obligation is to write profoundly and faithfully about issues which face women in Papua New Guinea" (1990:52), that is, issues such as the status of women in the country. Brash disagrees. While not denying the importance of raising women's status, she challenges the basic premise of Stella's argument and insists that her commitment is broader and more basic, dealing with fundamental social issues that concern the outlook and welfare of both men and women:

Although there are a lot of women's issues I could write about, I haven't touched them. I've written my own views. I was at the beginning of nation-building . . . it was a transitional period and all our emphasis was on everybody. As far as I'm concerned, it's still like that. There are young men and women who are out of work. I don't want to dissociate myself from those things and write about women's issues. We have a role in society. . . . At this point in Papua New Guinea there are real problems facing women, but at the same time there are issues confronting all of society. The emphasis should be put on the society rather than the individual person. (Brash 1992)

The danger of neocolonialism in Papua New Guinea society is one issue about which Brash has expressed considerable concern. Speaking of Gou and Sinob Haia and their privileged, elitist urban life-style, she comments:

The minute you start building walls around your house to stop the *raskols*, it's not the *raskols* you're barring, it's your own relatives

you're barring from entering your place. They won't want to come and visit you because they have to walk around and yell before you let them in. . . . [Recently] I was invited to a birthday party. There wasn't one village person there: it was exactly like a party out of the play. I didn't last very long. The party got a bit out of hand and I thought, No, I'm going back to the village. I can just go to sleep on the floor, and I don't have to worry about who comes in with clean hands. They are two different ways of life altogether. I like to choose the simpler one. (Brash 1992)

Most of the texts written during the 1970s portray Western influences as unfavorable. However, during this period a different view occasionally surfaces. In his story "The Flight of a Villager," August Kituai writes about the transition from village to town life—in this case in Goroka in Papua New Guinea's Eastern Highlands (1973). The attractions of the town are undeniable, "like a magnet gripping people" (1973:84). Kituai's characterization allows for an unusual degree of variety, in which both local and European characters are afforded evenhanded treatment. A few other writers have tentatively written about foreign influences in positive terms, and their work features in my discussion of syncretism below.

Alienation in Contemporary Society. The alienation of educated young people in modern Papua New Guinea has been examined by several of the country's writers. By far the most detailed study of this difficult and complex theme occurs in Russell Soaba's work, which has been described as "much concerned with cultural and religious confusion" (Goodwin 1979:67). Soaba is a relatively prolific writer whose work presents a challenge to the reader—partly because of its many unexplained literary and cultural allusions and partly because of Soaba's own preoccupation with existentialist philosophy and questions. His vision is clear, however, and the picture that emerges from all his writing is serious and disturbing. In contrast with the beauty, harmony, and peace of rural life, the urban scene is depicted as ugly, noisy, and on the brink of violence. In Nigel Krauth's words (1979b:41), "while others were watching the brassy procession towards Independence, Soaba saw the accidents along the roadside."

Soaba is firmly committed to highlighting the predicament of the lonely individual who has been educated away from his or her cultural roots. For all its attractions, the village is not presented as a serious option for his characters; at least not until his novel *Maiba*, which was published in 1985 (and so falls out of the scope of this article). The dilemma facing Soaba's main characters is a familiar motif in much early Papua New Guinea writing, notably the poetry of Pokwari Kale and Kama Kerpi. Like many of the writ-

ers themselves, these fictitious characters have grown up away from the village, only to return years later and make the bitter discovery that they are strangers on their own home ground.

In Soaba's novel *Wanpis*, the central character is of mixed racial origin and remains anonymous through much of the story, finally being identified as Abel Wilborough (1977:146). The creation of this "anonymous Anuki" is probably quite deliberate on Soaba's part. It has the effect of emphasizing the character's rootlessness and cultural dislocation. For example, when the teenaged "Anonymous" returns to his Anuki village after years away at boarding school, he is not even recognized by his own sister. Some years later, now married and looking forward to the birth of his first child in Port Moresby, he thinks back to his childhood and ponders the distance he has traveled since that uncomplicated time: "He missed himself in the days of his youth. It was beautiful, he thought of the period; and innocent. He thought of Mary; of Yaguyawa-Kaburina; of the woman called Enita. But his feelings for them were as remote as one having little or no history attached to one's life" (Soaba 1977:134).

Bernard Minol notes that Soaba's characters live in a transitional society between the village and the town, not fitting into either setting (1987a). While they live and work in the urban environment, they frequently find it hostile and thus occupy an emotional and spiritual vacuum somewhere between town life and the village that they recall with nostalgia. Nigel Krauth observes that this experience was very familiar to several of the early writers:

Generally the writers in Papua New Guinea have seen themselves as outsiders from their communities—alienated by education, by experience and by language. Nearly all the writers have used the old values and lifestyles in attempts to reconstruct their political identities; some like Hannet and Kasaipwalova have abandoned writing and returned to involve themselves in village politics and welfare in order to overcome this alienation. (1978c:57)

Soaba confirms this: "The individual writer is always on his own. . . . He is that *lusman* or *wanpis*: a creative artist" (Tiffin 1979:17). It is important to note that unlike some of his contemporaries who have entered business ventures or political life full-time, Soaba has retained his commitment to write, even if it has meant forgoing economic security. His resignations from full-time, paid employment at the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies and the University of Papua New Guinea appear to have been prompted by the desire to devote more time to writing (pers. com., Aug. 1992).¹⁴

Several other writers share Soaba's concern with isolated individuals who

face cultural alienation. One such writer is Benjamin Evara, whose poem "Forgetting Home" (1973), like the powerfully evocative "Homecoming" by Pokwari Kale (1972), identifies the irrevocable shift in the poet's status from village child to honored—but foreign—guest. The sadness of this experience is sensitively expressed by John Kadiba in "The Widening Gap," a moving poem that laments the growing distance between himself and "the dear folk"—a distance that exists on several levels and inevitably becomes harder to bridge with the passage of time:

Not only are we separated
 By distance in space and time,
 But in way in living [*sic*],
 In experience,
 In thought,
 In outlook.
 As the years move on,
 The gap grows,
 Inevitably,
 Unintentionally,
 Unwillingly,
 Sadly,
 But somehow it happens. (1974)

Other writers concur with Kadiba's observation that differences in outlook and perspective can be just as difficult to bridge as geographic distances.

Syncretic Views of Social Change. Papua New Guinean writing from the 1970s demonstrates the inevitability of social change, so that it emerges as an inescapable part of modern-day life. Vincent Eri's novel *The Crocodile*, Kama Kerpi's drama *Voices from the Ridge* (1974), and Michael Yake Mel's novel *Kumdi Bagre* (1984) are just three of the many texts that treat change as inevitable. There are relatively few voices, though, from this period suggesting that change can benefit society.

One of these is Arthur Jawodimbari, who in 1977 expressed the hope that a uniquely Papua New Guinean art could be developed, blending "traditional skills, beliefs and concepts" with "modern ideas and technology" (1977:189). Another writer sharing this hope is Albert Maori Kiki, who has argued that the country needs to encourage a blend of the traditional and the modern if it is to develop and has pointed to the Creative Arts Centre as "one step towards making creative arts a living entity" (quoted in Ma'ia'i 1974:22). Kama Kerpi's view of literature would appear to be in harmony

with this approach when he says, “A poet in a developing Papua New Guinea can be a voice of vision playing a redemptive role” (1973:35). Yet his concept of change appears quite complex. It is difficult to see any beneficial aspects of change in his drama *Voices from the Ridge*, although a different perspective can perhaps be found in his poetry. Krauth and McGaw have pointed to celebratory and redemptive intentions in some of his poems (Krauth 1975:59–60; McGaw 1987:93).

Two poets who express a direct interest in the syncretic concept are Jack Lahui and Loujaya Kouza. As I have already noted, both of these writers have exposed the unglamorous side of urbanization and certain other aspects of “civilization,” so their commitment to syncretism is all the more significant. Jack Lahui’s “Poem to My Son, Lahui Lahui” advocates a frankly syncretic vision for the next generation:

My son, my beloved son,
 Balance your heart and mind simultaneously
 In the see saw of your being
 Eliminate those ways old and new that will ruin you
 Establish those that implant a firm foundation
 Be educated and understanding. . . . (1975c)

Similarly, Loujaya Kouza’s poem “Grandfather’s Advice” expresses a concern to select the best from both traditional and modern ways of living. In this poem an old man who possesses “the knowledge of years” advises his grandson to “grow in the ways of the / wise and not the foolish, strive for / the future” (1978a). This advice is given on a mountaintop at sunset, and it is from this spectacular setting that the poem’s central metaphor is derived. It is an evocative and intensely visual metaphor, intriguing in its understated possibilities: “Cling fast to your tradition, tradition / dies like the setting of the sun over / the horizon. Civilisation is the rising of / a new moon.”

The stark contrast between night and day, between darkness and light may appear at first glance to suggest that the poet regards tradition and civilization as mutually exclusive and the modern world as completely undesirable. I believe such a reading would be simplistic, however, because it would fail to acknowledge the complexity of the poet’s message. The night/day contrast needs to be understood in conjunction with the old man’s stated hope that his grandson will be able to accomplish what he himself has “failed” to do. He looks to the future with some measure of anticipation and regards civilization as a new order. He counsels the boy to enter this new order with a strong sense of purpose and a commitment to aim for specific goals while retaining the traditional wisdom of his ancestors. This interpre-

tation seems to be in harmony with a recent comment of Loujaya Kouza's: "No society is immune to change. The *pace* of change determines whether it is destructive or otherwise" (pers. com., June 1992; my italics).

Among the few other poems from the 1970s that consider change to contain some positive elements are Rose Paru's "Accepting Change," Anne Tanby's "Independence," and Rosina Hipokak's "Changing Times." All of these poems adopt a rather didactic tone and assert the importance of approaching the future with openness and adaptability. As Rose Paru acknowledges, "It is hard to accept these Western ways," but she also asserts ". . . old and new can work together, / If from each we take the best" (1976). Anne Tanby exhorts "men from every clan and tribe" to forsake their traditional "arrows and clubs" and instead

Bring back to this land some ways of old.
Bring forth the peace of Christianity,
Striving to live together as brothers. (1976)

In Rosina Hipokak's poem "Changing Times," a young woman pleads with her father to

Move with the times, accept new ways;
Don't cling to customs our ancestors made;
Give a chance to your daughters
To live in the world as women with rights. . . . (1976)

The poem concludes on a positive note, with the father accepting his daughter's viewpoint. He stresses, however, that "this new-found freedom" carries with it the responsibility to make wise choices.

The most direct expression of syncretism during this period emerges in some of the essays, for example, "Melanesian Way?" by Bernard Minol (1987b) and "Art and Nationalism" by Bernard Narokobi (1980). Other notable examples can be found in Narokobi's "Melanesian Voice" series, originally published as newspaper articles in the daily *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* between 1976 and 1978, and subsequently collected and printed in book form as *The Melanesian Way* ([1980] 1983). Since the collection also features pieces by some of Narokobi's critics and supporters, it provides lively reading and a fascinating glimpse into the period's vigorous debate over issues of culture and national identity.

For example, Kumalau Tawali reveals his impatience with corruption among both whites and locals, and expresses hope that the future may bring more enlightened leaders: "Students and youth are meant to be the flowers of this nation. From them will come fresh insight into the crookedness in

society. From them will come the new creative leadership spirit that may have been missing in the old generation of leaders" ([1976] 1980:295). Not all contributors adopt a stance sympathetic to Narokobi's views. Some accuse him of inciting racial prejudice, while others dismiss his description of a uniquely Melanesian mode of operation as "puerile balderdash" (Narokobi [1980] 1983:x).

In his essay titled "The Melanesian Way," Narokobi underlines the need to be both coolly objective and highly selective in forging a path for his country's future. His choice of metaphor is particularly potent for a nation composed of small islands:

Melanesia has been invaded by a huge tidal wave from the West in the form of colonization and Christianisation. Like any tidal wave, the West came mercilessly, with all the force and power, toppling over our earth, destroying our treasures, depositing some rich soil, but also leaving behind much rubbish. . . . Western influence has a negative and destructive aspect. "Melanesian Voice" also sees it as a wave that has helped to set free our creative forces. It is a wave whose moving ripples should be used as a living light for a new future. . . . We can make conscious decisions to opt for what is best in both worlds. (Narokobi [1980] 1989:98)

Conclusion

Social change emerges as an important issue in the literature of the 1970s: the causes and consequences of change feature in almost all the serious writing in English from this period. The writers saw their role as pivotal and sought to employ their writing to shape society as well as reflecting it. Generally they appear to have seen change as an unfortunate aspect of the modern world. In the body of their work, the colonial encounter emerges as the single most important force prompting changes away from the country's original traditions and cultures. Christianity and Western education are identified as significant specific influences within the general colonial context.

The early writing provides considerable support for the perception that Western influences tend to be materialistic rather than spiritual, divisive rather than cohesive, and destructive rather than supportive of indigenous cultures and traditions. There is also substantial agreement among the writers that modern society tends to alienate rather than welcome its educated youth. Thus education, itself a powerful vehicle of sociopolitical change, is presented as an agent with potentially disturbing implications.

However, while the literature from this first decade expresses poignant

nostalgia for the village and its calmer life-style, it does not appear to advocate a simple return there. It is significant that Russell Soaba—the most prolific and philosophical of all the creative writers in this period and the one most consistently concerned with the plight of the alienated individual—does not present village life as a viable option for his characters. The village remains an important motif in his work, having the significance perhaps of a touchstone or a reference point, important in helping to define a character's roots and values, but no longer offering practical solutions or a real home.

Thus social change emerges as inevitable: a painful and costly loss of innocence, an uncomfortable but unavoidable reality in contemporary life. Relatively few writers from this period discuss change in positive terms. Although the syncretists' voices are significant among those raised during the 1970s, it must be stressed that they form a relatively small minority.

In 1978 Subramani wrote that the "full flowering of Oceanic art and literature" was still to come (p. 35). Although his comment was about the Pacific region in general, it was also an accurate description of the situation in Papua New Guinea. It may be argued, however, that the succeeding years brought a diminishing rather than a "full flowering." By the end of the decade, scholars and writers were already noting the decline in the country's literary output. For example, the Samoan writer Albert Wendt said in 1977: "There has been a lull in Papua New Guinea writing since Independence, and the Workshop last year was an attempt to start it again. The ones who are going to make it now are probably the true writers—writing for the sake of writing, not nationalist reasons" (Davidson 1978:115).

A number of possible reasons have been suggested for the lull in creative writing. Prominent among them is the fact that some of the nation's "first-generation" writers became involved in politics, public service, or the business sector, and simply grew too busy to keep writing (Sukwianomb 1982:8). Indeed, political involvement was arguably a logical next step after working for the country's independence—perhaps particularly for writers who viewed literature as a political tool.

Looking back on her own enthusiastic involvement in the pre-independence years, Nora Brash has observed that independence brought with it a sense of completion and of fulfilled objectives, and writers may have felt either that they had nothing more to fight for or that they should put their writing aside and become more involved in community affairs instead (1992). Similarly, Loujaya Kouza has said:

English literature allowed Papua New Guinea writers' experimentation with imagery that our people were familiar with and they

(the writers) used this to provoke and invoke sentiments such as the need to be independent, Papua New Guinea's heritage in need of preservation and elements of nationalism. . . . The very writers who were at the forefront of the cause of an Independent PNG are "FATCATS" in the government bureaucracy. Their cause achieved, they see no other causes worth fighting about. (Pers. com., June 1992)

There are a few exceptions to this trend, including Loujaya Kouza herself, Nora Brash, Jack Lahui, and Russell Soaba, who have all retained their commitment to write.

Nigel Krauth suggests two other possible reasons for the reduction in imaginative writing after Papua New Guinea's independence: "the crisis of writing's appropriateness" in such a multilingual, largely illiterate society, and the fact that copyright legislation waned in conjunction with the colonial administration (1978c:58). In addition to these factors, Sukwianomb notes the paucity of publishing outlets and the general "lack of enthusiastic support for the literary themes of the time" (1982:9).

My study of the second decade (1979–1989) reveals that the writers retained their commitment to the dual function of their work: both a dynamic, nation-shaping role and a mimetic, nation-reflecting role. It also shows that, while "literary" writing dwindled during the 1980s, other forms of writing continued to flourish, and there was no decline in cultural activity or dialogue.

NOTES

1. For instance, the title of Albert Maori Kiki's autobiography is *Kiki: Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime* (1968).

2. The drift into urban areas has increased visibly as young people (particularly young men) have been lured by the apparent advantages of a cash society. Whereas in 1966 only 5 percent of the country's population lived in the towns, by 1980 the proportion had grown to 13 percent (Australian Government 1991:42). Norlie Miskaram reports the following population figures for Port Moresby, the capital city: 1966, 41,848; 1971 (enumerated), 69,276; 1977 (estimated), 106,600; 1980 (estimated), 110,000 (1982:78). The latest available information confirms the trend documented by Miskaram. Table 3 of the census indicates population growth in the National Capital District (Port Moresby and its suburbs) as follows: 1980 population, 123,624; 1990 population, 193,242; annual growth rate for the National Capital District, 4.47 percent (Papua New Guinea 1991).

3. The literacy rate in Papua New Guinea is 45 percent according to the Australian Government (1991:40). Its report notes: "The population growth rate is 2–3 per cent, a rate

now much faster than the economic growth rate which has stagnated since the mid 1980s. Lack of economic growth in sectors which are employers of labour has exacerbated the unemployment situation." It further comments: "Less than one-third of the population over 15 years of age is literate compared to an average of three-quarters in comparable developing countries. Educational participation is among the lowest in the world, particularly for girls" (p. 46).

4. The term is used by the twentieth-century poet Karl Shapiro, quoted by James Sinclair (1985:1).

5. James Griffin, Hank Nelson, and Stewart Firth state: "Man has lived in New Guinea for about 50,000 years. His history has been dominated by New Guinea's geography, unique for the natural barriers which it placed in the way of human movement" (1979:1). The advent of aerial transport in the twentieth century has made some remote parts accessible. However, the country's topography is such that there are still vast areas where rugged mountains or mosquito-infested swamplands prevent exploration by anyone, including the local inhabitants. This landscape accounts in part for the great diversity of languages in Papua New Guinea.

6. Bryant J. Allen's account of the Pacific War offers these facts: 166 Papua New Guinean soldiers were killed during the war, 201 were wounded in action, and an unknown number of carriers, laborers, and civilians died during the fighting. Approximately 55,000 carriers and laborers were conscripted at the "peak of the fighting." Villages were severely disrupted in the battle zones, and entire communities suffered from food shortages, poor hygiene, and, consequently, dysentery. Much damage was caused by Australian and American aircraft bombs that were dropped inaccurately, the result of gunners having difficulty finding their ground targets (Allen 1992:14–15).

7. For example, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth offer this unflattering account of early Spanish explorers' behavior:

Torres and Prado, sailing west from Peru in 1606, wanted fresh food and water. They reached Mailu Island on the Papuan coast. They made what they thought were signs of peace, but the Mailu Islanders responded by brandishing spears; so, saying the Lord's Prayer and a war-cry, the Spaniards attacked, "shooting them as they fled." The Papuans lost the battle, and Captain Prado chose "fourteen boys and girls of from six to ten years and sent them on board." They were taught the Lord's Prayer, the "Ave Maria," the Creed and "the Commandments and Articles of the Catholic faith" by Spanish fathers in Manila, and were baptised "to the honor and glory of God." The Mailu Islanders had fought the Spaniards without any desire to convert them to Mailu beliefs. The Spaniards, by contrast, were early representatives of a European proselytism which continues to this day and which aims to save Papua New Guineans from the error of their traditional ways. (1979:4)

8. Samana is not alone in his concern. Writing from the Land Administration section at the University of Papua New Guinea, Peter Eaton observes: "Land is probably one of the most important and contentious issues in Papua New Guinea today. The tenure system has been described as the 'basis of economic and social relations for most of Papua New Guinea,' and as 'the institution affecting most profoundly the organisation of agricultural production'" (1982:38).

9. Dr. (later Sir) John Gunther was director of the Department of Public Health from 1946. In 1961 he chaired the select committee that was appointed to make recommendations about constitutional change in the Territory of Papua New Guinea.

10. *The Crocodile* was published the next year, 1970, by Jacaranda Press (Milton, Queensland, Australia).

11. Student numbers grew rapidly during this period. In 1960 the total post-primary enrollment was 2,217 in Papua and 2,932 in New Guinea, making a total of 5,149 students (Australian Government 1961a:257; 1961b:97, 98). By 1969 there were 15,437 high school students in Papua New Guinea (Weeks and Guthrie 1982:28), and by 1971 the figure had grown to 20,882 (Australian Government 1972:200). Minol's (1987a) and Simons's (1979) theses both provide substantial information about the growth of Papua New Guinea's formal education system.

12. These were expatriate publications that featured writing by Papua New Guineans.

13. Sukwianomb's term is "indigenouisation."

14. At the time, Dr. Soaba had recently returned after a period of full-time writing to lecture on a temporary basis in the Department of Language and Literature at the University of Papua New Guinea.

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EDITOR'S FORUM

RETHINKING PACIFIC ISLANDS STUDIES

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The article identifies several rationales for university-level Pacific Islands studies programs and considers their implications for curriculum design and development. It discusses some fundamental conceptual problems associated with area studies generally, before advocating a new emphasis on interdisciplinary forms of scholarship and more-rigorous attempts to decolonize the field of study.

IF THE RATIO of university students and researchers to residents is anything to go by, Pacific Islanders are among the most studied people on earth. At the Mānoa campus of the University of Hawai'i alone, more than thirty regional specialists devote much of their time and energy to Pacific Islands-related research and teaching. Some fifty courses, with annual enrollments of more than two thousand, focus exclusively on the region or parts of it. At the Australian National University, at least forty faculty and a similar number of postgraduate students pursue Pacific Islands research interests. There are also significant concentrations of Pacific Islands resources at the University of Auckland, Canterbury University, Macquarie University, Brigham Young University-Hawai'i, University of the South Pacific, University of Papua New Guinea, and University of Guam.¹ Many other universities and colleges in the Pacific Islands, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Japan, and Indonesia have one or two resident regional specialists and include some Pacific Islands mate-

rials in their curricula (Crocombe 1987; Crocombe and Meleisea 1988; Quanchi 1993, 1989).²

Of particular interest is the recent proliferation of organized, interdisciplinary programs of study that allow undergraduate and graduate students to major in Pacific Islands studies. Until relatively recently, the only such program at the graduate level was the M.A. in Pacific Islands Studies, which has been offered by the University of Hawai'i since 1950. In the 1970s and 1980s, several Maori studies masters degree programs were launched in New Zealand. In the early 1990s, James Cook University introduced a Graduate Diploma in Melanesian Studies, the Australian National University approved graduate diploma and masters programs in Pacific Islands Studies to start in 1994, Canterbury University approved an M.A. program in Pacific Studies to start in 1995, and a masters degree program in Micronesian studies got under way at the University of Guam in 1994.³ The number of undergraduate programs has also increased, and it is now possible to major in Pacific Islands studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, the windward campus of Hawai'i Pacific University (formerly Hawai'i Loa College), Brigham Young-Hawai'i, and the Australian National University. Undergraduate minors in Pacific Islands studies are offered at the University of Waikato and the Hilo campus of University of Hawai'i. Hawaiian studies are offered at several campuses in the University of Hawai'i system, and Maori studies majors are available at most New Zealand universities.⁴

The proposals to create or expand each of these programs have, no doubt, emphasized existing library or faculty resources, an institutional commitment to a particular Pacific Island area or population, faculty and student interest, and perhaps even some comparative advantage over other institutions in the competition for external funding. More difficult to identify are the likely intellectual or academic justifications for organizing a teaching or research program around a particular geographic or cultural area, rather than on the basis of an established academic discipline. The promotional materials associated with these programs are rather vague on the question of purpose.⁵ If nothing else, this vagueness presents practical difficulties for program planning and development. Without a clear sense of the intellectual underpinnings of the enterprise, how can appropriate curricula be designed, new faculty positions defined, or library resources evaluated?

The purpose of this article is to identify several possible rationales for Pacific Islands studies programs and to consider their implications for curriculum design and development. The focus is on programs at the graduate level, although the discussion may have relevance for undergraduate studies as well.

Pragmatic Rationale

Some of the most active centers for Pacific Islands studies are located outside the region (at least as it is usually defined), in metropolitan countries such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. An important driving force behind their development has been a pragmatic need to know about the Pacific Islands places with which the metropolitan countries have to deal.

In the United States the need to know about foreign places, including the islands of the Pacific, became pressing during World War II, when area and language specialists were recruited to train military personnel in appropriate skills. According to Schwartz, this was "an enterprise designed to achieve an encapsulated understanding of the unknown areas of the world in which we suddenly found ourselves engaged" (1980:15). After the war, the increasingly global nature of U.S. economic and political interests encouraged the rapid expansion of area and language programs, many of them modeled on their wartime counterparts. With the onset of the cold war, international education in the United States became geared to the competition with the Soviet Union for global influence (Heginbotham 1994:35–43). Funding for area studies programs came in large part from private foundations and the federal government, rather than from the universities themselves (Pye 1975:10–13).

The early history of Pacific Islands studies at the University of Hawai'i reflects these broad national trends. Several of the "founding fathers" of the program were involved in training or intelligence activities in the Pacific theater during the war, and the establishment of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in Micronesia in 1947 provided an early boost to Pacific Islands research on the Mānoa campus (Quigg 1987:17). Until relatively recently, the program received much of its funding from external sources closely associated with the growth of area studies generally.⁶ A persistent theme in the applications for these grants is that Americans should know about this part of the world and that academic endeavors to this end are worthy of government and other support.⁷

Without this pragmatic rationale, characterized by Embree as "the need to know one's enemies and one's friends" (1983:14), it is unlikely that whole programs would have been constructed around geographic areas, thereby distinguishing them in fundamental ways from other academic fields of study, which typically claim a more detached and universalist posture.⁸ Fifty years ago the novelty of the area studies approach lay in the assumption that it is possible to understand other societies and even whole regions in their totality, that there are certain essential characteristics that, once grasped,

will lead to an adequate understanding of the whole. Although few scholars would subscribe to such essentialist notions today, the fundamental unit of analysis remains the area, and the basic idea is still to put a range of disciplinary tools and perspectives to work in regional contexts.

The structure and requirements of the M.A. in Pacific Islands Studies program at the University of Hawai'i are consistent with the pragmatic rationale as manifest in the idea of area studies. Students are encouraged to learn about the region as a whole, multidisciplinary is emphasized, and students must acquire a "good command" of the anthropology, geography, history, and current affairs of the Pacific Islands (Center for Pacific Islands Studies 1993:14–15).

Australia has always had good strategic, political, and economic reasons to learn about its Asian and Pacific neighbors, but its version of area studies is rather different from the dominant model in the United States. The tradition of direct government funding of academic institutions is much stronger than in the United States, and in 1946 the federal government created the Australian National University specifically to promote research and post-graduate training in subjects of national importance. A significant part of the overseas dimension of the national interest was represented by the Research School of Pacific Studies, one of the new university's four constituent schools (Crawford 1968). According to an official publication, the rationale for establishing the school was "essentially the growing awareness of the importance to Australia of a sound understanding of the problems both of the 'Pacific Island neighbourhood,' and the near North, i.e. Southeast and East Asia" (Australian National University 1990:1).

The Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (as it is now called) has sponsored research on all parts of the Pacific Islands region, but there has always been a special focus on Papua New Guinea. This emphasis is not surprising given Australia's colonial involvement in Papua and New Guinea and its continuing strategic and economic interests there. During the late colonial period, key policy decisions were often based on reports commissioned from scholars based at the Australian National University. Indeed, a special New Guinea Research Unit of the university was established in Port Moresby in 1961 to conduct social and economic research in the territory (May 1976:7). After Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975, this role was assumed by a local entity, the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research (which later became the National Research Institute), but close ties with the Australian National University continued for a number of years.

Unlike its American area studies counterparts, the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies has always been organized primarily by discipline or topic. For example, the school was recently reorganized into four main

divisions, each representing a discipline or cluster of related disciplines.⁹ Some subunits, such as the Department of Political and Social Change or the National Centre for Development Studies, could be described as interdisciplinary in nature. But only a few entities, such as the Contemporary China Centre and the North East Asia Program, are explicitly organized around a particular area of the world. Nevertheless, the recent attempt to develop an organized, interdisciplinary program of Pacific Islands studies does not represent an entirely new departure.¹⁰ The area-based and interdisciplinary New Guinea Research Unit is an obvious precedent. Furthermore, the Faculty of Asian Studies has been in existence since 1962, and interdisciplinary undergraduate and graduate degrees in Asian studies have been offered for a number of years (Australian National University 1993).

The pragmatic rationale is clearly evident in the structures of the Australian National University's Graduate Diploma and M.A. programs in Pacific Islands Studies. Both programs require students to complete three core course-work units. One of these, "Images, Identities, and Issues," provides general background and discusses a range of contemporary issues, while the other two concern island economies and economic policy. Additional courses are chosen from existing Pacific-related offerings, and M.A. students must also complete a research essay. An appropriate mix of courses and a suitable research topic are identified in consultation with the adviser to suit a student's particular needs. The programs are advertised as "especially relevant for those who are seeking academic preparation for, or those who are engaged in a career requiring an understanding of the Pacific Islands region, whether in diplomacy, the public service, teaching, journalism or business" (*Pacific Islands Group Newsletter*, June 1993, 6).

New Zealand also has a long colonial history in the region and an ongoing pragmatic interest in developments there. Like their Australian counterparts, New Zealand academics were influential in colonial policy making in Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, and university-based research and teaching continue to inform New Zealand's foreign policy toward the region.¹¹ However, although public policy-oriented "think tanks" do exist within the state-funded university system, there is no New Zealand equivalent of the Australian National University. Canterbury University's Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies was established in 1985 at the bequest of a private individual, whose endowment continues to fund most of the center's modest budget.¹² The Centre for Pacific Studies at Auckland University was launched in 1985 with the help of funding from the Ministry of Pacific Islands Affairs and a private organization but has been funded entirely by the university since 1994. To date, its activities have been geared primarily to the needs and concerns of resident Pacific Islanders.

The powerful presence of the pragmatic rationale, with its implicit principle of national interest, does not necessarily render area studies an illegitimate part of the academy. First, the argument that there is a sharp distinction between “pure” and “applied” forms of scholarship is difficult to sustain. A more appropriate distinction might be between university programs that provide some sort of technical or professional training, including those structured mainly by pragmatic considerations, and those that emphasize research and critical inquiry. Second, the postmodern turn in the social sciences serves to emphasize, once again, that knowledge is never a neutral commodity that stands entirely free of the historical or political context in which it is produced. Finally, the assembled area studies resources are typically used for a wide variety of scholarly, political, and cultural purposes, many of which have no obvious connection to crass geopolitical concerns. Heginbotham argues that in the United States scholarship apparently unrelated to cold war concerns or even actively hostile to national goals has been tolerated by funding agencies, either as a concession to principles of academic freedom or in the belief that all in-depth knowledge of foreign areas is potentially useful (1994:35).

Nevertheless, some fundamental conceptual problems are associated with this form of scholarship. The first concerns the basic unit of analysis, which is by definition an area or region of the globe. As Edward Said (1979:4) and others have pointed out, these geographic sectors are not inert facts of nature, and there is nothing self-evident about them. When Professor Douglas Oliver noted in connection with a review of the University of Hawai‘i’s program in 1970 that the “Pacific Islands Area” was “an arbitrary and unjustifiable abstraction,” he was referring mainly to the enormous cultural and geographic diversity contained within its boundaries (quoted in Quigg 1987:91). However, in another sense, the boundaries of such entities are far from arbitrary. Rather, they are historical constructs that reflect the strategic interests of hegemonic powers at particular moments in history. As Ravi Palat points out, the term “Southeast Asia” gained currency only after use to designate Lord Mountbatten’s command in World War II (1993:9). The standard definition of “the Pacific Islands” is the region served by the South Pacific Commission—an organization established in 1947 to coordinate the activities of a handful of allied colonial powers with territories in this vast ocean (Fry 1994:136). When the Dutch lost their war with Indonesia over Irian Jaya in the early 1960s, “the Pacific Islands” suddenly lost its second largest territory, and some 20 percent of its population, to “South-east Asia.”

Almost inevitably such constructs become reified when they are used to organize an entire field of study. The tendency is to search for or simply

assume unifying regional cultural characteristics, common histories and pre-histories, and shared contemporary issues and problems. An entity that was created at a particular moment in history takes on a timeless quality; one that was conceived in the context of colonial administration and control assumes a mantle of indigenous integrity. The issue here is not so much whether the unit of analysis makes sense in terms of some set of innate characteristics. If such units are always constructed (and always contestable), then the important question becomes who decides where the boundaries are drawn and for what purpose. The danger is that issues of power become obscured behind a bland facade of supposedly objective scholarship.

If the first problem with area studies scholarship relates to an undue emphasis on assumed internal relationships and continuities, the second concerns the related and opposite tendency to ignore or downplay external linkages and wider contexts. As Eric Wolf argued, if our basic units of analysis are endowed with "the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded objects, we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls" (1982:6).

Creating a billiard ball out of the Pacific Islands region makes it easy to disregard early connections with places to the west and, especially, to minimize the importance of later connections with Europe and other centers of political and economic power. Analyses of economic development problems in the Pacific Islands, for example, typically emphasize internal "barriers" or "impediments" to growth while managing to ignore the global forces that have structured island economies for centuries. Such a bounded conceptual universe, with its inherent emphasis on insider-outsider dichotomies, can also distract attention from the complex patterns of accommodation and resistance provoked by colonial penetration and incorporation into a global economy.

The Laboratory Rationale

An alternative rationale for studying the Pacific Islands was outlined by Douglas Oliver two decades ago: "I suggest that because of their wide diversities, small-scale dimensions, and relative isolation, the Pacific Islands can provide excellent—in some ways unique—laboratory-like opportunities for gaining deeper understandings of Human Biology, Political Science, etc." (quoted in Quigg 1987:91). Western scientists have long recognized this opportunity, and the results of their investigations have profoundly affected a number of academic disciplines. For instance, information from early European voyages of exploration forced the reconsideration of some of the

fundamentals of natural science (MacLeod and Rehbock 1988); the nature of Pacific Islands societies sparked debates about noble and ignoble savages, which made their marks on European philosophy, art, and literature (Smith 1960, 1992). Perhaps the most sustained impact has been on anthropology, and Pacific materials have featured prominently in some of that discipline's most significant theoretical and methodological debates. The potential for this kind of work remains enormous. Studies of change by social scientists such as Ben Finney (1973, 1987), Bill Standish (1992), and Randal Stewart (1992) in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, or Fran Hezel (1989) and Don Rubinstein (1992) in Micronesia are important not only for what they can tell us about particular societies, but for their contributions to a more general body of knowledge.

The laboratory rationale has undoubtedly provided an important impetus for the development of all existing Pacific Islands studies programs. These programs have usually been built around cadres of regional specialists, most of whom remain based in "traditional" university departments and continue to approach Pacific Islands research and teaching activities from the perspectives of their respective disciplines. Most graduate students pursuing Pacific-related research topics continue to do so through discipline-based departments. Those that do not, for example candidates for the Pacific Islands studies' M.A. at the University of Hawai'i, are usually encouraged to frame their research projects in terms of questions of wider relevance.

In the laboratory approach, the region is no longer the primary unit of analysis, and some of the thorny conceptual problems associated with area studies disappear. However, other conceptual difficulties emerge. Douglas Oliver was enthusiastic about this type of Pacific scholarship, but he also felt that it was best pursued under the auspices of the established disciplines. If the laboratory rationale is the dominant one, the argument goes, there is simply no need for an organized program of Pacific Islands studies.

This position underestimates the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to scholarship. There is nothing preordained or inevitable about the current division of Western scholarship into a number of "traditional" disciplines. Rather, each specialty emerged under particular historical circumstances, often as a result of specific ideological differences between the leading practitioners of the day. Once established, however, each branch of the human sciences quickly adopted practices and invented a tradition that served to reinforce its differences from other branches. Wolf, among others, deplores the fragmentation of the social sciences and the resulting tendency to disassemble the human world into bits for study, without ever reassembling the totality (1982:7). Certainly, the field of Pacific Islands studies is replete with examples of anthropologists who emphasize "culture" at the

expense of "history" or "politics," or economists who fail to consider anything beyond a narrow conceptual world of money and markets (Hooper 1993).

The early advocates of area studies in American universities saw the advantages of employing a range of disciplinary tools to provide information useful for policy makers (Palat 1993:7). However, they were not interested in engineering the fundamental reintegration of the disciplines that Wolf and others have prescribed. The approach adopted in most area studies programs is better described as "multidisciplinary" than "interdisciplinary." M.A. students in Pacific Islands studies at the University of Hawai'i, for example, are required to take Pacific-related courses in a number of different disciplines, but they are not asked to synthesize what they learn in any coherent and sustained way. Research papers in the field typically borrow a fairly standard approach from a discipline (often history) and seldom venture far across established disciplinary boundaries.

To be truly interdisciplinary, a field of study would have to make a radical break with the past. As Roland Barthes argued:

Interdisciplinary work, so much discussed these days, is not about confronting already constituted disciplines (none of which, in fact, is willing to let itself go). To do something interdisciplinary it's not enough to choose a "subject" (a theme) and gather around it two or three sciences. Interdisciplinarity consists in creating a new object that belongs to no one. (Quoted in Clifford 1986:1)

Developing such an approach would be challenging, to say the least. The "founding fathers" of Pacific Islands studies at the University of Hawai'i found their initial emphasis on interdisciplinary work difficult to sustain (Quigg 1987).¹³ Nevertheless, the time is ripe for another concerted attempt to come to grips with the interdisciplinary aspects of Pacific Islands studies. The interdisciplinary idea has gained considerable currency among scholars in recent years. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, the impetus is coming from within the academy rather than from government bureaucrats or funding agencies, and it is rooted in intellectual rather than geopolitical concerns. Influenced by the seminal work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, scholars and students throughout the social sciences and humanities are reconsidering the epistemological foundations of their disciplines (see, for example, Rabinow 1984; Clifford and Marcus 1986; White 1973). Some, like James Clifford (e.g., 1988), are throwing off disciplinary constraints and pioneering innovative new approaches. Programs like Pacific Islands studies that operate beyond the institutional grip of the "tra-

ditional” departments are particularly well placed to further explore these new possibilities.

The Empowerment Rationale

Both the pragmatic and laboratory rationales for Pacific Islands studies largely reflect the agendas and priorities of outsiders, and both bear colonial and neocolonial taints. In the pragmatic frame, on the one hand, the ultimate purpose has been influence rather than understanding. The laboratory mode, on the other hand, can easily reduce Pacific Islanders to mere objects for study. A prime example was the Harvard-based study of population biology that scrutinized and probed thousands of Solomon Islanders in the 1960s and 1970s in the esoteric interest of science (Friedlaender 1975).

The decolonization of the region remains incomplete, but it has already changed the nature of Pacific Islands scholarship. The research agenda has been altered to reflect the emergence of a whole new range of economic, political, and social problems and issues. Disciplines such as Pacific history have attempted to become more “island centered” and less imperial in their concerns and emphases. More important, the former objects of inquiry have acquired the political and educational abilities to speak up and answer back. As Vilsoni Hereniko put it, Pacific Islanders are no longer “content to allow representations of themselves in print to be the preserve of foreigners” (1994:413). This new political environment has given rise to a third bundle of justifications for Pacific Islands studies that can be called the empowerment rationale.

The politics of Pacific Islands scholarship are complex. Everybody agrees that more indigenous voices and perspectives are needed, but there is considerable disagreement beyond that. For some, indigenous participation on the basis of equal opportunity is sufficient. But for others, the field will not be decolonized until Pacific Islanders are fully in control of a curriculum and research agenda long dominated by foreigners. It is sometimes claimed that this view is articulated only by a few forceful individuals and is not widely shared. However, it has its proponents on all the major campuses in the region, and many more sympathizers may exist among the silent majority of regional students and faculty. For example, Haunani-Kay Trask’s broadside (1991) against Roger Keesing for his “Creating the Past” article (1989) struck a responsive chord throughout the region, as did Epeli Hau’ofa’s revisionist article (1994), “Our Sea of Islands.”

Western-trained social scientists who believe they are working in the interests of Pacific Islanders are often puzzled—even hurt—by such rumblings and tend to dismiss the “activists” as misguided, ungrateful, or simply

power-hungry.¹⁴ Yet the Pacific advocates of "indigenization" are part of a global movement whose rationale deserves further scrutiny.

For these scholars, the real problem is the way that social science is practiced in non-Western societies, by Western and indigenous scholars alike. They reject the notion that social science as developed and practiced in the West is a neutral and universal discourse, and deplore the uncritical adoption of Western concepts and methodologies by Third World scholars. According to Syed Farid Alatas, indigenous scholars too often become the intellectual prisoners of their Westernized training, unable "to be creative and raise original problems . . . devise original analytical methods, and alienated from the main issues of indigenous society" (1993:308).

Several responses to the so-called captive mind problem are possible. One is to deny that it is a significant problem and argue that Western social science is generally applicable in the Third World, albeit with a few conceptual or methodological modifications here and there. This view is probably dominant in Western universities but is unacceptable to most in the indigenization movement, who advocate much more radical reforms. A second response is to argue that social science is so steeped in Western intellectual and material culture, so thoroughly ethnocentric, that it must be rejected entirely. Powerful strands of this response are apparent in some of the writings of Haunani-Kay Trask, for example when she dismissed Roger Keesing's academic "mumbo jumbo" about the invention of tradition in the Pacific and indicated that Hawaiian nationalists have made a conscious choice "for things Native over things non-Native" (1991:159, 163).

The danger with an "either-or" approach to indigenization is that Western ethnocentrism, or what Edward Said calls "orientalism" (1979), can easily be replaced by indigenous ethnocentrism or "reverse orientalism" in non-Western scholarship (Alatas 1993:313; see also Amin 1989; Moghadam 1989). For Said, whose earlier work did much to stimulate the indigenization debate, this outcome is unfortunate, condemning its practitioners "to an impoverished politics of knowledge based only upon the assertion and reassertion of identity." Instead he has suggested a third response to the problem of Western academic hegemony, one that seeks to create genuinely universal forms of scholarship. The ultimate purpose of such reforms, he has argued, should be "the reintegration of all those peoples and cultures, once confined and reduced to peripheral status, with the rest of the human race" (Said 1991:24).

This reintegration involves not the wholesale rejection of Western scholarship, but its "selective adaptation" to the needs and circumstances of non-Western societies and cultures (Alatas 1993:312). At the very least it requires social science practitioners to question the appropriateness of all of

their activities in non-Western locations, including the identification of problems for investigation and the selection of concepts and methodologies. Of greater significance is the perceived need to create "systematized bodies of knowledge," rooted in indigenous histories and cultures, on which more appropriate forms of scholarship can be based. According to Alatas, "Such social sciences are not confined to the study of the civilizations of their origin but are extended to explain and interpret the whole world from various non-Western vantage points" (1993:309).

There are many obstacles to the indigenization of academic discourse, not least in the Pacific where the struggle against domination, especially cultural domination, is only beginning and questions of identity remain vital. However, these issues are being raised and pursued in the region, and the volume of "indigenized" Pacific Islands literature is likely to grow (see, for example, Hau'ofa 1975, 1994; Meleisea 1978, 1987; Wendt 1987; Kame'e-leihiwa 1992). Meanwhile, the creative writings of Pacific poets, novelists, and playwrights are undoubtedly the richest sources of indigenous voices and representations currently available (see, for example, Hereniko 1994).

Mainly because of the dominance of other rationales, the older, established Pacific Islands studies programs are not particularly well placed to respond effectively to the new, more politicized environment. Some of the newer programs, especially the Hawaiian studies program at the University of Hawai'i and the various Maori studies programs in New Zealand universities, in contrast, are largely driven by empowerment criteria of one sort or another. Although Sidney Mead's proposed University of Aotearoa has yet to be realized, several degree-granting "tribal universities" have recently been established to promote Maoritanga and foster indigenous ways of knowing (Mead 1983:343–346; Hanson 1989:894–897). Auckland University's Pacific studies program, established primarily to serve the needs of resident (non-Maori) Polynesians, also falls into this category. The University of Guam appears willing to accommodate would-be decolonizers by promising research skills that allow students to contribute to knowledge of Micronesia and to respond "to problems and challenges encountered there" (*Pacific News from Mānoa*, Sept.–Dec. 1993, 5). But there is no sign of an indigenization agenda of the type advocated for Hawaiian studies by Trask and Kame'e-leihiwa, by Mead for Maori studies, or by Said and Alatas for non-Western studies generally.

New Directions for Pacific Islands Studies

Each of the three rationales for Pacific Islands studies outlined here has its own constituency and its own legitimacy. While they are not necessarily

mutually exclusive, each has particular implications for program planning and development. A program designed to prepare professionals to do business in the region, for example, will be structured quite differently from one where the dominant aim is to liberate the minds of oppressed people. Nevertheless, there are three fundamental issues that need to be addressed when contemplating the future of any organized program of Pacific Islands studies.

First, there is the question of why the region, or a particular part of it, should be treated separately from surrounding areas. Whatever its origins, the idea of the Pacific Islands has assumed a certain reality over the last five decades through the actions of regional organizations, international agencies, and governments. Nevertheless, "the Pacific Islands" has only limited utility as a concept and is certainly too slippery to form the basis for most types of academic inquiry. For most purposes, it makes little sense to talk of Pacific Islands politics, culture, history, economics, art, literature, or anything else, because these formulations assume a nonexistent regional integrity. Rather than move toward more solid, much smaller, spatial categories, it makes more sense to make theme or discourse the primary organizing principle in program planning and curriculum development. Starting with thematic concerns does not mean that place is ignored, but that the appropriate geographic, cultural, social, or political unit of analysis is not predetermined by extraneous considerations. (Interestingly, for pragmatic reasons having to do with the end of the cold war, U.S. funding agencies also appear to be advocating a move away from regions toward themes [Heginbotham 1994: 36–37].)

Instead of the politics, history, or culture of the Pacific Islands, then, it is more useful to think and talk of politics or history or culture *in* the Pacific Islands (Denning 1989). In practical terms, this means first identifying fundamental questions of human concern, such as what are wealth and poverty, and how are they created? What is production, and how do people organize themselves to produce the material necessities of life? What is power, and how is it exercised? What is culture, and how is it expressed? What is identity, and how is it constructed? What is gender, and how are gender relations determined? Only after appropriate sets and subsets of such concerns have been identified and refined can we begin to identify geographic or cultural sites and historical periods where they can usefully be explored.¹⁵ (Not surprisingly, the themes identified as important for study by the U.S. funding agencies are more narrowly defined to reflect national interests and concerns.)

Second, there is the issue of interdisciplinarity and what it means for a program of study. If university work in the social sciences and humanities,

especially at the graduate level, is all about research and analysis, then questions of epistemology are unavoidable. Without a strong sense of how knowledge is acquired and verified, it is extremely difficult to evaluate other people's work, let alone design and conduct original research. Each of the "traditional" human science disciplines is based on certain epistemological assumptions, and its students can choose among a range of established approaches to inquiry, conceptual frameworks, methodologies, and so on. Students in these programs learn how to "do" anthropology, political science, or whatever, but how can students learn to "do" Pacific Islands studies?

One option is to argue that there is no satisfactory way of doing it and to direct students to discipline-based degree programs. Alternatively, one can deny that it is a problem and let students "muddle through" their research projects using whatever bits of discipline they pick up along the way. A third option is to require that entering students have an appropriate disciplinary grounding for their proposed research projects or that they acquire one as part of the degree program. A more rewarding option, however, which could make a real contribution to scholarship, is to guide and encourage students to develop approaches that are truly interdisciplinary in nature.

Interdisciplinary work is distinguished first, and most obviously, by defining its objects of inquiry without reference to established disciplinary boundaries. It acknowledges that societies do not fall neatly into segments or compartments with labels coinciding with the names of university departments. It sees the connections between political, cultural, economic, social, linguistic, or spiritual phenomena, rather than emphasizing their separateness. In the field of Pacific Islands studies, perhaps the most notable convergences have occurred at the boundaries between the disciplines of anthropology (or, more properly, ethnography) and history (see, for example, Hanlon 1988; Salmond 1991; Sahlins and Kirch 1992). By putting back together two major disciplines pulled apart in the nineteenth century, works of political economy are also inherently interdisciplinary. In the Pacific Islands, such writings typically incorporate anthropological material as well (e.g., Brookfield 1972; Narayan 1984; Thompson and MacWilliam 1992; Buck 1993).

The postmodern movement in the social sciences has drawn attention to a second, less obvious, aspect of becoming interdisciplinary. This movement recognizes the key roles of creativity, subjectivity, and poetics in the "science" of interpreting and representing the social world. It encourages researchers to be reflexive, to acknowledge the contingent and open-ended nature of inquiry, to incorporate multiple voices into their narratives, and to experiment with new ways of presenting material. A seminal work in this

genre is James Clifford's "Identity in Mashpee," which uses a variety of literary techniques to investigate the tribal claims of Mashpee Indians (1988:277-346). In the Pacific, the postmodern challenge has been taken up in a variety of ways by anthropologists (e.g., Lindstrom 1993; Thomas 1992; Gewertz and Errington 1991), historians (e.g., Neumann 1992), and literature specialists (e.g., Hereniko 1995).

Students in Pacific Islands studies ought to be introduced to the interdisciplinary approach in the same way that students in other programs are introduced to their respective disciplines. A course or seminar for this purpose would discuss the intellectual history of the approach, examine and critique existing works in the genre, and develop proposals for individual research projects.

Finally, there is the issue of indigenous voices, perspectives, and epistemologies, and how they can be integrated into the dominant discourses of Pacific Islands studies. In a sense, decolonization is an inherent part of the business of becoming interdisciplinary, in that this process requires the critical scrutiny of established modes of inquiry. This approach allows ethnocentric aspects of orthodox approaches to be identified and facilitates the incorporation of indigenous epistemologies and perspectives (see, for example, Kame'eleihiwa 1992; Diaz 1994; Hanlon 1993). At the least, students in Pacific Islands studies programs can be exposed to the growing literature on indigenization and encouraged to discuss its implications for their own academic inquiries.

Epistemology is not the only issue here. It is also important to select the agenda of themes and issues on the curriculum with care. Even selecting an appropriate list of "critical" issues to discuss is inherently problematic, as there are radically different perspectives regarding what is important and for whom. It is easy to revert to conventional laundry lists of regional issues and problems and to forget that these tend to reflect primarily the interests and concerns of external powers or regional elites. Since no list can be neutral or objective, the best we can hope to do is constantly to raise questions about whose interests are enhanced or threatened by particular events or trends.

NOTES

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Ron May, Ben Kerkvliet, Peter Larmour, Stephen Henningham, Linley Chapman, Max Quanchi, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal, who provided useful comments and suggestions. However, I remain wholly responsible for the contents.

1. Most of these universities have established an institutional focus for Pacific Islands studies: the Centre for Pacific Studies at Auckland, the Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies at Canterbury, the Institute for Polynesian Studies at Brigham Young–Hawai‘i, and the Institute for Pacific Studies at University of the South Pacific. In 1994, the Australian National University established the Pacific Islands Liaison Centre. The University of Papua New Guinea has no such institutional base. The National Research Institute (which combined the former institutes for Papua New Guinea Studies, and Applied Economic and Social Research) has an extensive program of applied social, economic, and cultural research.

2. Some of these have also institutionalized Pacific Islands studies. For example, James Cook University of North Queensland has a Melanesian Studies Centre; University of New South Wales has a Centre for South Pacific Studies; University of Oregon has a Pacific Islands Studies program within a Center for Asian and Pacific Studies; University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands has a Centre for Pacific Studies; Kagoshima University in Japan has a Research Center for the South Pacific; and University of Hasanuddin in Indonesia has a Center for Pacific Studies.

3. The Australian National University's programs did not get under way in 1994 as planned because of low enrollments. The strategic plan for Auckland's Centre for Pacific Studies includes postgraduate studies, but no programs have been formally proposed. A masters degree in Hawaiian studies (or possibly Polynesian studies) is being planned at the University of Hawai‘i.

4. A major in Pacific Islands studies has been proposed for the community college in Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia.

5. The M.A. program at the University of Hawai‘i, for example, “is intended for students who desire a multidisciplinary degree focused on the Pacific region” (Center for Pacific Islands Studies 1993:14). The University of Guam promises its M.A. students an “interdisciplinary understanding” of Micronesia that will allow them to respond to regional “challenges and problems” (*Pacific News from Mānoa*, Sept.–Dec. 1993, 5). The Australian National University's M.A. and diploma programs are apparently designed to provide “academic preparation” for professionals operating in the region (*Pacific Islands Group Newsletter*, June 1993, 6).

6. Over the years, these sources have included the Carnegie Corporation, the Asia Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the U.S. Department of Education, and the U.S. Information Agency.

7. Copies of all of the applications are located in the files of the Center for Pacific Islands Studies, and Quigg discusses some of the earlier ones (1987). The narratives usually emphasize that it is the only such center in the United States.

8. For example, the Department of Anthropology at the University of Hawai‘i tells prospective students that the purpose of the discipline is to gain “a basic understanding of the

origin and development of humanity," while the Department of History defines its task as "the study of change and continuity in human society over time" (University of Hawai'i 1993).

9. These are Political Science and International Relations, Society and Environment (which includes departments of anthropology, human geography, and linguistics), Pacific and Asian History, and Economics.

10. Informal networks based on common interest in the Pacific Islands have always existed at the Australian National University. The formation of a Pacific Islands Group, with its own newsletter, the creation of interdisciplinary teaching programs, and the proposal to establish a Pacific Islands Liaison Centre may be part of a defensive strategy designed to counter a new institutional emphasis on Asia. This new emphasis, reflected in the insertion of "Asian" into the title of the research school in 1994, in turn, reflects the increasing importance of Asia for Australia.

11. For example, I. G. Bertram and R. F. Watters, two academics based at Victoria University of Wellington, were commissioned by the government to report on New Zealand's relations with the smaller Pacific Islands countries (1984). Such topics are also discussed periodically by academics and policy makers at Otago University's annual foreign-policy school.

12. Macmillan Brown wanted his money used to train New Zealanders for colonial administration. The terms of the will were eventually altered by the courts to reflect changing circumstances, allowing for the establishment of the center.

13. The requirement that students choose research topics involving at least two disciplines was eventually dropped, as was the Interdepartmental Seminar series, launched in 1953 to promote cross-disciplinary research activities. The program's interdisciplinary emphasis was further relaxed with the introduction of the Plan B, nonthesis, option in 1974, which served to shift attention away from the problems and challenges of research. About 80 percent of Pacific Islands studies M.A. degrees awarded by the University of Hawai'i since 1974 have been earned via the Plan B route (Quigg 1987).

14. In his reply to Trask, for example, Keesing hastens to establish his political credentials on issues of "past colonial invasion (including missionary invasion), present neocolonialism and global capitalism, gender, and the struggles of Third and Fourth World people" (1991:168).

15. In a sense, this means moving away from the pragmatic rationale, with its implicit emphasis on region, toward the thematic concerns of the laboratory rationale. However, the region can still provide a general context for research and inquiry.

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REVIEWS

SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF MĀORI TEXTS

John Charlot
University of Hawai'i at Mānoa

Manu van Ballekom and Ray Harlow, *Te Waitatanga mai o te Atua: South Island Traditions Recorded by Matiaha Tiramōrehu*. Canterbury Maori Studies, no. 4. Christchurch: Department of Maori, University of Canterbury, 1987. Pp. viii, 52, index, references. NZ\$8.95.

Helen M. Hogan, *Renata's Journey: Ko te Haerenga o Renata*. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1994. Pp. 175, bibliography, index. NZ\$29.95.

Margaret Orbell, *Traditional Māori Stories*. Auckland: Reed Books, 1992. Pp. viii, 192, glossary, bibliography. NZ\$29.95.

Mohi Ruatapu, *Ngā Kōrero a Mohi Ruatapu Tohunga Rongonui o Ngāti Porou: The Writings of Mohi Ruatapu*. Translated, edited, and annotated by Anaru Reedy. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1993. Pp. 256, glossary, bibliography. NZ\$29.95.

Ailsa Smith, *Songs and Stories of Taranaki: He Tuhituhinga Tai Hau-ā-uru*. Edited with translations and commentary by Ailsa Smith from the writings of Te Kahui Kararehe of Rahotu, Taranaki. Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury, 1993. Pp. xvii, 80, glossary, bibliography. NZ\$10 (New Zealand); NZ\$12 (Australia and the Pacific); NZ\$13 (U.S.).

POLYNESIAN CULTURES have produced extensive literatures, of which those of the Hawaiians and the New Zealand Māori offer the largest number of surviving examples. The vast corpus of Māori literature extends from pre-contact materials transmitted in the oral tradition to contemporary works. This literature is important as art and as material for the study of Māori history and culture. Fortunately, Māori literature has been appreciated by scholars since the nineteenth century, giving Māori studies in general an unusually broad basis in native sources. The abundance of native-language texts made Māori studies influential for the whole field of Polynesian studies, an influence that continues today.

Unfortunately, those texts were not always handled with methods that are acceptable today. Literary works were not evaluated and interpreted as individual wholes but were mined for data and divided into passages that could be used as prooftexts for secondary theories. In Margaret Orbell's words, nineteenth-century scholars "created their own synthesis from a mass of disparate accounts . . . chose the versions that suited their purpose best, and they edited and translated them in an arbitrary and high-handed manner" (1985:21). Fortunately, the original Māori documents were preserved and can be studied with better methods today.

The result of the poor nineteenth-century method was inevitably to systematize the great variety of Māori traditions, reducing them to a few fabricated candidates for the true or official version. Rather than appreciating the particular traditions of each family, tribe, or thinker on the origin of the universe, scholars used them to construct a larger composite version. Some Māori themselves, newly conscious of pan-Māori relationships, joined in this effort, making it one of the most interesting movements of the formation of a native identity. Māori and non-Māori supported each other in the formulation of large, comprehensive texts, in which each relevant god was given his or her cosmic niche, as if in a fully developed governmental bureaucracy. The edifice was crowned with monotheism—the hitherto secret tradition of a single high god, Io—making Māori religion, in the thinking of the time, a respectable peer of Christianity.

This truly impressive construction, a masterpiece of nineteenth-century Polynesian thinking, was then claimed to be the original, ancient tradition of which tribal and individual traditions were fragments and simplifications. E. S. Craighill Handy, in his *Polynesian Religion* (1927), extended this claim to all of Polynesia, opening a scholarly debate that can still degenerate into dispute. The Māori themselves are divided on the antiquity of Io-centered teachings and their relation to indisputable tribal traditions.

Besides systematizing Māori texts and traditions, scholars tended to historicize them. Mythical, legendary, and fabulous elements were eliminated

or explained in order to produce a narrative that could be accepted as plausible. Historicizing was combined with systematizing to create the teaching of the Great Fleet, in which each important tribal unit was given its historical niche, just as each god had been given his cosmic one. The method was the same—combining undoubtedly ancient migration traditions—and so was the purpose: to provide a comprehensive mental framework for the Māori, now living in unprecedented contact with each other and in opposition to a foreign population.

These impressive nineteenth-century syntheses by Māori and non-Māori have proved compelling for several generations of scholars and students of Polynesian cultures. But no historical claim can escape periodic challenge, and the resulting disputes can have an existential importance. Challenges to Christian claims by biblical and historical studies have been basic and painful forces in the intellectual development of the West, and the debate continues to form and divide us.

Objections to received views of Māori tradition have been made from a number of different fields. Because of the importance of Māori studies for Polynesian studies as a field, the resulting debates have a wide significance. I will discuss only the use and importance of texts as bases both for criticism and for reconstruction.

As to philological method, the nineteenth-century use of texts is unacceptable. Systematizing and historicizing were already discredited in the nineteenth century, and every subsequent development in philology has reinforced that judgment. The nineteenth-century constructs cannot, therefore, be accepted as the supposed original tradition but should be appreciated as forming their own valuable chapter in the history of Māori thought. For the earlier chapters, the scholar must turn to the original materials that were used by the systematizers themselves. In sum, what must be reconstructed is not a single intellectual system, but a many-branched intellectual history. Fortunately, Māori literature supplies evidence in abundance for such a task.

A pioneer in the new approach to Māori texts was J. Prytz Johansen, whose two books (1954, 1958) are considered among the greatest ever written in the field of Polynesian studies. Schooled in the European philological tradition, Johansen “acted on the principle of making texts take precedence of other sources and of studying concrete situations and events rather than of using general formulations” (1954:270). He scrupulously treated each text on its own and sought the best methods of interpreting it. He then induced his general views from the evidence of the texts rather than subjecting the evidence to theories formulated in other areas: “I have as far as possible made my studies of the Maoris be self-contained without drawing on cur-

rent theories of e.g., myth and rite, etc., as I am of the opinion that these phenomena can vary somewhat and therefore must preferably be elucidated in each separate case" (1958:3). Johansen's work ranged from the definition of key terms to the interpretation of narratives and chants. In doing this, he demonstrated that certain texts should not be interpreted historically, but needed to be interpreted by their connection to ritual: "the ritual gets a mythical context, which offers a solid basis for an interpretation of the ritual" (1958:9).

Margaret Orbell, considered the foremost scholar of nineteenth-century Māori texts, argued in her important book, *Hawaiki: A New Approach to Maori Tradition* (1985), that Johansen's books "provide the groundwork on which all later investigations in this area must be based" (1985:12). Many Māori traditions "are not historical accounts, but myths: that is, they are religious narratives which tell how things were arranged in the beginning, and why, therefore, events now happen as they do. Most of the figures in the myths were archetypal, in that their actions were seen as providing patterns to be followed by later generations." Māori texts must first be respected as autonomous works of literature, not as an undifferentiated mass to be exploited piecemeal. Those texts must then be interpreted with all the methodological rigor used in the study of other literatures: "People have not expected to find in works on Maori tradition the standards that apply in other areas" (p. 22). Proper method will make possible "the study of ancient Maori thought, religion and poetry" (p. 65).

Accordingly, Orbell has been dedicating herself to the difficult and demanding work of the edition, translation, and interpretation of Māori texts. She has also been training students such as Christine Tremewan, whose doctoral thesis (1992) is an exhaustive study of a body of South Island texts; Lyndsay Head, whose article "The Gospel of Te Ua Haumene" (1992) exhibits impressively the state of the art; and Ailsa Smith and Helen Hogan, whose work is reviewed here. Orbell has also worked as an adviser to others in the field, such as Anaru Reedy and Ray Harlow, whose work I also review here.¹

The work of such scholars has a pedagogical as well as a scholarly importance. The language of the nineteenth century is sufficiently different from modern Māori that contemporary readers find it difficult. Nineteenth-century texts have in fact been neglected in the ongoing effort to preserve Māori as a living language. But such texts must be studied to provide a literary and cultural link with the past, to preserve the richness of the language, and to deal with the ever-increasing amount of litigation based on nineteenth-century documents. The publication of more texts, translations, and notes provides materials for students to familiarize themselves with the

older language. Such texts can also replace secondary sources in courses, facilitate the establishment of courses in Polynesian literature, and encourage the use of Polynesian texts in courses on world literature.

Curiously little attention has been given to the important and extensive work being conducted in Māori philology. In all likelihood, this is due to the general neglect of language and literature in Polynesian anthropology and historiography and to the small number of people capable of assessing the recent publications. My own knowledge of Māori is too rudimentary for a thorough criticism of the following works, and I will concentrate on points that I can make from my own areas of research.

Orbell's *Traditional Māori Stories* (1992, cited above at the beginning of this review essay) is the most recent example of her work. She has chosen an interesting variety of stories and has carefully transcribed the texts from available original manuscripts (even when they have been published previously). For easier reading, she has regularized the text and added diacritical marks. Her translations are careful and readable; their excellent English remains very close to the Māori originals and gives a good impression of their energy and forward movement. Such translations are possible only when one is a genuine expert. Introductions and notes provide the available information on the storyteller and the date and place of origin of the text. Information is provided on the manuscript, prior publications and studies, and differing versions. Orbell sketches the cultural and literary context, both Māori and general Polynesian, and the peculiar characteristics of each text. She emphasizes the need to appreciate "stylistic individuality": storytellers have "their own approach, their own artistry" (p. 5). Photographs of the storytellers and artworks have been chosen expertly and are genuinely useful (Orbell has worked also as an art critic and historian). Great care has clearly been taken to make the book interesting for the general reader, instructive for the student, and useful for the scholar.²

A most important new publication is *Ngā Kōrero a Mohi Ruatapu Tohunga Rongonui o Ngāti Porou: The Writings of Mohi Ruatapu* (1993, above), on which Orbell "worked closely" with Anaru Reedy: "Without her insights and experience, the task would not have been possible" (p. 7). Ruatapu was one of the most learned Māori of the nineteenth century and one of the three principal teachers of the last Whare Wānanga (School of Learning), started in 1836. His writings thus preserve the highest level of teaching of the time.

The book is a transcription and translation with informative notes of two of the four extant manuscripts written by Ruatapu; publication of the other two is promised. The translator has proceeded with great caution: passages were apparently left untranslated unless they were securely understood

along with the references and cultural context. The words of some untranslated passages yield a sense, but the translator did not want to proffer that without greater certainty on the point being conveyed. As with all other such books, translations will be improved through scholarly discussion.

Significantly, no mention is made of Io traditions in Ruatapu's writings, although the claim has been made that they were taught at the school in which he was active. In fact, Ruatapu's traditions can be fitted perfectly into the context of Māori and other Polynesian traditions. Polynesian texts on the origin of the universe provide some of the strongest evidence for the cognate character of Polynesian intellectual culture and can be adequately understood only when studied together (Charlot 1991). This publication will certainly take a prominent place in the comparative study of the subject and provide an incentive and a model for the publication of further texts. The need and desire for such texts is indicated by the fact that the first printing was sold out before publication.

An example of the interesting materials available is Ballekom and Harlow's *Te Waiatatanga mai o te Atua: South Island Traditions Recorded by Matiaha Tiramōrehu* (1987, above), the text and translation of "one of the longest and earliest documents written by a South Islander" (p. viii). Tiramōrehu wrote his manuscript in 1849 in the varying spelling found in writings by other speakers of South Island Māori. John White, in his 1887 publication *The Ancient History of the Maori* (Wellington: Government Printer), "used this material . . . but without giving any credit to the author, or even keeping the text together as a coherent whole" (p. vi). This edition is therefore a good example of the rescue operations being performed by contemporary scholars. The text was transcribed from the original manuscript, and after the tragic death of Ballekom, Harlow provided a translation and a few short notes. The book recounts the origin of the universe and the earliest generations, and reading this version along with Ruatapu's creates a strong impression of the similarities and differences of Māori traditions.

Ailsa Smith's 1993 edition (above) of some of the writings of her great-grandfather Te Kahui Kararehe (ca. 1845–1904) illustrates the literary materials transmitted as family treasures among the Māori: *Songs and Stories of Taranaki* contains texts on the origin of the universe, legendary and historical narratives, chants, and political songs. The current debate on who has the right to publish Māori texts will be largely resolved as more Māori are inspired and trained to assume the task. Such family traditions contain valuable variations of Māori traditions: for instance, the raising of the sky is ascribed by Smith's family to Tangaroa as opposed to Tāne in the better-known tradition (pp. 1–8). Smith follows her teacher Orbell's format and style of literal translation and shares her interest in archetypal interpreta-

tion. Smith carefully notes the local character of the language and is attentive to genres and differing versions. Her informative notes make effective use of the related literature. Smith's book raises the hope that the remainder of the family papers will be published along with a complete description and history of their origin and transmission.

Helen Hogan's text, *Renata's Journey* (1994, above), is of a different type: a nineteenth-century account in a nontraditional form of the new world of Māori-Pākehā relations. The narrative of an 1843 trip with a missionary party by Renata Kawepō (1808?–1888) is “probably the earliest surviving piece of extended prose written by a Māori” (p. 7) and has “no literary precedent” (p. 127). The learned and powerful Kawepō is an excellent example of a remarkable Polynesian negotiating the early contact period both intellectually and in his personal relations. He organizes his pioneering narrative according to the traditional form of an itinerary with formulaic expressions. He tests himself against the foreigners in deeds and manners and does not hesitate to express his opposition to and even anger at certain of their actions and decisions. Hogan's commendably full research illuminates Kawepō's terse remarks, notably by comparing them with the journal of the missionary William Cotton, with whom Kawepō was traveling. The differing interests and perspectives of Māori and foreigner are brought clearly to the light. For instance, the Māori climb a dangerous cliff to *mātakitaki* (sight-see) a famous view, a Polynesian practice (pp. 62–63); Cotton complains that the Māori just wanted to take the shortest route (pp. 112–113). The tensions that revealed themselves during the trip were to reappear throughout Kawepō's long and prominent life and probably influenced his political and cultural decisions. Hogan's presentation of Kawepō's work is a model of completeness, including a description of the manuscript, an explanation of the methods of editing, text and translation on facing pages, notes on language and forms of expression, short biographies of the principal personages, genealogies of the Māori using family information, a discussion of the salient problems of culture change found in the text, illustrations—some done on the trip—and maps, both nineteenth century and modern.

Māori—indeed Polynesian—literature is good reading. The stories contain strong characters, exciting plots, and vigorous expression. The traditions of the origin of the universe and the early generations are impressive feats of memory and coordination. Most important, the reader of the original language is in direct contact with Māori self-expression, undistorted by secondary sources. In fact, the strong projection of the self, the personality of the storyteller and thinker, is characteristic of Polynesian literature.

Such texts can also be used as secure bases for further study both of Māori and other Polynesian materials. Comparative study will in turn

influence translation. For instance, a number of cognate words are shared by Polynesian texts on the origin of the universe; a comparative study would enable the translator to understand their use more precisely in that context as opposed to more modern uses of the same words.³ As a student of other Polynesian literatures (Charlot 1977, 1990, 1991), I was particularly interested in literary forms, structures, and devices. For instance, many of the same genres can be found, such as stories of the origin of a land feature or of a saying or custom.

Similarly, the structure of the Māori single-story form is the same as that found in Samoan and Hawaiian literature. It can contain the following elements: title or titular sentence, introduction, transition to the narrative, the narrative itself, one or more conclusions, and a terminal sentence (Charlot 1990:417). A good example is the story "Ko Tieke-iti" in Orbell's *Traditional Māori Stories* (p. 117). The titular sentence announces the story: "*He kōrero tēnei no Tieke-iti rāua ko Tieke-rahi* (This is a story about Little Tieke and Big Tieke)." The introduction, "*He puta . . . tāima katoa*," provides general information necessary for the narrative, in this case, the principals' habitual activity. The narrative relates the singular events that form the plot of the story, "*Tiakina . . . kāore tahi i mau*," and the whole is closed by a terminal sentence, "*Ka mutu tēnā* (That's the end)." These same elements are found often in single stories, and titular and terminal sentences frequently use the same words and expressions.⁴ The other Polynesian elements mentioned above can also be found in Māori stories, often in cognate wording.⁵ Other Polynesian devices can also be used, such as the regular expression of series of events (Orbell 1992, above:21, 73, 103) and building to a climax (p. 126). Modernizations can be found, such as the use of explanations and the more extensive expression of emotions that would otherwise be understood (*ibid.*, pp. 151–160).

Once this structure is identified, stories can be recognized when inserted into larger complexes (Charlot 1990:425–426); complexes are in fact most often constructed by combining originally independent smaller units into a redactional framework. For instance, three terminal sentences in a large complex enable the reader to distinguish the stories from the surrounding explanatory passages.⁶

The construction of the complexes of Ruatapu and Tiramōrehu is based on genealogies into which the stories of famous members are inserted when those protagonists are reached in the lineage (compare Charlot 1991:129–132). The genealogy itself can serve as the introduction, so that only the narrative of the story is presented, as in Tiramōrehu's sections on Tawhaki and Rata (Ballekom and Harlow 1987, above:14–18, 18–21). Indeed, Ruatapu can place the expression of the genealogical connection in the traditional

place of the introduction, between the titular sentence and a transition to the narrative.⁷ Throughout, Ruatapu retains more elements of the original story structures.⁸

Ruatapu's Māui section (pp. 18–25) is framed by a titular sentence (p. 18, "*Ko ngā mahi tēnei a Māui*"; p. 119, "These are the things that Māui did") and a terminal one (p. 25, "*Ka mutu i konei āna mahi katoa*"; p. 126, "That is the end of all the things he did"). After a short narration of Māui's wondrous birth, a transition—*ka noho*—leads to the first of eight stories (pp. 18–19). The same transition enables the reader or hearer to distinguish the second, fifth, sixth, and seventh stories (pp. 19, 22 ff.). Subtitles are also used, which are similar to titular sentences; the subtitle for the eighth story is followed immediately by a classical titular sentence (p. 25). The last three sentences before the terminal sentence of the fifth story are a conclusion (p. 23, "*Takoto tonu . . . he motu*"; terminal sentence: "*Ka mutu tēnei mahinga a Māui*"). The fourth story ends with a formal conclusion (p. 21, "*No reira . . . a Mahuika*") and a terminal sentence ("*Ko te tinihangatanga tēnei a Māui a Mahuika*"; p. 122, "This is how Māui deceived Mahuika"). The sixth story also has a terminal sentence (p. 24), and less formal, summarizing statements terminate the first, second, third, and eighth stories (pp. 19 ff., 25). The terminal sentence of the whole complex serves also for the eighth story. This very clear structure is an aid to understanding.

Ruatapu's tendency to employ structural elements can be seen also in his regular practice of framing chants with a presentation sentence and a terminating sentence (pp. 27, 28 ff., 39–40, 41 ff., 50–51, 79, 98, 108–111); one of these sentences can be omitted. The power of a form on Ruatapu's composition can be seen in his splitting a narrative in order to accommodate it to his controlling genealogical framework (pp. 34, 46–47).

Many other Polynesian literary elements can be found in the above and other Māori texts. For instance, prose can be based on chant (Ruatapu 1993, above:96, 98; compare Charlot 1988:303–308). In many Māori genres, paired opposites are used as completeness formulas and organizing principles, such as *runga/raro* (up/down), *rangi/nuku* (sky/earth), *uta/tai* (land/sea), *pō/ao* (night/day), *ora/mate* (life/death), *mua/muri* (forward/backward), *tū/noho* (stand/sit), *roto/waho* (inside/outside), *ake/iho* (up/down), and *-ī/-ā* (sound symbolism, high and low). These pairs are essential for any description of Polynesian thinking. At an even more basic level, the reading of Māori texts helps in the understanding of those in other Polynesian languages, as words and expressions become clearer through comparison. Finally, little-studied but important Polynesian cultural elements can be discovered as articulated by the texts, such as the ideal of the completeness of learning (Ballekom and Harlow 1987, above:18).

The above publications have made important new materials available to the scholar and the student. We can be grateful also for the effort that has made them so agreeably accessible.

NOTES

1. Harlow has also been influenced by the work of Agathe Thornton, a classical scholar, who has done important work in establishing and translating texts with commentaries, general introductions, and comparisons with other Polynesian literatures (pers. com., 1994).

2. Characteristically, Orbell is constantly taking notes for future editions: for example, for p. 160, she would now change the translation "Then they heard the woman was singing her song" to "Then they realized that the woman was singing her song" (pers. com., 1993).

3. Some discussion is needed also on the appropriate English glosses for Māori religious terms. For instance, to translate *tipua* or *tupua* as "demon" seems to reflect nineteenth-century foreign religious attitudes. "Daemon" is a less familiar word but more exact and less burdened with value judgment.

4. Titular sentence: Orbell 1992, above:29, 42, 53, 72, 84, 89, 101, 103, 104, 111, 117, 121, 125, 130 (118 is an alternative opening for a story); Graham 1946:28; Head 1986:25; Tremewan 1988:16.

Introduction: Orbell 1992, above:8, 20, 29, 33, 42, 48, 53, 63, 67, 72–73, 89, 103, 111, 121–122, 125, 130, 133, 147. Introductory material can be combined with titular sentences and also displaced (pp. 85, 89, 103, perhaps 125–126). Introductions can begin with the mention of travel (p. 142; compare Charlot 1990:421); Head 1986:25; Tremewan 1988:16. The last two examples are of a special type of introduction developed in New Zealand: information is provided about the migration canoe.

Terminal: Orbell 1992, above:44, 58, 76, 86, 94, 106, 122, 132, 136, 158; Head 1986:26; Tremewan 1988:17.

Many more examples could be cited.

5. Transition from introduction to narrative: Orbell 1992, above:20 ("Na"), 25 ("tae noa ki tētahi rā"), 53 ("Ākuanei"), 67 ("Na, ko tētehi rā"), 73 ("Ākuanei"), 101 ("I tētahi pō"), 147 ("I aua rā"). Conclusion: Orbell 1992, above:76 ("Tēnei kāinga . . . kī ana te Māori"), 120 ("Mau tonu . . . i Waiaua ra"); compare 158; Tremewan 1988:17 ("Ko aua puke e tū nei ināiane").

6. Graham 1946: complex, 30–37; terminal sentences, 34 ("Heoi ano, ka mate a Ureia"; "Heoi ano, ko te mutunga tenei o nga korero . . . ngohi"), 36 ("Heoi ano ra—me mutu ona korero i konei"; this could be used also as a termination of the whole complex).

7. Ruatapu 1993, above:40, titular sentence ("Ko te kōrero tēnei o Ruatapu"), introduction/connection ("Ko Paimātunga . . . ko Hau"), transition ("Ka noho, ā").

8. Ruatapu 1993, above: e.g., titular sentence: 34, 61, 70, 100, 108, 111; introduction: 34 ("He ika . . . ko Hawaiiki"), 65 ("Ko te kāinga . . . ko Tahere-pohue"). Transitions: "ka noho," etc., is used frequently as a transition to the narrative from titular sentences, intro-

ductions, genealogical connections, previous stories, and episodes; Ruatapu 1993, above:19, 22ff., 26–27, 34, 38, 40, 49, 55, 59, 65, 74, 83, 100, 111ff. Conclusions of stories and episodes are naturally frequent, given the aetiological purpose of the complex: Ruatapu 1993, above:43, 47, 52, 56 (a particularly full example, “No reira . . . whaka-tupuranga”), 59–60, 63, 77–78, 82, 84, 91, 93, 102, 114. Terminal: Ruatapu 1993, above:44, 48, 82, 88, 94, 102, 108, 114.

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BOOKS NOTED

RECENT PACIFIC ISLANDS PUBLICATIONS: SELECTED ACQUISITIONS, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1995

THIS LIST of significant new publications relating to the Pacific Islands was selected from new acquisitions lists received from Brigham Young University-Hawai'i, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, University of Auckland, East-West Center, University of the South Pacific, National Library of Australia, and the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau's Centre for Pacific Development Training. Other libraries are invited to send contributions to the Books Noted Editor for future issues. Listings reflect the extent of information provided by each institution.

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